The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal

An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior, that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the objective of antitrust law is to promote economic welfare, then per se treatment—or any heightened presumption of illegality—of reputation mechanisms with coordinated punishments is misplaced.

Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law

Conservatives across the nation are celebrating. This past Term, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held for the first time in the nation’s history that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, unrelated to military service, to keep and bear arms. 

I am unable to join in the jubilation. Heller represents a triumph for conservative lawyers. But it also represents a failure—the Court’s failure to adhere to a conservative judicial methodology in reaching its decision. In fact, Heller encourages Americans to do what conservative jurists warned for years they should not do: bypass the ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the courts. 

In this Essay, I compare Heller to another Supreme Court opinion, Roe v. Wade. The analogy seems unlikely; Roe is the opinion perhaps most disliked by conservatives, while many of those same critics are roundly praising Heller. And yet the comparison is apt. In a number of important ways, the Roe and Heller Courts are guilty of the same sins.

The Writing on the Wall: Miranda’s “Prior Criminal Experience” Exception

The Miranda decision requires that police read suspects a set of warnings to ensure that the suspect knows his rights and only waives those rights “voluntarily” and “knowingly.” This Note proposes a “prior criminal experience” exception to Miranda, by which an incriminating statement made outside Miranda may be admissible at trial in certain circumstances. Under the new view of the law, just as today, law enforcement agents would be required to administer Miranda warnings to every suspect before custodial interrogation. However, should a law enforcement officer negligently fail to give the warnings, use of an incriminating statement against a suspect in court would not be barred absolutely. Rather, the statement might be admissible depending on the suspect’s knowledge of his rights, gained through prior criminal experience.

Essentially, the trial court would use a totality-of-circumstances test to determine if the suspect knew his rights at the time of his most recent statement to police. Compulsion still would be presumed in the absence of Miranda warnings, so the burden would fall on the government to show that the defendant had the constitutionally required knowledge. If the court finds the suspect had the requisite knowledge, a police officer’s negligence in not Mirandizing him is immaterial, and the court will allow the confession into evidence. If the court finds that the suspect does not have knowledge of his rights, the prong is not met, and the court will exclude the incriminating statement. The “prior criminal experience” exception only applies to the “knowledge” prong of Miranda; the voluntariness inquiry would not change. The exception ensures that courts do not allow the constitutionally required Miranda warnings to give an advantage to criminal suspects where none is needed.