The Common Law of Interpretation

Note — Volume 108, Issue 5

108 Va. L. Rev. 1243
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*J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 2022. I owe special thanks to Professor Richard Re for his insightful research direction and for his careful comments on early drafts. I am also grateful to each of my classmates who provided support and feedback throughout the project.Show More

Courts and commentators have claimed that there is no methodological stare decisis. That is, the Supreme Court’s decision to use purposivism or textualism to interpret a legal text in one case is not binding in future cases. While a contrarian strain of scholars has argued that judicial decisions about interpretation should serve as controlling authority in later cases, critics fear that this approach would tie the hands of future courts too tightly.

However, this Note argues that the Supreme Court’s directions about how to interpret legal texts already have a soft and salutary authoritative force. It does so, first, by reconceptualizing so-called “methodological precedent.” Those who argue that interpretive decisions are not binding are led astray by the assumption that methodological stare decisis would look like a categorical commandment, such as: “Thou shalt not consult legislative history.” A more modest vision of methodological precedent is a kind of common law: that is, a collected series of smaller decisions converging on a set of norms for interpreting legal texts. Different norms might be settled to different degrees at different times. But as certain methods become accepted in the case law, even opponents may employ them, or feel that they have some constraining force. This kind of case-by-case development is already happening (albeit imperfectly). It has both horizontal and vertical effects, causing judges to adopt specific interpretive approaches or engage in specific modes of analysis. Additionally, this methodological common law is normatively desirable because it balances goals of stability and predictability while respecting the value of interpretive pluralism.

Introduction

The U.S. Supreme Court is in the business of determining the meaning of legal texts.1.Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).Show More It should be no surprise, then, that many of the pages in the U.S. Reports are devoted to communicating the Court’s views on the proper methods of interpretation. Some of these statements are general and trans-substantive, like the declaration, “Today, our statutory interpretation cases almost always start with a careful consideration of the text.”2.Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2337 (2021).Show More Some are specific to the kind of legal directive, such as the principle that “remedial statutes should be liberally construed.”3.Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968).Show More Sometimes the Court articulates a canon of construction that is triggered by a particular context, such as the rule that “[i]mplications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”4.Immigr. Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001).Show More

But what is the legal status of these interpretive directions? For many years, judges and scholars have agreed there is no such thing as “methodological stare decisis.”5.See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2144 (2002) (“[T]he Justices do not seem to treat methodology as part of the holding [of a case].”); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 339, 389 (2005) (“[S]tare decisis effect attaches to the ultimate holding . . . but not to general methodological pronouncements, no matter how apparently firm.”); Stephen M. Rich, A Matter of Perspective: Textualism, Stare Decisis, and Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1197, 1197 (2014) (“When the Supreme Court rules on matters of statutory interpretation, it does not establish ‘methodological precedents.’” (quoting Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1902 (2011))); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 167 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[N]o principle of stare decisis requires us to extend a tool of statutory interpretation from one statute to another without first considering whether it is appropriate for that statute.”).Show More No Supreme Court majority opinion purports to require that future justices be textualists or purposivists. Nor does one majority’s decision to use a particular extrinsic source (like dictionaries or drafting history) seem to mean that future courts must do the same. Thus, while a given case may stand for any number of legal propositions, each court supposedly writes on a blank methodological slate.

But this consensus may rest on eroding foundations. First, the wholesale exclusion of interpretive premises from a case’s “holding” has always been in tension with the Supreme Court’s view that the “portions of the opinion necessary to [reach the] result” are binding on future courts.6.Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996). Although, what makes a part of an opinion “necessary” to the result and what kinds of propositions are “necessary” is open to interpretation.Show More The fact that the Supreme Court’s conclusions about legal interpretation are treated differently than its other outcome-determinative premises has been assumed more often than it has been defended. Second, an emerging wave of scholars has suggested that the Court’s statements about methodology should (and perhaps do) have some precedential effect.7.E.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863, 1870 (2008) (“[A]s a matter of policy, courts should give extra-strong stare decisis effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation.”); Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 681, 684 (2008) (terming decisions about judicial methodology “subdecisions” and arguing that “the purposes behind traditional stare decisis suggest that the appropriate reform is to extend the scope of stare decisis to statutory interpretation subdecisions”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1754, 1848 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories] (arguing that methodological stare decisis “appears to be a common feature of some states’ statutory case law” and is therefore possible and potentially beneficial); Grace E. Hart, Comment, Methodological Stare Decisis and Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation in the Choice-of-Law Context, 124 Yale L.J. 1825, 1826 (2015) (arguing that statutory interpretation decisions should be treated as substantive law to help govern choice-of-law disputes); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Eager to Follow: Methodological Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 99 N.C. L. Rev. 101, 106 (2020) (arguing primarily that lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead on methods of statutory interpretation).Show More They contend that rule of law values would be enhanced by clarity about how courts will approach difficult questions of statutory interpretation.

But these arguments in favor of methodological stare decisis have provoked strong criticism.8.See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 Geo. L.J. 1573, 1591 (2014) (“[I]t would be severely problematic for federal courts to attempt to freeze interpretive rules into place by applying stare decisis.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation, in Precedent in the United States Supreme Court 135, 154 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013) (“[Adopting] a regime of methodological stare decisis . . . would for some period of time imperil rather than foster stability.”).Show More As a descriptive matter, at least some judges may not feel that they are bound by the Supreme Court’s prior methodological decisions.9.See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e do not regard statements in our opinions about . . . generally applicable interpretive methods . . . as binding future Justices with the full force of horizontal stare decisis.”).Show More Indeed, it is hard for lawyers to believe that the Court’s interpretive views are “binding” in any sense when they have witnessed decades of intractable disagreement over the proper methods of statutory and constitutional interpretation.10 10.Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 7, at 1753–54.Show More As a normative matter, judges are likely to chafe at the suggestion that their deeply held convictions about interpretation are trumped by old judicial decisions or long-dead members of their court.11 11.See Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1125, 1149 (2019) (suggesting that a jurist would likely protest if “faced with the prospect of subordinating her individual view” and “urged to apply an interpretive methodology”).Show More

This Note pushes back against both of those objections. First, it argues that there is already a soft system of methodological precedent at the Supreme Court and in the lower federal courts. Both critics and detractors of the idea of methodological precedent generally assume that, if such precedent existed, the Supreme Court would issue (and future courts would follow) explicit and broad legal directives, like: “legislative history is a permissible source of evidence for resolving statutory ambiguity,” or “the Constitution should be interpreted according to its original public meaning.”12 12.See notes 57–59 and accompanying text.Show More But the absence of such categorical holdings does not mean that the interpretive statements that the Court does issue are not authoritative. Instead, the Supreme Court’s back-and-forth about interpretation operates as a common law of methods, where individual cases elucidate specific norms and facilitate consensus. It can take multiple cases and many decades for a methodological dispute to be “settled,” and different areas of the law are settled to different degrees. But as interpretive norms are enshrined in case law, they exert an authoritative force on the Supreme Court and lower courts in a way that mimics the effect of precedent. And second, despite the fears of commentators, this system is actually beneficial. In fact, a system of gradual methodological common law achieves many of the rule of law goals underlying stare decisis while still allowing room for interpretive pluralism.

The argument proceeds in four Parts. Part I briefly explores the concept of “precedent.” Part II proposes a common law model of interpretive precedent where individual cases serve as minor but meaningful authorities about the proper way to interpret legal texts. Over time, debates about interpretive methods can be settled through accumulated decisions and judicial practice, even without the Supreme Court explicitly dictating a comprehensive philosophy of interpretation. Part III is descriptive, arguing that such a common law of interpretive methods already exists. Part IV is a normative defense of this status quo.

  1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
  2. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2337 (2021).
  3. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968).
  4. Immigr. Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001).
  5. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2144 (2002) (“[T]he Justices do not seem to treat methodology as part of the holding [of a case].”); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in Statutory Interpretation, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 339, 389 (2005) (“[S]tare decisis effect attaches to the ultimate holding . . . but not to general methodological pronouncements, no matter how apparently firm.”); Stephen M. Rich, A Matter of Perspective: Textualism, Stare Decisis, and Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1197, 1197 (2014) (“When the Supreme Court rules on matters of statutory interpretation, it does not establish ‘methodological precedents.’” (quoting Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 Yale L.J. 1898, 1902 (2011))); B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 167 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[N]o principle of stare decisis requires us to extend a tool of statutory interpretation from one statute to another without first considering whether it is appropriate for that statute.”).
  6. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996). Although, what makes a part of an opinion “necessary” to the result and what kinds of propositions are “necessary” is open to interpretation.
  7. E.g., Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863, 1870 (2008) (“[A]s a matter of policy, courts should give extra-strong stare decisis effect to doctrines of statutory interpretation.”); Jordan Wilder Connors, Note, Treating Like Subdecisions Alike: The Scope of Stare Decisis as Applied to Judicial Methodology, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 681, 684 (2008) (terming decisions about judicial methodology “subdecisions” and arguing that “the purposes behind traditional stare decisis suggest that the appropriate reform is to extend the scope of stare decisis to statutory interpretation subdecisions”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1754, 1848 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories] (arguing that methodological stare decisis “appears to be a common feature of some states’ statutory case law” and is therefore possible and potentially beneficial); Grace E. Hart, Comment, Methodological Stare Decisis and Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation in the Choice-of-Law Context, 124 Yale L.J. 1825, 1826 (2015) (arguing that statutory interpretation decisions should be treated as substantive law to help govern choice-of-law disputes); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Eager to Follow: Methodological Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 99 N.C. L. Rev. 101, 106 (2020) (arguing primarily that lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead on methods of statutory interpretation).
  8. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 Geo. L.J. 1573, 1591 (2014) (“[I]t would be severely problematic for federal courts to attempt to freeze interpretive rules into place by applying stare decisis.”); Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation, in Precedent in the United States Supreme Court 135, 154 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013) (“[Adopting] a regime of methodological stare decisis . . . would for some period of time imperil rather than foster stability.”).
  9. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2444 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]e do not regard statements in our opinions about . . . generally applicable interpretive methods . . . as binding future Justices with the full force of horizontal stare decisis.”).
  10. Gluck, States as Laboratories, supra note 7, at 1753–54.
  11. See Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 1125, 1149 (2019) (suggesting that a jurist would likely protest if “faced with the prospect of subordinating her individual view” and “urged to apply an interpretive methodology”).
  12. See notes 57–59 and accompanying text.

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