Essay

Selection Effects in Constitutional Law

The standard consequentialist analysis of constitutional law focuses on the incentives that shape the behavior of government officials and other constitutional actors. Incentive-based accounts justify elections as a means of constraining officials to promote the public welfare, or at least the welfare of the median voter; justify the separation of powers as a means of making “ambition counteract ambition”; justify negative liberties, such as free speech and free association, as a necessary corrective to incumbent officials’ incentives to suppress political opposition; and so forth.

In this experimental Essay, I offer a preliminary sketch of a different way of looking at constitutional law generally and constitutional structure in particular: through the lens of “selection effects.” Constitutional rules, on this account, should focus not only on the creation of optimal incentives for those who happen to occupy official posts at any given time, but also on the question which (potential) officials are selected to occupy those posts over time. Where an incentive analysis is short-term and static, asking only how legal rules affect the behavior of a given set of officeholders, selection analysis is long-term and dynamic, asking how legal rules themselves produce feedback effects that, over time, bring new types of government officials into power.

This turn to selection-based analysis yields fresh insight into the dynamics of constitutionalism. Because constitutional rules affect the pool of potential and actual officeholders, as well as the behavior of current officeholders, focusing on selection effects shows that some constitutional rules prove “self-stabilizing”: the rules tend to select a corps of officeholders who will act to uphold and stabilize the rules themselves. Other constitutional rules, by contrast, prove “self-negating”: the rules tend to select a corps of officeholders who work to undermine or destabilize the rules themselves. This framework supplies insights into diverse areas of constitutional law and theory, ranging from governmental structure, campaign finance, and voting rights to criminal sentencing, free speech, and affirmative action.

State Action and the Thirteenth Amendment

The Thirteenth Amendment is unique among constitutional provisions in directly regulating private activity. The amendment abolishes slavery both in the familiar antebellum form, in which it was established by the state, and as it might be perpetuated by private individuals, either through their own coercive activity or through the exercise of common law rights. This private action interpretation of the amendment became established soon after the amendment was ratified, and it has remained unquestioned since. This Essay considers the arguments for the amendment’s coverage of private action based on its text, its origins, and the congressional debates over its meaning. The text of the amendment itself makes no reference to the states, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, as it was modeled on territorial legislation in which Congress exercised plenary authority over private behavior. The congressional debates over the amendment reveal that it was designed to eliminate all forms of slavery, to alter the existing distribution of power between the states and the federal government, and to abolish slavery as a system of property rights—including property rights exercised by private individuals. All of this was accomplished by the self-executing provisions of section 1, but the private action interpretation of the amendment also extends to section 2, which grants Congress the power to enforce the amendment “by appropriate legislation.” This grant of legislative authority provides indirect, but crucial support, for modern civil rights legislation that prohibits private discrimination. Section 2 should not be narrowly construed in an effort to find a restraint on federal power analogous to the state action doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment. The influence of the Thirteenth Amendment has been—and should continue to be—as broad as the problems of slavery to which it was originally addressed.

The Concealmeant of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking

Religious beliefs and values can play a significant and potentially necessary role in the judicial disposition of cases, particularly those in which the positive law is meaningfully underdeterminate. With some exceptions, however, the permissible role of such beliefs and values in various stages of the judicial process is not often appropriately addressed within public and even academic circles. To the contrary, the issue tends by most commentators to be either largely overlooked, perhaps due to its delicacy or complexity, or categorically disposed of pursuant to a debatable theory of public discourse or a distinctive reading of the Constitution’s religion clauses. The central thesis of this Essay is that the relationship between judging and religious influences, as a result of these and other circumstances, is one defined substantially by concealment, much of it unconscious, rather than by truly principled and effective regulation. The Essay’s purposes, accordingly, are to develop this thesis more fully; to examine its chief consequences, especially for the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking; and, to the extent that these consequences are unfavorable, to suggest some modest corrective measures.

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