Issue 2

Unmasking John Doe: Setting a Standard for Discovery in Anonymous Internet Defamation Cases

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for and protects an open marketplace for the competition of ideas. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. said, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market[.]” The Internet, where anonymity is easily achieved and speech is cheap, seems to be a broader and more pure manifestation of such a marketplace than previously seen. In the 1990s, the Internet was a new mode of communication and an untested medium for speech. The intersection of First Amendment law and defamation law in cyberspace has since posed a variety of legal questions that continue to develop nearly two decades later. How should the fundamental right to freedom of speech play out over a medium where anyone’s voice can be heard instantaneously by thousands, even millions, of people? Who should be liable for defamatory speech occurring over the Internet? When is it appropriate to compel disclosure of a “John Doe” defendant’s identity in a defamation case? 

Unmasking John Doe contends that to answer those questions requires a precarious balancing act. Using a hypothetical John Doe lawsuit, the note develops and rigorously tests an obscure standard provided by a Louisiana court, arguing that it may provide the key to ensuring that Internet speakers know the limits of protection guaranteed to them and that meritorious claims of defamation will not be prematurely dismissed.

The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal

An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior, that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the objective of antitrust law is to promote economic welfare, then per se treatment—or any heightened presumption of illegality—of reputation mechanisms with coordinated punishments is misplaced.

Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law

Conservatives across the nation are celebrating. This past Term, in District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held for the first time in the nation’s history that the Second Amendment protects an individual right, unrelated to military service, to keep and bear arms. 

I am unable to join in the jubilation. Heller represents a triumph for conservative lawyers. But it also represents a failure—the Court’s failure to adhere to a conservative judicial methodology in reaching its decision. In fact, Heller encourages Americans to do what conservative jurists warned for years they should not do: bypass the ballot and seek to press their political agenda in the courts. 

In this Essay, I compare Heller to another Supreme Court opinion, Roe v. Wade. The analogy seems unlikely; Roe is the opinion perhaps most disliked by conservatives, while many of those same critics are roundly praising Heller. And yet the comparison is apt. In a number of important ways, the Roe and Heller Courts are guilty of the same sins.

©Virginia Law Review Association. All rights reserved.