Issue 3

Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford

Professor Tom Lininger examines the impact of Crawford v. Washington on prosecutions of domestic violence. Prior to Crawford, these prosecutions relied heavily on hearsay, in part because accusers often recant or refuse to testify. Crawford has raised significant doubts about the admissibility of such evidence unless the government provides the accused with an opportunity for cross-examination. 

Professor Lininger surveyed 64 district attorneys’ offices in California, Oregon and Washington to determine the effect of Crawford on domestic violence cases. The counties involved in this survey make up approximately 90 percent of the population in the three states. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents indicated that the Crawford decision significantly impeded prosecutions of domestic violence in their jurisdictions. Moreover, 76 percent of respondents indicated that after Crawford, their offices are more likely to drop domestic violence charges when the accusers recant or refuse to cooperate.

The article suggests legislative reforms that would adapt the states’ evidence codes to the new constitutional requirements of Crawford in order to facilitate effective prosecutions of domestic violence. One category of proposals would maximize opportunities for pretrial cross-examination of accusers. Another set of proposals would expand certain statutory hearsay exceptions. Finally, the author suggests miscellaneous reforms that would better protect battered women before trial, would help juries to understand the psychology of recanting accusers, and would diversify the charges brought by prosecutors so that hearsay statements are not indispensable. 

The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment

When is a death sentence, a sentence of imprisonment, or a fine so “excessive” or “disproportionate” in relation to the crime for which it is imposed that it violates the Eighth Amendment? Despite the urgings of various commentators and the Supreme Court’s own repeated, albeit uncertain, gestures in the direction of proportionality regulation by the judiciary, the Court’s answer to this question within the past few decades is a body of law that is messy and complex, yet largely meaningless as a constraint. In the core of this ineffectual and incoherent proportionality jurisprudence lies a conceptual confusion over the meaning of proportionality. The Court’s latest statement on this question, Ewing v. California, is symptomatic of the Court’s confusion. This Article seeks to prepare the ground for a more coherent and potent jurisprudence of proportionality to develop by clarifying the concept of proportionality. First, this Article describes the way in which the Court’s confusion over the meaning of “proportionality” has been the source of the problem by discussing four different ways in which the Court has understood the term. Second, this Article proposes “retributivism as a side constraint” as a conception of proportionality that would bring together the disparate elements of the case law to establish a more coherent and effective constitutional doctrine. Third, this Article specifies the meaning of retributivism as a side constraint, emphasizing the distinction between comparative and noncomparative aspects of retributivism and the significance of the distinction for understanding not only what it means for one to “deserve” a punishment, but also the Supreme Court case law on excessive punishment.

A Forest with No Trees: The Supreme Court and International Law in the 2003 Term

The Supreme Court’s docket in the 2003-2004 term included five cases directly presenting questions of international law. Republic of Austria v. Altmann raised issues of the international law of expropriation and the immunity of foreign sovereigns. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain concerned a statute authorizing suits to redress “a tort . . . committed in violation of the law of nations.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, and Rasul v. Bush concerned the status of individuals taken prisoner in the war on terror, thereby raising the subject of that best-known of all international agreements, the Geneva Convention.

The thesis of this Article is that, despite the direct relevance of international law to these cases, the Court repeatedly ignored international law and, when faced with no plausible way to ignore international law, took a highly constricted approach to its application. The Article argues that the Court decided three of the five cases—Altmann, Padilla, and Hamdi—without resolving any substantive international legal questions. In Rasul, the Article asserts, the Court ignored the Geneva Convention, although it did take a pragmatic, control-oriented view of what constituted “sovereignty.” Even in Sosa, where the statute’s plain language—giving federal courts jurisdiction over suits for a “tort, committed in violation of the law of nations”—unavoidably required some attention to international law, the Court repeatedly took a constricted reading of the meaning and relevance of international law, both by ignoring the importance of treaties to the statutory scheme (and history) and by repeatedly limiting the scope of the customary “law of nations.” In all five cases, the Court focused on purely procedural issues and on statutory interpretation instead of on international law.

A concluding section of the Article speculates that the Court downplayed international legal issues not for fear of public, legislative, or executive backlash, but rather because the Court simply is more comfortable with traditional methods of statutory and originalist interpretation than it is with the unfamiliar, decentralized world of international law.

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