IS OSHA UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

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INTRODUCTION

IMAGINE that Congress creates a federal agency to deal with a large problem, one that involves a significant part of the national economy. Suppose that Congress instructs the agency: Do what you believe is best. Act reasonably and appropriately. Adopt the legal standard that you prefer, all things considered. Suppose, finally, that these instructions lack clear contextual referents, such as previous enactments or judicial understandings, on which the agency might build.

If the nondelegation doctrine exists, as the Supreme Court proclaims, then this hypothesized statute would seem to violate it. After all, the Court has not overruled or even questioned its decision in the Schechter Poultry case, striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act. On the contrary, the Court has continued to insist on the need for an “intelligible principle” by which to limit the exercise of agency discretion. Remarkably, however, the core provision of one of the nation’s most important regulatory statutes—the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”)—is not easy to distinguish from the hypothesized statute.

That provision defines an “occupational safety and health standard” as one that is “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.”

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1 Contextual referents are emphasized in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F.Supp. 737, 748 (D.D.C. 1971) (“[T]he Court has made clear that the standards of a statute are not to be tested in isolation and derive meaningful content from the purpose of the Act, its factual background, and the statutory context.” (internal quotations omitted)).


4 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472; Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 685–86.

When the Secretary of Labor issues regulations governing tractors, ladders, or electrical equipment, the only question to be asked is whether one or another standard is “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” Notably, this language appears in a mere definitional clause, not in a separate substantive provision instructing the Secretary what, exactly, he is supposed to consider in deciding what to do. Nor is the agency required to do whatever is “necessary,” strictly speaking, in order to provide safe employment; its duty is softened, in the sense that it is told to do what is “reasonably necessary.” In fact, the agency is not even required to do that. Apparently it is permitted to reject what is “reasonably necessary” and instead to select what is merely “appropriate.” And how does the agency decide what counts as either “reasonably necessary” or “appropriate”?

Suppose that the agency chooses to proceed in strict accordance with cost-benefit analysis, treating that form of analysis as its rule of decision. Is it permitted to do that, on the ground that what is “reasonably necessary” or “appropriate” is whatever cost-benefit analysis counsels? Or suppose that the agency treats cost-benefit analysis as relevant but not conclusive, on the ground that (say) $800 million in monetized safety benefits to workers justifies an expenditure of $900 million on the part of employers—an expense that could result in increased prices, decreased wages, or decreased employment. Would that approach be lawful? Or suppose that the agency rejects cost-benefit analysis altogether and decides to require employers to eliminate all “significant” risks (however defined) to the extent “feasible” (whatever that means). Is there anything in the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language to foreclose that approach?

It is tempting to respond that the constitutional problem would be solved if the agency adopted subsidiary policies to discipline its own discretion. For example, the agency might conclude that notwithstanding the vagueness of the statutory language, the best way

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5 This strategy is suggested in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 758 (D.D.C. 1971) (“Another feature that blunts the ‘blank check’ rhetoric is the requirement that any action taken by the Executive . . . must be in accordance with further standards as developed by the Executive.”).
to proceed is through a strict cost-benefit test. But in 2001, the Supreme Court squarely rejected the idea that a nondelegation problem can be cured by policy judgments at the agency level. In the process—and this is the major difficulty and my motivation for posing the central question here—the Court eviscerated the rationale of the court of appeals decision that had upheld the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language against constitutional attack. And because of the sheer breadth of the agency’s power, extending to essentially all of America’s workers, the nondelegation objection is especially acute under the Court’s own analysis.

It is true that a narrowing construction from federal courts can rescue a statute from a nondelegation challenge, but the question remains: what would be the content of any such narrowing construction, if it is to qualify as a construction rather than simple policymaking? The broadest difficulty is that with the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language, Congress appears, at least at first glance, to have made no decision at all about the substantive standard under which the Secretary of Labor is supposed to proceed. A reader might be tempted to conclude that Congress has said, “make things better,” without giving the Secretary guidance about how, exactly, he is to go about accomplishing that task.

One of my central aims here is to explore the nondelegation problem in one of the few settings in federal law in which that problem seems real. But the discussion is also meant to shed light on some pressing questions for both regulatory policy and administrative law. Over 5000 Americans die each year in the workplace, and more than 4,000,000 are injured or sickened by the conditions

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1 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472 (“We have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute.”).

2 UAW v. OSHA (UAW II), 37 F.3d 665, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

3 See Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475 (emphasizing importance of breadth of delegation).


5 After American Trucking, 531 U.S. 457, it seems clear that the Court has little interest in reviving the nondelegation doctrine as a general rule. See infra Section I.C.

of their employment. Surely steps could be taken to reduce these deaths, injuries, and illnesses. Under the statutory language, the Secretary is required to make a wide range of choices about what, if anything, to demand of American employers and how, if at all, to protect American workers. The agency should do far better than it does. But what are the legal limits on its authority? Is the agency entitled to do nothing at all? Is it entitled to be aggressive, even draconian? Lurking questions involve consistency and transparency. Suppose that one OSHA regulation protects a large number of lives at relatively low cost, while another regulation protects a small number of lives at a relatively high cost. Suppose too that the agency’s explanations for its decisions are often opaque, so that it is hard to understand why the agency chose one level of regulation rather than another and how the agency sets its own priorities. Can anything be done, before or within the agency or in courts, to ensure against crazy-quilt patterns? Might it be possible to ensure a degree of accountability, rather than a technocratic smokescreen or fog?

As we shall see, there are three possible solutions to these problems. The most aggressive would be to strike down the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language on constitutional grounds. A possible attraction of this approach is that it would inevitably trigger a democratic debate about the proper content of occupational safety and health policy—a debate that would in all likelihood be more sophisticated and constructive than the crude discussion, over thirty years ago, that initially produced OSHA. On the other hand, courts have been reluctant to invoke the nondelegation doctrine to strike down federal legislation, and for exceedingly good

15 A dated but still relevant study is Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Workers At Risk: The Failed Promise of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (1993).
16 This does in fact seem to be the pattern. See Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 26–27 (6th ed. 2006).
reasons. A decision to invalidate OSHA would send shock waves through the federal regulatory state, and courts should hesitate before doing that.

The least aggressive approach, rooted in the Avoidance Canon, would be to respond to the apparent vagueness of the statutory language by making a serious effort to use that language to create floors and ceilings on agency action. Such an effort might plausibly yield three principles. First, the statute requires the agency to regulate serious or significant risks; second, it forbids the agency from regulating small or trivial risks; and third, it requires the agency to respect the constraints of feasibility. As we shall see, judicial insistence on these three requirements would not answer all of the concerns of those attracted to the nondelegation objection, but they would go a long way in that direction, while significantly improving the operation of the statutory scheme.

A third approach, and in the end the most attractive, would be to construe the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language to mandate some form of cost-benefit balancing. On a plausible view, a regulation is not “reasonably necessary” if the benefits do not justify the costs, and the word “appropriate” plainly suggests balancing. One version of this approach would require the agency to use cost-benefit analysis as the rule of decision, so that regulations could go forward only if the monetized benefits exceed the monetized costs. But in the context of workplace safety, where distributional concerns are obviously relevant, a strict monetary test would run into serious problems. A softened and preferable version would require the Secretary to calculate both costs and benefits and to find a “reasonable relationship” between the two. An approach of this general kind is probably the best response to the nondelegation challenge, and it would also have the important vir-

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18 The most valuable discussion is Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1721–24 (2002) (challenging the nondelegation doctrine on originalist and welfarist grounds); see also Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 323, 325–28 (1987) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine is not administrable by federal judges). My goal here is not to evaluate the legitimacy or value of the nondelegation doctrine. Instead, I take the doctrine as a given for purposes of discussion.

true of promoting both transparency and coherence in occupational safety policy.

It is true that any cost-benefit reading would raise serious questions about the application of these principles to the distinctive context of occupational safety. The most important of these questions involves distributional issues: how should the agency proceed if the costs exceed the benefits but workers are nonetheless significant winners on balance? I will offer some brief suggestions about how such questions might be answered. The basic conclusion is that the agency should not be permitted to proceed if the costs dwarf the benefits, but that as a matter of law, substantial gains to workers should be sufficient to justify regulation even if the monetary value of those gains is below the aggregate costs.

I. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH, AND DELEGATION

To understand the constitutional issue, it is necessary to explore a complex line of cases. Notably, no one has challenged OSHA regulations on constitutional grounds since 1994. But rulings since that time place the constitutional problem in sharp relief. The central problem is that the Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements, apparently designed to restrict the use of the nondelegation doctrine, eliminate the existing line of defense for the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language.

A. Benzene

The constitutional debate over OSHA began quite unexpectedly in 1980, when the Supreme Court in *American Petroleum* resolved a challenge to the Secretary of Labor’s effort to limit benzene exposure. In that case, no constitutional objection was explicitly raised by the parties. Instead the Court was asked to answer what turned out to be a surprisingly difficult question of statutory construction: when the Secretary is regulating carcinogens under OSHA, what is the legal standard? To answer that question, the

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20 See *UAW v. OSHA (UAW II)*, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
23 Id. at 611.
Court had to deal with two independent provisions. The first included the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. The second was the provision more specifically governing toxic substances and harmful physical agents, which reads:

The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his working life. 24

One of the Court’s key tasks was to reconcile the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language, which applies to all occupational safety and health standards, with the “no employee will suffer” language, which is limited to standards involving “toxic materials or harmful physical agents.” The Court had three principal options. First, it could have said that the two provisions, taken together, call for some form of cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps a standard is not “reasonably necessary or appropriate” unless the benefits exceed the costs; perhaps a standard is not “feasible” if the costs are high and the benefits are low. Second, the Court could have said, as the government vigorously urged, 25 that the Secretary of Labor is forbidden from regulating on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. Instead, she must regulate to the point of (economic and technological) feasibility whenever at least one “employee will suffer material impairment” as a result of exposure. Third, the Court could have said that the Secretary could regulate a risk only if it rose to a certain level of significance, in the sense that a statistically small risk (1 in 1 million? 1 in 100 million? 1 in 500 million?) would not justify regulatory controls.

Each of these positions attracted support within the Court. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell favored a form of cost-benefit balancing. He would require the agency “to determine that the economic effects of its standard” bore “a reasonable relationship to the expected benefits.” 26 In his view, a standard is neither “rea-

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25 Am. Petrol., 448 U.S. at 639, 641.
26 Id. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring).
sonably necessary” nor “feasible” if the expenditures are “wholly disproportionate to the expected health and safety benefits.” This conclusion makes some intuitive sense, but as a matter of interpretation, it runs into evident problems. The toxic materials provision governs benzene, and that provision requires the Secretary to set the standard that “most adequately assures . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health.” Suppose that a regulation would cost $900 million but would save five workers from “material impairment of health.” On standard assumptions about the monetary valuation of human life, such a regulation would impose costs that are disproportionate to benefits. But under the statutory language, the agency must nonetheless ensure “that no employee will suffer,” and hence it would be required to proceed even if the monetized costs greatly exceed the monetized benefits.

To be sure, the word “feasible” operates as a firm limit on what the Secretary might do. No regulation may be issued if it is not “feasible.” But in light of the structure of the sentence, “feasible” means practicable in the sense of capable of being done; it does not entail cost-benefit balancing. If “feasible” referred to cost-benefit balancing, it would be inconsistent with the “no employee will suffer” language, because a cost-benefit test would allow a number of employees to “suffer.” And so the Court ruled in a subsequent decision, drawing on the ordinary meaning and structure of the statute to suggest that feasible means “practicable.”

I shall turn shortly to some evident puzzles here, involving the meaning of feasibility.

In a dissenting opinion commanding four votes in American Petroleum, Justice Marshall adopted the second position, urged by the government in defense of the benzene regulation. He con-

27 Id.
28 The value of a statistical life is now considered to be in the general vicinity of $6 million, though that figure is highly controversial. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle 132 (2006).
29 Am. Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508–09 (1981). To be sure, this idea raises questions of its own. What, exactly, does it mean for a standard to be “practicable?” Suppose that some percentage of affected businesses would fail if the regulation were imposed. What percentage would be high enough to make the regulation no longer feasible?
30 See infra Subsection II.B.2.
tended that the toxic materials provision, with its “no employee will suffer” language, imposed no requirement that the agency show a risk to be significant, in the sense of exceeding a certain statistical threshold. In his view, the specific provision governing toxic substances must prevail over the more general “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language.\textsuperscript{32} Carefully parsing the text and legislative history, Justice Marshall insisted that the agency was not required to quantify the risk to establish that it rose to a level of significance.\textsuperscript{33}

The Court’s plurality disagreed. Its key argument was that a standard would not count as “reasonably necessary and appropriate” unless it would serve to eliminate a “significant risk” of harm.\textsuperscript{34} The plurality struggled to defend its interpretation by reference to the statutory text and history,\textsuperscript{35} and it conspicuously failed to come to terms with the “no employee will suffer” requirement, which seemed to suggest that a statistically small risk (say, one in two million) would trigger regulatory controls if the risk would produce death or serious injury in a few employees. Lacking a clear anchor in the standard legal materials,\textsuperscript{36} the plurality pointed instead to what it saw as the unfortunate implication of Justice Marshall’s reading, which would “give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit.”\textsuperscript{37} Here the Court seemed to suggest a background principle for use in construing risk-reduction statutes: \textit{In the face of doubt, such statutes should not be interpreted to authorize the government to impose substantial burdens for trivial gains.}\textsuperscript{38}

To this, the plurality added an explicit nondelegation concern: if the statute did not require the risk to “be quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an understandable way,” it might be unconstitutional. In the plurality’s view, courts should favor a “construction . . . that avoids this kind

\textsuperscript{32} Id. at 709.
\textsuperscript{33} Id. at 713–15.
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Am. Petrol.}, 448 U.S. at 639.
\textsuperscript{35} Id. at 639–52.
\textsuperscript{37} \textit{Am. Petrol.}, 448 U.S. at 645.
of open-ended grant.”\textsuperscript{39} Citing \textit{Schechter Poultry}, the Court thus suggested a nondelegation canon to the effect that courts should favor a construction that grants an agency bounded rather than unbounded authority.\textsuperscript{40} The basic idea is a variation on, or a specification of, the more general Avoidance Canon, which asks courts to avoid serious constitutional issues unless Congress has explicitly raised them.\textsuperscript{41} If Congress intends to grant an agency open-ended authority, to an extent that raises serious nondelegation concerns, it must make its will plain.\textsuperscript{42}

For my current purpose—exploring the constitutional vulnerability of OSHA—the key opinion came from then-Justice Rehnquist.\textsuperscript{43} He contended that the governing provisions amounted to “a legislative mirage, appearing to some Members but not to others, and assuming any form desired by the beholder.”\textsuperscript{44} In his view, the words “to the extent feasible” rendered the toxic substances provision “largely, if not entirely, precatory.”\textsuperscript{45}

Justice Rehnquist did not argue that a nondelegation problem would arise if Justice Powell were correct; a requirement of cost-benefit balancing hardly offends the Constitution.\textsuperscript{46} Nor did Justice Rehnquist argue that if Congress meant to enact the interpretation favored by the plurality, the statute would create any constitutional problem. If Congress instructed an agency to regulate all “significant risks” to the point of “feasibility,” the agency would retain considerable discretion but not to an extent that would violate the nondelegation doctrine.\textsuperscript{47} And while the plurality suggested that the government’s interpretation would be constitutionally trouble-

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Am. Petrol.}, 448 U.S. at 646.
\textsuperscript{40} See Manning, supra note 36, at 223.
\textsuperscript{42} Id at 129–30.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Am. Petrol.}, 448 U.S. at 671.
\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 681.
\textsuperscript{45} Id. at 681–82.
\textsuperscript{46} Cost-benefit analysis does, of course, require agencies to make a number of supplemental judgments to render balancing operational. See W. Kip Viscusi, \textit{Fatal Tradeoffs: Public and Private Responsibilities for Risk} 17–32 (1992) (discussing methods for valuing life). For a critique, see Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, \textit{Priceless} 10–11 (2006) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is based on incoherent methodology and amounts to a broad grant of discretion to those who must give it content).
some, Justice Rehnquist did not make that claim. That claim is hard to take seriously in light of the Court’s past willingness to uphold broad grants of discretion to regulatory agencies. Surely Congress holds the constitutional power to require aggressive and cost-blind regulation of workplace risks, whether or not the underlying risks can be shown to be significant. For nondelegation purposes, there is all the difference in the world between a draconian statute, which tells an agency to impose stringent regulation, and an open-ended statute, which asks an agency to select its own standard. Justice Rehnquist essentially urged that so long as the nondelegation doctrine exists, Congress must make some choice among the three principal interpretive possibilities. If it has failed to do so—if all courts have is a “mirage”—then any intelligible principle must be supplied by the agency itself, in violation of the Constitution.

Eight members of the Court disagreed with Justice Rehnquist, not on the ground that the italicized claim is wrong, but on the ground that Congress did, in fact, make the relevant choice. For present purposes, the larger point is that the division within the Court raises an obvious question. Suppose the toxic substances provision is not involved and that the agency is guided only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. How, if at all, would the agency be constrained? The question is far from fanciful, because much of the agency’s work does not involve toxic substances. Hence the more specific provision, with its “no employee will suffer” and “to the extent feasible” language, does not seem to be applicable at all.

B. Safety Standards, Health Standards, and the New Nondelegation Doctrine

1. The Challenge

The issue of legal constraints on agency discretion under OSHA reached the court of appeals in 1991. The case involved the agency’s regulation of industrial equipment that might move suddenly and hence produce injuries. The regulation required two procedures: “lockout” and “tagout.” With “lockout,” certain equipment must be locked so as to ensure that no movement can

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48 UAW v. OSHA (UAW I), 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
occur. With “tagout,” a plastic warning must be placed on equipment, informing workers that the equipment should not be operated unless the tag is removed. In issuing the regulation, the agency said that the toxic substances provision was inapplicable and that it was governed only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. In the agency’s view, the statute drew a sharp distinction between “safety standards” and “health standards,” and the more stringent “no employee shall suffer” provision was applicable only to the latter.

Challenging the agency’s position, the United Auto Workers argued that the toxic substances provision did apply and hence that the agency must apply the “significant risk/feasibility” framework established in *American Petroleum*. Noting that the toxic substances provision included a reference to “harmful physical agents,” the United Auto Workers contended that this provision literally applies to dangerous equipment. The court responded that this argument was a form of sophistry. In its view, Congress seemed to have drawn a distinction between health risks and safety risks. To support this point, the court noted that the phrase “harmful physical agents” appeared in a separate provision that seemed to involve health (“toxic substances or other harmful agents”) rather than safety; it concluded that, at the very least, the agency could reasonably conclude that the toxic substances provision applied only to health standards.

The court’s conclusion meant that, in issuing safety standards, the Secretary was governed only by the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” provision. With the background provided by Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in *American Petroleum*, the National Association of Manufacturers challenged that provision as an unconstitutional delegation. In responding to that challenge, the agency outlined its understanding of its statutory authority. It agreed that it would have to establish a “significant risk.” It added that it could not regulate beyond the point that was “both technologically and economically feasible.” But it did not treat feasibility as a floor; it

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49 Id. at 1313.
50 Id.
51 Id at 1314.
52 Id. at 1314–15.
53 Id. at 1317.
could, if it chose, regulate far less aggressively. In the court’s words, “[t]he upshot is an asserted power, once significant risk is found, to require precautions that take the industry to the verge of economic ruin . . . or to do nothing at all.”

The court acknowledged that, because agency standards must be applied across broad categories, the agency could not punish particular companies that it did not like. Hence a central nondelegation concern, involving favoritism, was reduced. Nonetheless, some potentially “dangerous favoritism” remained, since stringent standards might come down especially hard on small firms and favor large ones. Thus the agency’s understanding “would give the executive branch untrammeled power to dictate the vitality and even survival of whatever segments of American business it might choose.”

The court emphasized that the agency’s discretion covered all of American enterprise, not a single industry, and that the delegation did not involve a power particularly conferred on the president, such as the power over foreign policy.

How might the nondelegation problem be cured? Emphasizing the importance of predictability and the rule of law, the court’s evident preference was for a narrowing construction by the agency, perhaps involving a form of cost-benefit analysis. Evidently, the court believed that a key purpose of the nondelegation doctrine is to control agency discretion, and that if the agency committed itself to cost-benefit analysis, the constitutional problem would be solved. In other words, the agency might supply the requisite “intelligible principle” on its own and in that way overcome the nondelegation challenge. Indeed, the court insisted that cost-benefit analysis would be compatible with statutory text and history. The word “reasonably” suggests balancing, which is associated with the “reasonable man” standard in tort law. Unfortunately, the court did not acknowledge that the word “reasonably” modifies “necessary,” and hence the statute failed to impose a freestanding obliga-

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54 Id.
55 Id. at 1318.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 1319 (“Cost-benefit analysis is certainly consistent with the language of § 3(8).”).
60 Id.
tion to be “reasonable,” apparently posing a problem for the cost-benefit interpretation. But the statutory phrase is “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” and surely the word “appropriate” could (reasonably) be understood to entail cost-benefit balancing. Thus the court refused to strike down the statute, emphasizing that it could be interpreted to allow such balancing and could therefore be construed to be constitutional.61

2. The Agency’s Response

On remand, the agency declined the court’s invitation to construe the statute to require cost-benefit balancing.62 It did, however, attempt to bind itself through an assortment of intelligible principles. Thus the agency listed six principles that would limit its discretion:63

- The risk must be significant.
- Compliance must be economically feasible.
- Compliance must be technologically feasible.
- The standard must use the most cost-effective measures.
- The agency must explain its adoption of a standard departing from any national consensus standard.
- The agency must explain its standard by reference to record evidence and also explain any inconsistency with prior agency practice.

The court of appeals thought that by themselves, these principles were not sufficient to rescue OSHA’s “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language, because they gave the agency too much room to “roam” between different levels of stringency.64 But the agency added a final criterion. Looking at various other sections, the agency said that it must “provide a high degree of employee protection,” moving close to the point of feasibility.65 Because the agency could “deviate only modestly from the stringency” required by the health standards, the court said that the agency’s approach imposed sufficient discipline to rescue the statute from nondelega-

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61 Id. at 1321.
62 UAW v. OSHA (UAW II), 37 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
63 Id. at 668.
64 Id. at 669.
65 Id. (quotation omitted).
The central idea seemed to be that once a significant risk was shown, the agency would regulate at least close to the point of feasibility. The agency was therefore bound by a set of constraints that amounted, as a whole, to the equivalent of the requisite intelligible principle; the nondelegation problem was therefore cured.

The court’s rationale here raises some immediate questions: What does “feasibility” mean? When, exactly, does regulation become so stringent that it is no longer “feasible” to comply with it? If a regulation is expensive, it is likely to endanger at least one or a few firms. Is such a regulation not “feasible” for that reason? Or, are massive business failures required? If the agency says the latter, then it faces an evident problem: under that approach, any particular regulation might move industry to the brink of massive business failures, and that step might make other regulations impossible to absorb even if they are relatively inexpensive. In practice, the agency cannot possibly choose numerous regulations, each of which puts whole industries on the brink of failure. A great deal of additional work would be helpful to understand actual agency practice in light of the feasibility condition and to determine what the appropriate legal constraints on that practice should be. For present purposes, the key point is that because of the agency’s emphasis on the need for stringency, the court of appeals found that the nondelegation objection was answered.

C. The Dead Nondelegation Doctrine

The court of appeals holdings just discussed suggest a simple principle: If a statute is an unconstitutional delegation as written, it can nonetheless be saved as a result of subsidiary policymaking by the agency in the form of a narrowing construction, even if that construction is merely optional in light of the standard sources of statutory interpretation. This principle amounts to a new nondelegation doctrine. But in 2001, the Supreme Court unambiguously rejected that doctrine in American Trucking.\(^67\)

The case tested the meaning and validity of a key provision of the Clean Air Act, one that appears similar to the “reasonably

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\(^66\) Id.

necessary or appropriate” phrase. That provision asks the EPA to issue national ambient air quality standard to the point “requisite to protect the public health.”\footnote{42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).} Building on its OSHA decisions, the court of appeals held that the statutory phrase was an unconstitutional delegation because it lacked an intelligible principle.\footnote{Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999).} What counts as “requisite”? The court thought that Congress had not answered that question. “Here it is as though Congress commanded EPA to select ‘big guys,’ and EPA announced that it would evaluate candidates based on height and weight, but revealed no cut-off point.”\footnote{Id.}

At the same time, the court said that the EPA could issue a narrowing construction that would save the statute from constitutional attack. In the key sentence, the court said that “an agency wielding the power over American life possessed by EPA should be capable of developing the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that takes into account population affected, severity and probability.”\footnote{Id. at 1039.} Unlike in the OSHA cases, the court ruled that the statutory term explicitly banned the agency from basing its decisions on cost-benefit analysis.\footnote{Id. at 1038 (“Cost-benefit analysis . . . is not available . . . .”).} But the agency would be permitted, and indeed required, to act in accordance with some kind of quantitative benefits analysis, requiring regulation when the benefits reached a certain magnitude and forbidding regulation when the benefits did not reach that magnitude.\footnote{Id. at 1039–40.}

The Supreme Court rejected this approach.\footnote{Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).} First, it held that a narrowing construction by the agency was neither here nor there.\footnote{Id. at 473. (“Whether the statute delegates legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no bearing upon the answer.”).} The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in Article 1, Section 1, and in the Court’s view, its purpose is therefore to require that laws are made by the national legislature.\footnote{On some serious complexities here, see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1729–32.} It follows that agency self-binding is irrelevant. The intelligible principle must come from
Congress itself. If Congress has given an agency a blank check, it
does not matter if that agency chooses to narrow its discretion, cer-
tainly if the narrowing is based on the agency’s own policy judg-
ments.

Second, the Court held that the statute, as written, was not an
unconstitutional delegation.\textsuperscript{77} National ambient air quality stan-
dards must be set at the level that is “requisite to protect the public
health.” This requirement means that such standards must be “suf-
icient, but not more than necessary.”\textsuperscript{78} In the Court’s view, that
constraint is sufficient to overcome the nondelegation problem.
The Court did emphasize that the nondelegation issue would be
analyzed by reference to the scope of the agency’s power, which
was certainly broad in this case, covering as it did a wide assort-
ment of industries; but the EPA’s discretion was far from un-
cabined by the statutory language.\textsuperscript{79}

At first glance, the Court’s analysis on this last point seems
hopelessly unsatisfying: how is the word “necessary” a useful limi-
tation on agency discretion? The objection of the lower court ap-
ppears unanswered: does this provision not grant the agency the dis-
cretion to proceed as stringently as it wishes, without imposing any
kind of floor and ceiling? But perhaps the Court’s conclusion is not
as unhelpful as it seems. A national ambient air quality standard
could be characterized as more aggressive than “necessary,” and
therefore as unlawful, if it delivered benefits that are trivial or ex-
ceedingly small, or if it regulated risks that do not concern ordinary
people in ordinary life. As Justice Breyer wrote, the statute “does
not require the EPA to eliminate every health risk, however slight,
at any economic cost, however great.”\textsuperscript{80} In his view, the statute does
not authorize the agency to eliminate all risk—“an impossible and
undesirable objective.”\textsuperscript{81} What counts as requisite to protect the
public health will “vary with background circumstances, such as the
public’s ordinary tolerance of the particular health risk in the par-
ticular context at issue.”\textsuperscript{82} Thus the agency should consider “the se-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} \textit{Am. Trucking}, 531 U.S. at 476.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Id. at 473 (quotation omitted).
\item \textsuperscript{79} Id. at 475–76.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., concurring).
\item \textsuperscript{81} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Id.
\end{itemize}
verity of a pollutant’s potential adverse health effects, the number of those likely to be affected, the distribution of the adverse effects, and the uncertainties surrounding each estimate.83

It follows from these remarks that some imaginable restrictions would violate the statute because they would go beyond the point that is “requisite.” Equally important, it also follows that a national standard could be characterized as less aggressive than “necessary” if it left unaddressed a residual risk that was, in fact, significant.84 Suppose that in light of the pollutant’s adverse effects and the number of people at risk, the EPA’s standard was inexplicably lenient. We should conclude that such leniency would be unlawful because it would fall short of the level “requisite to protect the public health.”85

It is possible to go further. If Justice Breyer’s analysis is put together with the Court’s, then the EPA’s task may not be radically different from what was sought by the court of appeals. That is, the agency may have to devise “the rough equivalent of a generic unit of harm that takes into account population affected, severity and probability.”86 Without some kind of generic unit of harm, it might not be possible for the agency to give an adequate explanation of why any particular regulation is more stringent or less stringent than necessary.87 And to this extent, the simple words “requisite to protect the public health” do establish both floors and ceilings on agency action.

To reach this conclusion, courts might rely on the text, simple and brief though it is, and need not engage in any especially aggressive form of statutory construction (as the Supreme Court did in American Petroleum). The statutory terms in the relevant provi-

83 Id. at 495.
84 It is relevant here that, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held that an agency’s failure to respond to a petition to make rules is subject to judicial review. 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459 (2007). Thus if an agency refuses to make a rule in the face of a petition asking for one, courts might view the agency’s refusal as unlawful. The Clean Air Act sets out conditions under which the EPA must regulate. For discussion, see Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
85 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 496 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Am. Lung Ass’n, 134 F.3d at 392 (requiring EPA to explain failure to issue short-term standard for asthmatics in light of evidence that a new standard would eliminate significant harm).
86 Am. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
87 But see Am. Trucking Ass’n v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 362 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying deferential review to ozone and particulates standards).
sion of the Clean Air Act are plausibly taken to invite floors and ceilings and do so while forbidding the agency from engaging in cost-benefit balancing. We shall shortly see how this analysis applies to OSHA.  

II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

A. OSHA’s Unnoticed Vulnerability

My principal topic is the meaning and validity of the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” clause in OSHA. It will be useful, however, to begin with a brief overview of the agency’s practice.

I. Agency Practice: A Glance

Since 1994, OSHA safety regulations have not been challenged on nondelegation grounds, but the agency has nonetheless issued a number of such regulations. In explaining those regulations, the agency has typically offered an account of the “pertinent legal authority,” which refers to the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language. In what has become a kind of boilerplate, cutting across Republican and Democratic administrations, the agency has explained that a regulation satisfies that standard

if it substantially reduces or eliminates significant risk, and is economically feasible, technologically feasible, cost effective, consistent with prior Agency action or supported by a reasoned justification for departing from prior Agency actions, supported by substantial evidence, and is better able to effectuate the Act’s purposes than any national consensus standard it supersedes.

A standard counts as economically feasible “if industry can absorb or pass on the cost of compliance without threatening its long term profitability or competitive structure.” A standard counts as cost-effective “if the protective measures it requires are the least costly of the available alternatives that achieve the same level of

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88 See infra Subsection II.B.2.
89 See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,746, 56,748 (Nov. 4, 1996).
90 See, e.g., id.
91 Id.
protection.” 92 In addition, safety standards “must be highly protective.” 93 The words “highly protective” are not themselves defined, but they are a clear bow in the direction of the holding in the UAW II case.

What does all this mean? Some of it means nothing at all, or at least nothing that bears on the question at hand. Under existing administrative law doctrine, all agency decisions must be either consistent with past action or a “justified” departure. 94 That requirement does not come from OSHA, and it is irrelevant to a nondelegation challenge. It is true that under OSHA, any regulation must be supported by substantial evidence, 95 but the requirement of record evidence is hardly sufficient to respond to a nondelegation objection, which points to an absence of statutory standards. Nor is any help provided by the idea that any regulation must be “better able to effectuate the Act’s purposes” than the standard that it supersedes. This idea merely replicates the idea that a departure must be “justified,” and by itself, a reference to “the Act’s purposes” tells us exactly nothing about what those purposes are.

It follows that the agency’s understanding can be reduced to three ideas: (1) the risk must be significant; (2) the regulation must be feasible; and (3) within the continuum bounded at one end by very lenient and at the other by the constraint of feasibility, the agency will choose a regulation that is “highly protective.” 96 As I have noted, the word “feasible” is itself ambiguous. 97 No on/off switch separates the “feasible” from the “infeasible.” Inevitably, the agency is exercising some discretion in deciding exactly how aggressive to be.

It is true that in assessing significant risk, the regulations often refer to the passage in American Petroleum that estimated a significant mortality risk as somewhere above one-in-a-billion, with a suggestion that one-in-a-thousand could surely qualify as signifi-

92 Id.
93 Id.
96 Occupational Exposure to 1,3-Butadiene, 61 Fed. Reg. at 56,748.
97 See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text.
For most of its standards, OSHA calculates the significance of a risk in exactly these terms: it determines the rate of death per 1000 workers, assuming a 45-year work life. If the risk of death is at or above 1 per 1000, it qualifies as significant. As early as 1987, the agency said that a risk of over 1.64 per 1000 counts as significant and that a risk of 0.6 per 100,000 “may be approaching a level that can be viewed as safe.”

But many regulations—and the safety standards in particular—express significant risk in terms of the magnitudes of annual deaths and injuries, rather than in terms of deaths per 1000 workers. With a bit of arithmetic these can be recast in terms of deaths per 1000 workers, and informal calculations reveal that whenever we know the magnitude of the annual death and injury rate, the risk is greater than one death per 1000 workers. The two exceptions are the standard for confined spaces, where the risk is indeterminate because the size of the workforce is not given, and the standards for scaffolding, where the risk of death is slightly below 1 per 1000.

As a general practice, the agency’s safety regulations do offer separate statements of both costs and benefits, but the agency does not formally compare the monetized benefits to the monetized costs.
costs to calculate “net” benefits. Costs are stated in dollars and benefits are usually expressed in terms of deaths and injuries prevented. That is, both benefits and costs are quantified, but usually only costs are monetized. Nonetheless, assuming $6.8 million as the value of a life (OSHA’s preferred figure during this range\textsuperscript{106}), every regulation, with one exception,\textsuperscript{107} that claims to prevent deaths is justified by cost-benefit analysis even without taking injuries into account.

It is unclear why the agency only rarely explicitly monetizes prevented deaths or injuries, but there is some evidence that the agency does monetize when the ultimate question is close. For example, the agency monetized the 1.3 annual deaths intended to be prevented by its electrical installation standard, and then converted that amount to 2005 dollars, yielding $9.4 million in monetized benefits. The regulation cost $9.6 million.\textsuperscript{108} A proposed standard governing confined spaces stated monetized benefits of $85 million; the regulation cost $77 million.\textsuperscript{109} Another case of conspicuous monetization is the ergonomics standard,\textsuperscript{110} overturned by Congress.\textsuperscript{111} This standard was unique in that it would have prevented only injuries and not deaths. The agency calculated the value of the prevented injuries to be $9.1 billion, with costs of $4.5 billion.\textsuperscript{112} According to these numbers, the ergonomics standard was not a close call, but the controversy surrounding the proposed regulation might well have spurred explicit monetization.

\textsuperscript{106} See, e.g. Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. 10,100, 10,305 (Feb. 28, 2006).
\textsuperscript{107} The exception is Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium. Id. at 10,308. The cost-benefit analysis in this regulation is extensive, perhaps because it is unclear whether the regulation is justified on cost-benefit grounds. However, since this is a health regulation, the agency was required to reduce the risk to the limits of feasibility.
\textsuperscript{109} Confined Spaces in Construction, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,352, 67,392–93 (Nov. 28, 2007). Consider also Occupational Exposure to Hexavalent Chromium, 71 Fed. Reg. at 10,308–10, in which the monetized benefits were arguably exceeded by the costs.
\textsuperscript{111} S.J. Res. 6, 107th Cong. (2001).
\textsuperscript{112} Ergonomics Program, 65 Fed. Reg. at 68,262.
2. The Surprising Effect of American Trucking

The *American Trucking* decision did not exactly invite greater use of the nondelegation doctrine. On the contrary, the Court’s insouciant approach to the “requisite to protect the public health” language of the Clean Air Act suggested a noticeable absence of enthusiasm for the doctrine. Ironically, however, the Court’s rejection of the new nondelegation doctrine eliminated the route by which the court of appeals had upheld the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language in OSHA against constitutional attack. After *American Trucking*, it is plain that a narrowing construction by the agency will not save an otherwise unacceptable delegation. If OSHA is to be rescued from constitutional objection, it must be because of what the statute says, not because of agency policymaking in the absence of legislative guidance. Recall here the emphasis in *American Trucking* on the scope of the agency’s power: because OSHA covers essentially all American workers, the existence of untrammeled discretion would be a serious problem.

We are now in a position to see the central difficulty. After *American Trucking*, everything turns on whether the phrase “reasonably necessary or appropriate” sets out an intelligible principle. To be sure, the statutory provision would be valid if it could be treated as analogous to the national ambient air quality provisions of the Clean Air Act. As we have seen, the Court upheld the phrase “requisite to protect the public health” on the ground that it forbids cost-benefit balancing and calls for a cost-blind inquiry into how much regulation is “necessary.” In the Court’s view, that inquiry is not unguided. But there are real difficulties in understanding OSHA to mean the same thing as the Clean Air Act. As construed by the court of appeals, the words “reasonably necessary or appropriate” are plausibly, but not necessarily, taken to authorize cost-benefit balancing and thus seem to leave discretion to the Secretary to decide whether the statute requires such analysis or not. In other words, Congress has not set out an intelligible principle supporting or rejecting cost-benefit analysis. Whether standards must be based on that form of analysis is for the agency to decide.

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113 Indeed, the Court in *American Trucking* did compare the Clean Air Act to OSHA; however, the comparison did not focus on the “reasonably or appropriate” language. *Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns*, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
Perhaps this is a fatal defect. Insofar as the words “reasonably necessary or appropriate” are involved, Justice Rehnquist’s original objection seems at least plausible: the agency has been authorized to choose whatever principle it likes.

To be sure, the very idea of an “intelligible principle” poses its own difficulties. What, exactly, does that idea mean? The best answer points to the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine, which is to ensure that Congress, as the national lawmaker, does not grant blank checks to the executive branch or anyone else.114 If Congress has set out an intelligible principle, agency discretion is sufficiently bounded. On this view, it might well be unacceptable for Congress to tell an agency to do as it chooses or whatever “the public interest requires,” unless the notion of the public interest, in context, offers sufficient discipline.115 In this light, it should be clear that the difference between a principle that is “intelligible” and one that is not is inevitably a matter of degree. The question becomes how much discretion is too much discretion—a question that is not easily administered by federal courts. The difficulty of judicial administration is a standard objection to aggressive judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine, even assuming that it has firm constitutional roots.116 But as the doctrine now stands, it is necessary to ask how, if at all, OSHA limits the agency’s room to “roam.”

How might courts respond to this problem? There are three possibilities.

**B. Solutions and Proposals**

1. **Invalidation**

The most aggressive approach would be to invalidate the provision on constitutional grounds. To be sure, invalidation would represent the first invocation of the nondelegation doctrine to strike down a federal statute in over seventy years—and only the third in 114 On the complexities here, see Posner and Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1725–43.


the nation’s history.\footnote{The other two are \textit{A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States}, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) and \textit{Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan}, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). In this respect, the nondelegation doctrine has had only one good year.} In addition, it would send shock waves through the administrative state. But unlikely as it would seem, disruptive though it would be, and radical as it would appear, this approach is not entirely without appeal.

In \textit{American Trucking}, the Court emphasized that the statutory phrase “requisite to protect the public health” does not seem more open-ended than several other statutory phrases that the Court has upheld against nondelegation attack. As we have seen, the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” clause is plausibly different, because that phrase seems to allow (but not to require) the agency to use some form of cost-benefit analysis as a rule of decision. It would therefore be easy to distinguish \textit{American Trucking}: while Congress set out an intelligible principle to govern national ambient air quality standards, it failed to do so in the context of occupational safety standards. The basic idea would be that in the relevant provision of the Clean Air Act, Congress instructed the agency to engage in a cost-blind analysis of how much protection is “requisite,” whereas in OSHA, Congress left the agency at sea.

At the same time, invalidation would force, for the first time, a sustained legislative encounter with the exceedingly difficult policy questions raised by occupational safety and health regulation. When the statute was originally enacted in 1970, Congress did not seriously grapple with those problems. Instead, it was largely content simply to recognize the existence of a problem and the need for a regulatory solution.\footnote{See Currie, supra note 17, at 1160; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 360–61.} Since that time, however, public officials have been in a position to learn an immense amount about regulatory policy. Much of this learning might be brought to bear on a new enactment.\footnote{For various perspectives, see Viscusi, supra note 46, at vii–xi; W. Kip Viscusi, \textit{Rational Risk Policy} 1–4 (1998); Currie, supra note 17, at 1160; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 354–60; Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, \textit{Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform}, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 62–63 (1989).} Of course, there is disagreement about how
best to incorporate what has been learned, but that is precisely the question for democratic engagement.

This is not the place for a sustained discussion of regulatory reform in the domain of occupational safety, but a few points might be helpful. It is now clear, for example, that information disclosure is sometimes the best response to serious risks. It is plausible to think that the first line of defense, in the domain of worker safety, should be a requirement that employers inform employees about the hazards that they face. In principle, disclosure should create an incentive to increase safety and at the same time increase the likelihood that workers will receive a wage premium for the relevant risks. Congress might well instruct OSHA to ensure that when the workplace exposes workers to risks above a certain threshold, they must be warned.

At the same time, we know a great deal about the limits of disclosure strategies, stemming in part from bounded rationality on the part of those who must assess risks. There is reason to believe that many workers are “risk optimists,” reducing cognitive dissonance by concluding that for them, the workplace is safer than it actually is. To the extent that this is so, information disclosure may not work. At the very least, it is necessary to ensure that workers adequately process the information that they receive, in part so that they do not falsely conclude that they are relatively immune from statistical risks. Congress might require the agency to supplement disclosure requirements in two different ways. First,
it might impose clear bans on risks that reasonable employees would not be willing to run. Second, it might ban employers from exposing employees to certain risks when the monetized benefits of the ban outweigh the monetized costs, in a variation on the approach of the Safe Drinking Water Act.

Very plausibly, however, a strict cost-benefit test is not appropriate in this context. Distributional considerations matter. For example, it is imaginable that an $800 million cost would be justified for a benefit of $700 million in increased safety—if the cost was borne mostly by consumers and if the expenditure saved 100 lives a year. Even if the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits under standard assumptions about valuation, it is reasonable to think that the agency should proceed. Perhaps the welfare effects of the regulation are desirable, on balance, whatever the monetized analysis suggests. Perhaps the welfare gains to workers, in terms of safety, exceed the overall welfare losses to employers, customers, and workers who might find themselves with reduced wages or without jobs. Monetary measures are based on willingness to pay, and it is possible that the welfare gain is greater than the welfare loss even if the monetized costs are greater than the monetized benefits. Even if this point does not hold, perhaps the regulation would be justified on redistributive grounds. If workers gain a great deal in terms of safety, perhaps the agency should proceed even if others (employers, consumers) lose more than workers gain.

Of course, it is conventional to think that the best way to handle distributive considerations is through the tax system. Many people believe that the intended beneficiaries would be better off with a cash payment than with a regulatory requirement. It is possible that mandatory safety regulations will result in reduced wages and decreased employment, and if so, it is not clear that workers as a whole will benefit from such regulations. Perhaps the losses in terms of wages and employment opportunities exceed the gains in

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128 See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 359.
131 On some of the complexities here, see id. at 436–39.
132 For a relevant discussion about the relationship between employment regulations and wage levels, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223, 225–30 (2000).
terms of safety. To know, we need to learn something about the incidence of the various costs. If redistribution is the goal, the tax system is the preferred means. But at least it can be said that an occupational safety regulation might have desirable redistributive consequences, especially if workers lack information. If it does, the agency might legitimately take those consequences into account.

Under a view that has roots in Justice Powell’s opinion in *American Petroleum*, the agency should be required to show a “reasonable relationship” between benefits and costs; distribu
tional considerations and concerns about equity might overcome what would follow from a strictly monetary test.133 It is important to know who bears the costs and who enjoys the benefits, not merely the magnitude of both of these. But my primary goal here is not to specify what Congress should require the agency to consider. It is instead to suggest that there could be real value in democratic engagement with that question, especially in light of the relevant learning in the last decades. One argument for use of the nondelegation doctrine—or perhaps it is a mere hope134—is that invalidation of the statute might produce a better, more informed occupational safety law.

2. Of Significant and Insignificant Risks

If possible, courts should avoid the heavy constitutional artillery, simply because of the disruption that invalidation would cause and because of the many problems with judicial use of the nondelegation doctrine.135 The least aggressive approach would build on both the agency’s current practices and on Justice Breyer’s opinion in *American Trucking* so as to create floors and ceilings on agency action. A central claim here would be that courts should construe the disputed provision so as to avoid constitutional doubts—a principle that would, in this context, call for an interpretation that would limit agency discretion. A reasonable interpretation along these lines ought to produce a band within which agency outcomes must fall. There are three major points here.

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134 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1743–54.
135 See supra note 18.
The first is that after American Petroleum, we know that the agency must establish that it is seeking to regulate a “significant” risk. It is not permitted to conclude that a standard is “reasonably necessary or appropriate” if the risk is trivial. A judgment about the significance of a risk would call for an assessment of both the magnitude and the probability of harm. If, for example, an industry practice exposes hundreds of thousands of workers to a 1-in-1000 risk of mortality or serious injury, the risk unquestionably qualifies as significant. As the exposed population becomes smaller, the probability decreases, and the magnitude of the harm drops, it is harder to categorize the risk as “significant.” As several courts have held, some risks are not above the relevant floor. In this respect, OSHA does overlap with the Clean Air Act provision at issue in American Trucking. The latter provision forbids regulations that are not “requisite to protect the public health” and thus bans the agency from imposing restrictions on trivial risks. The Court has made clear that OSHA has a similar requirement: the Secretary of Labor may not proceed unless the risk reaches a certain threshold.

The second point is that the agency is not permitted to ignore a significant risk. If the agency imposes no regulation, or an inexplicably weak regulation, it has failed to do what is “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” Indeed, the agency might well be subject to judicial review if it fails to respond to a petition to produce a rule dealing with a substantial safety problem. If the agency refuses to address a significant risk, it had better explain itself. In fact, the Supreme Court held, in Massachusetts v. EPA, that any such explanation must be rooted in the statutory text. To this extent, OSHA is analogous to the Clean Air Act; just as the agency cannot be too draconian, so too it cannot be too lenient. In both contexts, there are both floors and ceilings on agency action. Like the “requisite to protect the public health” language, the require-

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136 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980 (11th Cir. 1992).
138 Cf. Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (requiring EPA to explain failure to issue short-term standard for asthmatics in light of evidence that risk was substantial).
140 Id. at 1462.
141 Id.
ment of a “significant risk” forbids the agency from being draconian; and in both contexts, the statutory terms, taken in context, forbid the agency from being too lenient, even to the extent of permitting judicial review of agency inaction. It is true the words “reasonably” and “appropriate” soften OSHA in ways that the word “requisite” does not. But if the agency ignores a significant risk or fails to eliminate such a risk, it is required to offer a good explanation, made out in terms of statutorily relevant factors.

The third point is that “feasibility” operates as a constraint on what the agency might do or require. As we have seen, the term itself is not self-defining, but it is at least somewhat helpful to say that the agency may not require actions that are neither technically nor economically feasible. Without this constraint, which is clearly imposed on agency regulation of toxic substances, the nondelegation problem would be more serious. True, a statute that forces an agency to regulate even if regulation is not feasible would limit agency discretion. But if an agency is permitted to decide whether to impose a feasibility constraint or not, it would seem to lack an intelligible principle by which to decide what to do.

The conclusion that the constraints of feasibility must be respected is less than obvious because the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language does not by itself constrain the agency in this way; that language lacks a feasibility limitation. Perhaps the agency could deem a restriction “reasonably necessary.” if the risk is large enough, even if regulation would create serious economic dislocations.

But there are two problems with this argument. The first is that a regulation might well be considered neither “reasonably necessary” nor “appropriate” if it would not be economically or technologically feasible. A restriction that would cause massive business failures would not seem to be “appropriate.” By itself, this argument may not be decisive, but an argument from statutory structure strongly supports this conclusion. Note that the more aggressive toxic substances provision, governing health standards,

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142 See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 980–82 (11th Cir. 1992).

143 Cf. Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that feasibility does not constrain the EPA’s authority to issue national ambient air quality standards).
contains an explicit feasibility limitation.\textsuperscript{144} It would be odd indeed to construe the less stringent and more general definitional clause not to include the same limitation. In view of this statutory structure, requiring health standards to be “feasible,” it makes sense to say that safety standards must be feasible as well. As I have emphasized, the idea of feasibility is far from self-defining, and inevitably it leaves a great deal of discretion to the agency. But, that degree of discretion does not create a serious constitutional issue.

Are these three limitations, taken as a whole, sufficient to save the statute against a nondelegation challenge? Probably, but the answer is not entirely obvious. If an intelligible principle is required, floors and ceilings may not be enough; we might also need some principle to tell us how to choose between the floor and the ceiling. As the court of appeals observed in \textit{UAW II},\textsuperscript{145} the three principles leave the agency with considerable discretion on a crucial issue: stringency.

Suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant risk to the maximum point, that is, the point of feasibility. Apparently, that decision would satisfy the statutory requirements. By contrast, suppose that the agency decided to regulate a significant risk only slightly. Perhaps that decision would be unlawful if it allowed a significant risk to remain. But what if the agency decided to regulate a significant risk, not to the point of feasibility, but to the extent justified by a strict cost-benefit test? In other words, suppose that the agency concluded that a regulation of a significant risk was “reasonably necessary or appropriate” only if the benefits exceeded the costs. At first glance, that approach would be consistent with the statute as well—but would not be mandatory. And the fact that the agency would have unfettered discretion to choose between “significant risk/feasibility” and “significant risk/cost-benefit balancing,” might seem to doom the statute on constitutional grounds.

The best response is that this degree of discretion, while substantial, does not amount to a blank check. The three principles outlined above are sufficiently intelligible and constraining to overcome the constitutional objection. To those who reject this


\textsuperscript{145} \textit{UAW v. OSHA (UAW II)}, 37 F.3d 665, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
response but want to avoid invalidation, there is a remaining option.

3. Cost-Benefit Analysis

The third option would require some form of cost-benefit analysis under the theory that the statutory text mandates it. Under the statutory phrase “reasonably necessary or appropriate,” perhaps the agency cannot proceed unless it has assessed both costs and benefits and shown that the latter justify the former, at least in the sense that the benefits are roughly proportional to the costs. Substantial costs might be justified if they would ensure substantial benefits, even if a strict monetary test suggested that the costs exceeded the benefits. But a lack of inquiry into the actual effects of regulation and a failure to demonstrate a degree of proportionality would be fatal to the regulation.

It is easy to see the form that such a ruling might take. As the court of appeals suggested in UAW I, the statute uses the term “reasonably necessary,” and the adverb might well call for a form of balancing.\textsuperscript{146} We have seen that the word “reasonably” distinguishes OSHA from the Clean Air Act provisions governing national ambient air quality standards, which use the unmodified term “requisite.” The words “or appropriate” strengthen the argument. Taken as a whole, the statutory phrase “reasonably necessary or appropriate” might well be taken to suggest a general reasonableness standard, one that requires benefits to justify costs. Courts of appeals have taken a similar approach in the context of disability discrimination. While not imposing a strict cost-benefit test, courts interpret the term “reasonable accommodation” in that context as requiring a plaintiff to show that the costs of an accommodation would not be disproportionate to the benefits.\textsuperscript{147} In the context of OSHA, such a construction would have the additional benefit of eliminating the nondelegation problem. If courts can construe the statutory language in such a way as to avoid that problem, they should do exactly that.

The strongest objection to this construction is that the statute does not unambiguously require it, and under established doctrine,

\textsuperscript{146} UAW v. OSHA (UAW I), 938 F.2d 1310, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

\textsuperscript{147} See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
an agency is permitted to interpret statutory ambiguities as it reasonably sees fit. The best response is that this principle is trumped by the Avoidance Canon: agencies cannot construe statutes in such a way as to raise serious constitutional objections. Suppose that we are tempted to conclude that unless the Avoidance Canon is invoked, the statute allows the agency to choose between an approach that requires cost-benefit balancing and an approach that does not. The problem is that under this approach, the nondelegation problem would reemerge. One solution to that problem is to hold that “reasonably necessary or appropriate” requires and does not merely permit cost-benefit balancing. It is true, of course, that the Avoidance Canon requires some intelligible principle, and that cost-benefit balancing is only one candidate; floors and ceilings, of the kind described above, are the primary alternative.

We shall shortly see that such balancing has significant advantages. For the moment, it will be useful to see how the agency’s safety regulations fit within the universe of federal regulations protecting against mortality risks.

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149 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738–39 (2006) (plurality opinion); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 503–05 (9th Cir. 2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting that the Avoidance Canon only trumps Chevron deference where there is “a comparatively high likelihood of unconstitutionality, or at least some exceptional intricacy of constitutional doctrine”); AFL-CIO v. FEC, 333 F.3d 168, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2003). But see Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 492–93 (denial of rehearing en banc) (“When Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, and the agency has filled it, we have no authority to reconstrue the statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems. . .”).
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What is striking about the OSHA’s safety rules is the variability in cost per life saved—from a low of $100,000 (a real bargain) to a high of $98 million (well above the standard figure, within the federal government, of around $6 million\(^{151}\)). The fact that OSHA safety regulations are concentrated toward the lower end of the range suggests the possibility of further opportunities for life-saving regulations.

To be sure, these particular figures should be taken with many grains of salt, among other things because they do not include savings short of mortalities averted.\(^{152}\) The only point is that a glimpse at the figures shows significant and apparently inexplicable variability across safety regulations. Cost-benefit analysis might well help to increase sense and coherence. If conducted properly and given appropriate weight, it might well help workers themselves, because expensive regulation is likely to produce decreases in wages, in jobs, or both. It is a serious mistake to act as if workers’ interests invariably favor more aggressive safety regulation; workers may lose in wages and job opportunities what they gain in safety. The relationship among regulations, wages, and employment presents an array of theoretical and empirical challenges.\(^{153}\)

Of course, any cost-benefit approach leaves some crucial questions unanswered. Hard-line enthusiasts for the nondelegation doctrine might object that those questions are so large that cost-benefit analysis, in the abstract, itself raises nondelegation concerns. What is the appropriate valuation of a statistical risk of mor-

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\(^{151}\) See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 132.


\(^{153}\) The best discussion of the general issue remains Jolls, supra note 132, at 225–30.
tality). Should a statistical life be valued at $1 million, $6 million, $10 million, or $30 million? How should the agency value the thousands of injuries, falling short of mortality, that come from workplace accidents? Independent of the question of valuation, must the agency follow a strict cost-benefit test, in accordance with which regulations are banned if the monetary costs outweigh the monetary benefits? Or should the agency be permitted to give weight as well to distributional factors? That is, could it allow costs to exceed benefits because employers and their customers would bear the former, whereas employees would enjoy the latter?

To require a reasonable relationship between costs and benefits, it is not necessary for courts to answer such questions. In light of the worker-protective goals of OSHA, surely it would be legitimate and perhaps mandatory to take account of redistributive goals and to proceed if workers would be significantly benefited and if the costs would be at least proportionate to that benefit. The agency should therefore be required to show, not that a regulation satisfies a strict cost-benefit test, but that the costs have a reasonable relationship to the benefits. If the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits, the agency should be permitted to proceed so long as there is such a relationship between the two. Recall that even if a safety regulation fails a cost-benefit test by standard measures, it might produce net welfare benefits. We have seen that those standard measures involve “willingness to pay,” and they are only a crude measure of welfare effects. What matters is welfare, not monetized willingness to pay. The agency could well decide that a rule would have desirable welfare effects even if the monetized benefits were lower than the monetized costs.

154 For relevant discussion, see Viscusi, supra note 46, at 17–33; Sunstein, supra note 130, at 386–96.
155 On some of the complexities here, see Rose-Ackerman, supra note 17, at 357–58. As I have noted, it is incorrect to proceed as if an occupational safety standard automatically transfers resources from employers to employees. In all probability, employees will themselves bear some of the relevant costs, as for example through decreased wages and fewer employment opportunities. For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between employment regulations and wage levels, see Jolls, supra note 132 at 225–30.
156 See Adler & Posner, supra note 6, at 159–61; Viscusi, supra note 46, at 19–22.
157 See Adler & Posner, supra note 6, at 166–75.
To be sure, authority to consider distributive goals increases the discretion given to the agency, but so long as the benefits and costs must be shown to be proportional, the constitutional problem is not serious. I have emphasized that a cost-benefit approach to workplace safety regulations would raise many questions, but one of the advantages of that approach is that it would force the agency to ask and answer those questions in public. In addition, a proportionality test would have the advantage of fitting plausibly well with the agency’s own practice, both in terms of its conclusions and its standard rationale.\footnote{158 See supra Subsection II.A.1.} We have seen that the agency typically strives to account for both costs and benefits and that, in general, a reasonable relationship seems to exist between the two. The problem is that without the pressure of legal constraint, the agency’s inquiry into costs and benefits is ad hoc and undisciplined and produces some of the variability captured in Table 1. A cost-benefit construction, of the sort suggested here, would ensure greater transparency and regularity. It would also have the advantage of promoting greater clarity and monitoring of agency discretion by increasing the likelihood that when the agency chooses one degree of stringency rather than another its judgment can be scrutinized in public.

C. Of Narrowing Constructions and Subsidiary Policymaking: A Puzzle and a Clarification

There is a final puzzle, and it raises a large issue with respect to the relationship between courts and the administrative state. The issue involves the status of narrowly construing agency discretion to avoid nondelegation challenges.\footnote{159 For an illuminating and detailed treatment, see Manning, supra note 36, at 223–28.} Such narrowing constructions are not uncommon,\footnote{160 Many courts have followed this approach. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 748 (D.D.C. 1971).} and I have suggested that the cost-benefit approach is best justified as an example. But the whole approach raises a serious question. The problem is that if, as American Trucking teaches, agencies cannot rescue open-ended delegations through subsidiary policymaking in the guise of interpretation,
The question therefore arises: what is the status of the Avoidance Canon, in the specific context of a nondelegation challenge, in the aftermath of *American Trucking*?

At first glance, nothing in *American Trucking* should endanger the use of the Avoidance Canon. The Court’s suggestion was merely that if a statute does confer open-ended authority on an agency, the agency cannot eliminate that problem by deciding how much discretion to exercise.

The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise—that is to say, the prescription of the standard that Congress had omitted—would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority.

The new nondelegation doctrine, repudiated by *American Trucking*, asked agencies to develop “subsidiary policy” by which to discipline their discretion under open-ended statutes. The reason for the repudiation of the new doctrine is that the development of subsidiary policy counts as an exercise of discretion. It is not “interpretation.”

If *American Trucking* is understood in this way, it certainly suggests that courts cannot rescue a statute from a nondelegation challenge if they are themselves making subsidiary policy. But when a court (or for that matter an agency) is legitimately selecting an interpretation that narrows agency discretion, it is not really making subsidiary policy. Instead, a court that properly uses the Avoidance Canon is relying on standard legal materials to hold that, of two or more plausible interpretations of a text, the agency is bound by the one that gives it limited rather than open-ended authority.

To be sure, an approach of this kind would not be legitimate if the standard legal materials left both court and agency at sea—if the narrower interpretation really is policymaking and does not qualify as an interpretation at all. But if courts can fairly insist on that interpretation as a reasonable way of coming to terms with

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161 See Manning, supra note 36, at 246–53.
what Congress has actually said, then *American Trucking* creates no obstacle.  

Here, then, is a possible problem with the approaches I have outlined. Suppose that the relevant interpretation is really an exercise in policymaking—that courts are choosing an intelligible principle not on the basis of anything that Congress has done but as a means of implementing a policy of the judges’ own choosing. Under *American Trucking*, the “floors and ceilings” approach and the cost-benefit approach would not cure the nondelegation problem if they amounted to judicial policymaking. But I have argued that both approaches are legitimate readings of the legal materials in light of the Avoidance Canon. If this argument is correct, then judicial insistence on one or another does not run afoul of the Court’s rejection of the new nondelegation doctrine.  

**CONCLUSION**

My goal here has been to explore the meaning and validity of the principal provision governing occupational safety standards in the United States. Remarkably, Congress’ sole guidance has been to tell the Secretary of Labor to do whatever is “reasonably necessary or appropriate” to provide safe and healthful places of employment. The leading court of appeals decision upholds this provision on the ground that the agency has developed subsidiary policy by which to limit its own discretion. After *American Trucking*, however, this route is unavailable.

In these circumstances, courts have three options. The most aggressive is to invalidate the statute on constitutional grounds. Notwithstanding its disruptive potential, this route does not entirely lack appeal. Especially in view of the sheer amount of information that has accumulated over the last decades, Congress should be expected to do much better than to instruct the Secretary of Labor to do what he deems “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” Invalidation of the statute might well have a democracy-forcing function,

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163 There is an issue in the background here. Suppose that the legal materials would permit two reasonable interpretations, A and B, both of which are highly constrained. If the agency picks A, is there a nondelegation problem? On the standard approach, the answer is negative. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). In general, the agency’s discretion to choose among two reasonable interpretations does not create a “blank check.”
one that would spur a degree of national deliberation about how best to protect American workers from hazards faced in the workplace. Such deliberation could well produce a greatly improved statute, one that would benefit from a great deal of theoretical and empirical work since OSHA was first enacted.\(^\text{164}\) And however aggressive, this approach would be less radical than it might seem. No other federal regulatory statute confers so much discretion on federal administrators, at least in any area with such broad scope, and it is not difficult to distinguish OSHA from statutes that the Court has upheld.

The least aggressive option, grounded in the Avoidance Canon, is to parse the statutory language to create floors and ceilings on agency action. The central argument here is that the agency may not regulate trivial risks (as held in *American Petroleum*), ignore significant risks, or regulate beyond the point of feasibility. Thus interpreted, is OSHA unconstitutional? The question is not entirely easy to answer. On the one hand, the agency would have a limited band of operation: the floors and ceilings would reduce its room to maneuver. And if this interpretation were taken to ban the agency from making its decisions on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, then the delegation in OSHA would provide constraints similar to those the Clean Air Act, as upheld in *American Trucking*.

The problem is that, at a minimum, the “reasonably necessary or appropriate” language seems to permit the agency to decide whether to choose cost-benefit analysis as the basis for its decisions. The question then becomes: If the agency is given the discretion to choose between (a) cost-benefit analysis or (b) an approach based on significant risk/feasibility, is there a violation of the non-delegation doctrine? Would the agency’s power to choose between (a) and (b) suggest that Congress gave it a blank check in violation of *American Trucking*? Probably not, but reasonable people might disagree about how to answer that question.

The third and best possibility, also grounded in the Avoidance Canon, would be to construe the statute to require some kind of cost-benefit balancing, rooted in a minimal requirement of proportionality between costs and benefits. This approach would have the virtue of permitting the Secretary of Labor to decide exactly what

\(^{164}\) See supra notes 119–29.
cost-benefit analysis entails in the distinctive context of occupational safety. The Secretary would have the power to assign values to mortality and morbidity effects and to give significant weight to considerations of equity and fair distribution.

From a strictly doctrinal point of view, an evident advantage of this approach is that it would fit well with the statutory language while also eliminating the constitutional problem. And from the standpoint of sound policy, a proportionality requirement would also have the virtue of increasing the transparency of occupational safety law by ensuring, for the first time, that the key choices are explained in a way that is subject to public scrutiny and review.\footnote{For those who believe that cost-benefit analysis undermines transparency, this argument will of course not be convincing. See Heinzerling & Ackerman, supra note 46, at 8–9. For a different view, see Sunstein, supra note 125, at 291–93.}