The importance of education to succeed in today’s society is well documented and recognized by courts, but is not adequately provided to the over 96,000 juveniles who are confined each year in the name of rehabilitation. This Note argues that children in juvenile detention have a right to an adequate education based on state constitutional guarantees of education. This right can be used to challenge the inadequacy of the current educational services provided in juvenile detention facilities. The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on the juvenile justice system, explains the importance of education in juvenile detention, and surveys the applicable federal statutes and corresponding litigation. Part II briefly discusses potential federal constitutional challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, but concludes that these challenges are unlikely to be successful. Part III argues that state constitutional guarantees of education are applicable to students in juvenile detention facilities. First, it analyzes the contours of the state rights to education as interpreted in school finance litigation. Second, it responds to the main objection that children in juvenile detention have sacrificed their right to education by arguing that (1) the purpose of confinement is rehabilitation, which is consistent with the right to education, and (2) even if the purpose of confinement is punishment, it does not follow that juveniles have sacrificed their right to education. Third, it analyzes specific challenges that could be raised by children in juvenile detention. Part IV concludes that given the acceptance of the adequacy conception of the right to education, the time is ripe to challenge the inadequacy of education currently provided in juvenile detention.
Note
The Low Written Description Bar for Software
This Note focuses on the application of 35 U.S.C. � 112�s �written description� disclosure requirement to software. After tracing the contours of the modern written description requirement, it addresses the seemingly-inconsistent treatment of software and biotechnology inventions under � 112. The Note argues that while functional written descriptions are generally held to be insufficient for biotechnology or DNA inventions (�Gene X does Y� does not pass muster), courts will allow inventions involving software to be claimed via functional descriptions (�Program X does Y� is sufficient)�a much lower descriptive bar. The note concludes that the relative predictability of software development as well as the inherently functional nature of software description account for this differing treatment, and that biotechnology inventions will require less burdensome disclosure as the predictability of that field increases.
A Doctrine of Full Faith and Credit
Imagine a judgment from a California state court in which a plaintiff (“P1”) prevails in a civil suit against the defendant (“D”). A second plaintiff (“P2”) brings a related suit in Alabama against D and seeks to estop D from relitigating issues found adverse to D in California. Given the conflict between the preclusion laws of Alabama and California, may the Alabama court choose which state’s law it will enforce? Or does federal law require Alabama to give the California judgment the same preclusive effect that the judgment would have in California? The answers to questions such as these have considerable practical importance. Cost-conscious litigants determine how much they are willing to spend based on the associated risk of loss or probability of gain in any litigation. Uncertainty surrounding the judgment’s preclusive effect will change that analysis. Unfortunately, there is currently no consistent answer to these questions. This Note will argue for a broad understanding of the implementing statute’s scope. This understanding is a clear rule that courts can easily follow, as opposed to a policy-based standard that is difficult to implement. This Note will present a doctrinal theory that both supports such a reading and provides certainty in the application of the implementing statute.