November 2006, Volume 92, Issue 7|
Eliminating Corrective Justice
92 Va. L. Rev. 1311 (2006)
A prominent position in the contemporary debate over the relationship between distributive and corrective justice is that distributive justice is normatively prior to corrective justice. The view eliminates corrective justice as a principle with independent normative force. This Comment in three sections argues that the eliminitivist arguments urged by Kevin Kordana and David Tabachnick against Rawslian conceptions of tort law are unconvincing. Section I argues that nothing intrinsic to Rawlsian methodology bars corrective justice from having independent normative force in tort law. Section II argues that the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice or considerations bearing on the temporal scope of distributive and corrective justice don't compel the same conclusion. Briefly describing different possible positions on the point of corrective justice, Section III concludes that the relation between distributive and corrective justice can't be assessed without determining the conceptual elements of corrective justice.
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