The importance of education to succeed in today’s society is well documented and recognized by courts, but is not adequately provided to the over 96,000 juveniles who are confined each year in the name of rehabilitation. This Note argues that children in juvenile detention have a right to an adequate education based on state constitutional guarantees of education. This right can be used to challenge the inadequacy of the current educational services provided in juvenile detention facilities. The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on the juvenile justice system, explains the importance of education in juvenile detention, and surveys the applicable federal statutes and corresponding litigation. Part II briefly discusses potential federal constitutional challenges based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, but concludes that these challenges are unlikely to be successful. Part III argues that state constitutional guarantees of education are applicable to students in juvenile detention facilities. First, it analyzes the contours of the state rights to education as interpreted in school finance litigation. Second, it responds to the main objection that children in juvenile detention have sacrificed their right to education by arguing that (1) the purpose of confinement is rehabilitation, which is consistent with the right to education, and (2) even if the purpose of confinement is punishment, it does not follow that juveniles have sacrificed their right to education. Third, it analyzes specific challenges that could be raised by children in juvenile detention. Part IV concludes that given the acceptance of the adequacy conception of the right to education, the time is ripe to challenge the inadequacy of education currently provided in juvenile detention.
Issue 3
The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity
This Essay analyzes the tax treatment of carried interests in private equity. It argues that there are two competing analogies: service income and investment income. Standard approaches are not able to resolve which of the competing analogies is better and often fail even to recognize that there are competing analogies. The best method for determining the proper treatment of carried interests is through direct examination of the effects of each of the possible treatments, known as the theory of line drawing in the tax law. Using this approach, it is clear that the better treatment of holders of carried interests is as investors. Key pieces of evidence include the longstanding policy premises behind partnership taxation and the complexity and avoidance problems with attempts to tax carried interests as service income. In particular, the longstanding policy behind partnership taxation is to tax partners as if they engaged in partnership activity directly. Current law, which gives carried interests holders capital gain follows this approach, and changing the law to tax carried interests as service income would require rejection of this historical trend. Because such an approach would mean taxing carried interests differently than if the partners engaged in the activity directly, it would be easily avoidable. Moreover, attempts to tax carried interest as service income will have to be able to distinguish service income from other types of income, a task which has proven to be difficult, complex, and avoidable.
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications
Since 1996, the Supreme Court of the United States has signaled that the jurisprudence of the writ of habeas corpus, and its possible suspension, should be informed by an understanding of the writ and of the Habeas Suspension Clause in the U.S. Constitution “as it existed in 1789.” This article recovers the historical basis of the Suspension Clause. It begins by exploring, in the English context, previously unexamined court archives and other manuscript sources. It then traces the path of the writ across the British Empire in the years before 1789. Finally, it analyzes early American uses of the writ, including its treatment in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Ex Parte Bollman. The article concludes that the writ’s peculiar force was the product of judicial rather than statutory innovation; that judicial authority was premised on the idea that judges enacted powers peculiar to the king—his prerogative—when they used the writ; that this meant that judges focused more on the behavior of jailers rather than the rights of prisoners; that this focus gave the writ its surprisingly wide coverage as to persons and places; and that the implications of this history for current cases involving the claims of Guantanamo Bay detainees are significant.