MYOPIC CONSUMER LAW

Andrew T. Hayashi*

People make mistakes with debt, partly because the chance to buy now and pay later tempts them to do things that are not in their long-term interest. Lenders sell credit products that exploit this vulnerability. In this Article, I argue that critiques of these products that draw insights from behavioral law and economics have a blind spot: they ignore what the borrowed funds are used for. By evaluating financing transactions in isolation from the underlying purchase, the cost-benefit analysis of consumer financial regulation is truncated and misleading. I show that the same psychological bias that allows someone to be sold an exploitative loan also makes it possible that the exploitative loan benefits them by causing them to purchase a product or service that they should, but would not otherwise, buy. I demonstrate the importance of this effect in a study of tax refund anticipation loans. I find that regulation curtailing these loans increased the use of an alternative credit product and reduced the use of paid tax preparers and the take-up of the earned income tax credit.

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* Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Jennifer Arlen, Oren Bar-Gill, Gustavo Bobonis, Tom Brennan, Ryan Bubb, Mihir Desai, Brian Galle, Yehonatan Givati, Jacob Goldin, Daniel Hemel, Louis Kaplow, Lewis Kornhauser, Kory Kroft, Day Manoli, Ruth Mason, Patricia McCoy, Alex Raskolnikov, Kyle Rozema, Emily Satterthwaite, David Schizer, Kathryn Spier, Rory Van Loo, David Walker, George Yin, workshop participants at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Columbia Law School-Hebrew University Tax Conference, the University of Toronto, Boston University, Cardozo Law School, New York University, and Harvard Law School. Thanks to the Brookings Institution and AggData LLC for providing data. I am especially indebted to Kent Olson of the UVA Law Library for exceptional research assistance.
INTRODUCTION

Behavioral law and economics has had significant influence on the regulation of consumer credit.¹ This is both important and justified. It is important because consumer finance is central to the functioning of a modern economy; it is what President Obama called the “lifeblood” during the height of the financial crisis in 2009.² At the level of individual households, consumer credit is important because the timing of income and expenses are rarely contemporaneous. And yet, credit transactions are fraught. Credit both reflects and perpetuates wide differences in individuals’ economic opportunities and their vulnerability to financial adversity. Credit is more expensive for the poor, and this fact creates a

patina of exploitation and abuse over debt transactions that has resulted in extensive state and federal regulation.

The influence of behavioral economics on consumer credit regulation is justified because two features of consumer credit raise doubts about consumers’ ability to make borrowing choices that are in their best interests. The first feature is complexity. Consumer debt often has a complex fee structure, opaque repayment terms, and default consequences that are hard to evaluate. The second feature is the tradeoff between current and future purchasing power that is at the heart of every credit transaction. It is the essence of debt that the borrower exchanges her promise to pay amounts in the future for the ability to consume more now. This intertemporal tradeoff is one that individuals often struggle to make properly, and the challenge is especially great for individuals who focus excessively on the short term and who are therefore inclined to borrow impulsively and on terms that they subsequently regret.

Both complexity and intertemporal choice are areas where behavioral law and economics scholarship is able to traffic in deep intuitions and draw on strong empirical evidence to make recommendations about how to regulate imperfectly rational consumers.

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5 I am unaware of any data about the intuitive appeal of complexity and impatience as explanations for why people struggle to evaluate credit contracts. Nevertheless, I trust that most readers, particularly those with home mortgages, will be inclined to agree that understanding all the terms of a secured loan, even when one is trained in law or economics, demands a great deal of time and effort. It is unsurprising then that some do not even make the effort. Judge Posner famously declined to read the “boilerplate” on his own home mortgage. David Lat, Do Lawyers Actually Read Boilerplate Contracts?, Above the Law (June 22, 2010, 2:42 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/do-lawyers-actually-read-boilerplate-contracts-judge-richard-posner-doesnt-do-you/ [https://perma.cc/R574-VCQS]. I also expect that most of us identify with the present-biased individual, who procrastinates when it comes to unpleasant tasks and acts impulsively when it comes to food or leisure. For a review of the literature, see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 91 (2009).
In this Article, I focus on arguments about consumer finance regulation that draw on research about “present bias,” which is a sort of myopia that causes people to focus on the present and neglect the future. I argue that consumer law scholarship that draws on these insights has itself been myopic. People borrow money in order to buy things, and scholarship has generally neglected to consider what borrowed funds are used for.\textsuperscript{6} I show that focusing on the terms of a loan, isolated from the good or service that is purchased with the proceeds, leads to misleading conclusions about the benefits to the borrower. Integrating the costs and benefits of the underlying purchase with the terms of the credit transaction can upend standard conclusions about the effects of present bias and relocate efforts to improve consumer welfare from the regulation of financial products to the circumstances that create demand for high-cost credit in the first place. I demonstrate the significance of this theoretical claim by reporting results from a study of tax refund anticipation loans (RALs), which shows how RALs increase the use of paid tax preparers and the take-up of the earned income tax credit (EITC) by low-income households. Because of the size of the EITC, these loans may make present-biased taxpayers better off, even if the loans are designed to exploit their bias.

When considering the benefits of credit transactions for present-biased consumers, why do the motivating purchases matter? The answer is that many goods and services are characterized by significant upfront costs but benefits that are only realized in the future. As I show in Part I, present-biased consumers tend to undervalue products with this temporal pattern of costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{7} Durable goods, such as homes, cars, and appliances, are like this. Purchasing durable goods involves a significant cash outlay at the time of purchase in exchange for a stream of consumption benefits that are realized over time. In fact, all sorts of choices present this same temporal pattern of immediate costs and future benefits. For example, the benefits of education are mostly realized long after the classroom experience. Applying for social welfare benefits can require an upfront investment of time and effort in exchange for benefits

\textsuperscript{6} Some researchers do think it is broadly relevant what consumers do with the loan proceeds, but none evaluate the bundled loan and purchase together from the perspective of a biased consumer. See, e.g., Shmuel I. Beecher, Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The Case of High-Cost Credit and Payday Loans, in Legal Applications of Marketing Theory (Jacob Gersen & Joel Steckel eds.) (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 10), http://ssrn.com/abstract = 3235810 [https://perma.cc/2ZRB-QQ44].

\textsuperscript{7} See discussion infra Section I.A.
that are received in the future. The EITC, which is the largest federal cash transfer to low-income households, is only available to individuals who file a tax return and complete the burdensome earned income credit (EIC) schedule. The key point is that when the deferred costs and immediate benefits of certain exploitative credit products are added to the immediate costs and deferred benefits of durable goods and services, the bundled transaction may be one that is appealing to a present-biased individual and makes them better off. The exploitative loan tempts the present-biased individual to do something that is in her interest but that she would not otherwise do.

The results from this analysis sound a note of caution about decontextualizing the choices that consumers make. At the most general level, this Article shows that if consumer law is to help imperfectly rational consumers, it is not enough to show that certain goods or services would only be purchased by consumers acting on a bias that operates against their own interests. It must also consider what other choices these consumers are likely to make that depend on that product and how the exploitative product fits into the overall way that they have arranged their lives. The personal affairs of present-biased individuals are likely to be characterized by a variety of biased decisions that may be interconnected in important ways. Although the entire constellation of choices made by present-biased individuals will leave them worse off than if they made the

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10 I say that a loan is exploitative if only biased borrowers want to borrow on its terms. This definition does not imply anything about the profitability of these loans to the lender or about the division of the gains from trade. For a philosophical treatment of exploitation, see Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation 7–8 (1996).
same choices rationally, this does not imply that compelling them to make any one of these choices rationally will leave them better off.\textsuperscript{11}

The second contribution of this Article is to consumer finance regulation specifically. Regulating the substantive terms of consumer credit requires distinguishing between different kinds of loan products and the uses to which the loan proceeds are put. Specifically, secured debt that must be used to purchase goods and services with deferred benefits has different effects on present-biased consumers than general unsecured debt that can be used to change the timing of consumption generally.\textsuperscript{12} When we integrate the loan’s terms with the pattern of costs and benefits from the purchase that necessitated the loan, we see that the bundled transaction may in fact be beneficial for present-biased consumers.\textsuperscript{13} If the bundled transaction is beneficial, then prohibiting credit terms that are designed to tempt present-biased individuals might hurt those that the ban is meant to help.

Third, and at the level of most direct application, the results of my empirical study have very specific implications for the regulation of RALs and refund anticipation checks (RACs). The results sound a warning to regulators about the effects of eliminating these products. RALs disappeared almost entirely following a regulatory change in 2011,\textsuperscript{14} a change that was celebrated by consumer advocates.\textsuperscript{15} The near elimination of RALs reduced the use of paid tax preparers, lowered take-up of the EITC, and increased demand for RACs.\textsuperscript{16} RACs are popular, and RALs have begun to make a comeback, but both credit products are the focus of opposition from advocates and concern by regulators.\textsuperscript{17} Thus,

\textsuperscript{12} See discussion infra Section I.A.
\textsuperscript{13} See discussion infra Section I.A.
\textsuperscript{14} See discussion infra Section II.D.
\textsuperscript{16} See discussion infra Part II.
\textsuperscript{17} Tax RALs are resurgent, albeit in smaller amounts than before. For a sense of the magnitude of this resurgence, there were 35,000 refund loans made in 2014 and approximately one million loans made in 2016. Kevin Wack, Tax Refund Loans Get a Second Life, Am.
understanding the role they play in affecting tax compliance and the take-up of valuable social benefits is important and timely.

To be clear, present bias is not the only reason to be suspicious of credit transactions, and the purpose of my analysis is not to provide an all-things-considered appraisal of high-cost credit products. Complexity, unrealistic optimism about repayment prospects, and other psychological biases may cause people to choose financial products that are not in their best interests.\(^\text{18}\) I agree with scholars who emphasize the problem of complexity and the potential role for regulation in this area.\(^\text{19}\) But when regulation is motivated by concerns about borrowers’ psychological biases, it must consider not just how those biases generate demand for the product being regulated but also how that product is likely to fit into the life of someone who exhibits that bias more generally.

Part I explains the present bias framework for thinking about credit transactions and describes how present bias has been used to explain demand for three economically important, high-cost credit products. I show how integrating the underlying purchase transaction into the analysis of these credit products can change our conclusions about whether these products are beneficial. In Parts II–V, I report and discuss the results of an original study of the effects of regulating RALs. The results illustrate the theoretical effects I describe in Part I, provide evidence that is relevant for regulating this financial product, and raise hard questions about the intermediating role of the private sector between individuals and the U.S. Treasury. In Part VI, I describe a framework for thinking about the regulation of consumer credit products, paying special attention to RALs.

I. BIASED DEMAND FOR CREDIT

The price of consumer credit can vary dramatically depending on the remedies available to the borrower in the event of default, the degree of competition among lenders, and borrower characteristics such as income

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\(^{18}\) Overly optimistic borrowers may borrow too much or too little. See Richard M. Hynes, Overoptimism and Overborrowing, 2004 BYU L. Rev. 127, 131.

\(^{19}\) See, e.g., Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics and Public Policy 102: Beyond Nudging, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 396, 396 (2015) (arguing that behavioral economics should leverage gaps in the traditional economic approach that assume fully rational and informed individuals to deliver policy solutions).
and wealth. Credit becomes more expensive as the risk of default increases. Because borrowers with lower incomes generally pose higher default risks, their cost of credit tends to be higher. Credit products that are commonly used by low-income households include payday loans, credit cards with low introductory (teaser) interest rates, and sub-prime mortgages. Traditionally, scholars operating in the law and economics tradition have taken a relatively sanguine view of high-price consumer credit under the assumption that the price reflects the cost to the lender of providing that credit and the assumption that the individuals who avail themselves of these credit products are acting in their best interests.

However, recent scholarship on high-price consumer credit that draws on research from psychology and economics is skeptical that everyone who borrows on these terms is acting in their own best interests. Scholars in this area argue that these high-price credit products can exploit individuals’ cognitive biases or limitations in ways that make those individuals worse off.

Why would someone make the mistake of taking out a loan that will leave them worse off? There are generally two sources of error that scholars point to. The first source of error is consumers’ limited ability to understand a loan’s terms. Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren argue that credit products should be subject to comprehensive safety regulation, largely because of this concern. Bar-Gill and Warren focus on

21 See Matthew J. Rossman, Counting Casualties in Communities Hit Hardest by the Foreclosure Crisis, 2016 Utah L. Rev. 245, 257.
22 See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal, Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit Scoring Puzzles?, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 412, 413 (2009) ("Payday borrowers’ average incomes are much lower [than similar borrowers who do not use payday loans.").
consumers’ inability to understand the terms of debt products— mortgages in particular—and note that consumer confusion about these products can persist because there are relatively few opportunities for borrowers to learn from their mistakes. The second source of error is rooted in how people think about the tradeoff between benefits enjoyed now and costs borne later in time. Some scholars argue that borrowers may make mistakes with debt even if they are fully aware of the contractual terms, because they fail to properly appreciate the long-run costs associated with the loans.

The fundamental nature of consumer credit is that consumers receive money that they can use to purchase goods and services that they want now, while putting off the costs of paying for those things until some point in the future. There are several reasons why individuals might incur large interest charges and other fees to trade a large cash payment in the future for a smaller cash payment now, some of them rational and some of them not. One explanation for high-price borrowing is that people are excessively optimistic, expecting that the burden of repaying the debt in the future will be lighter than the cost of paying out of pocket now. Another explanation for why fully informed individuals might make irrational choices involving tradeoffs between the present and the future is that those individuals are subject to present bias. Such individuals underestimate the pain that they will experience when they must pay back the loan because they generally discount the well-being of their future selves. Individuals with present bias treat the present very differently than any other period in their life; they constantly procrastinate and put off unpleasant tasks, believing that they will get around to them tomorrow, and they act impulsively to satisfy their appetites in the present.

26 For a discussion of the barriers to learning from credit mistakes in the context of credit cards, see id. at 17–21. The problem is even more acute in the case of mortgages, which are used less frequently.


Present bias is a theory about how people make intertemporal tradeoffs in consumption, not cash, so some assumptions must be made to apply the theory to understand demand for high-price credit products with low upfront costs and high deferred costs. Scholarship that applies economic models of present bias sometimes conflates temporal patterns of cash flows and consumption, but these patterns are only equivalent in certain circumstances. Specifically, cash is only equal to consumption when the borrower is living hand to mouth. To see why, consider first an individual’s preferences over cash flows.

Given a choice between receiving $100 today or $100 a year from now, an individual will generally value the hundred dollars today more than the hundred dollars a year from now. Why? One reason is the risk that the payment promised to be made a year from now will not in fact be made. The second reason to prefer cash now is that the hundred dollars received today can be invested at some positive rate of return such that it will be worth more than $100 a year from now. Thus, whether the household wants to spend the money on consumption now or later, they would rather have it now, and the degree to which they prefer having it now depends on both the credit risk of the promisor and the rate of return that the household could earn on $100 today. Note that neither of these factors is particular to the household itself; the investment return and the credit risk of the promisor have nothing to do with the household’s preferences about consuming now or later.

Consider now an individual’s preferences over the consumption of goods and services. For example, how does someone think about whether they prefer a vacation today or a vacation a year from now? How does an individual compare a fine meal received next week as compared with a fine meal received in six months? Preferences between goods and services at two different points in time are governed not by market rates of return but by the preferences of the individual herself. In contrast to preferences over cash flows, preferences over consumption at different points in time are unique to individuals and the goods and services under consideration. Although it might seem quite intuitive for an individual to prefer a fine meal in one week to that same fine meal in six months, it would not be irrational for an individual to prefer the latter. They might simply enjoy the anticipation of looking forward to that meal, such that they would rather receive it a little further out into the future. By contrast, anyone who prefers more money to less will prefer to receive cash now instead of later.
It is typically assumed that individuals prefer consumption sooner rather than later, if only because there is some chance that they will not be around to enjoy consumption at that later date. The rate at which future consumption is discounted may be high, or it may be low, but it is generally assumed to be positive. The scholarly literature on present bias formalizes a very particular way that individuals discount future consumption. Individuals with present bias generally prefer consumption at future date \( t \) a little more than the same consumption received at future date \( t + 1 \), but when these individuals actually arrive at date \( t \), their preferences change so that they dramatically prefer consumption at current date \( t \) to consumption at future date \( t + 1 \). Thus, the preferences of the individual for consumption at time \( t \) as compared with time \( t + 1 \) change over time, and for that reason, they are irrational from an economic perspective.\(^{31}\)

To see how such preferences function, consider the following. Given the choice by his employer between a week of vacation a month from now and ten days of vacation two months from now, Andrew might decide that the extra five days of vacation is worth the wait and choose the ten days of vacation. However, if Andrew is asked again a month from now, and he is given the choice between five days of vacation immediately and ten days of vacation in a month, Andrew might decide he just cannot wait any longer and would in fact prefer the five days of vacation now.\(^{32}\) His preference between the two vacations depends on when he is asked. These sorts of preferences, which lead to impulsive behavior and procrastination, are both intuitively familiar to most of us and have been well substantiated in the economics literature.\(^{33}\)

\(^{31}\) Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman, Behavioral Law and Economics 10 (2018) (“[E]conomic rationality assumes . . . that people’s preferences are exogenously given and do not change over time.”).

\(^{32}\) This change in his preferences means that he would be willing to pay some amount of money to change the choice between vacations he made at that earlier date. Such inconsistency is generally viewed as irrational, if only because it opens Andrew up to the risk of being a “money pump” or being exploited by a “Dutch Book.” See generally, Robin P. Cubitt & Robert Sugden, On Money Pumps, 37 Games & Econ. Behav. 121, 121–23 (2001) (arguing that money pump arguments do not unequivocally support consistency assumptions).

Preferences over cash flows and consumption are only equivalent when individuals consume whatever cash they have on hand. The most extreme case, in which households are living entirely hand to mouth, is generally limited to the very poorest households. Nevertheless, many households are much more liquidity and credit constrained than is typically appreciated, so that the amount of cash they have on hand at any one time can have surprisingly large effects on important consumption and investment decisions with long-lasting consequences. There is accumulating evidence that cash constraints can have outsized effects beyond what would seem to be rational, affecting college enrollment, mortgage default, and household consumption generally. In the remainder of this Article I assume that users of high-priced credit products are cash constrained, so that present bias is a plausible potential explanation for the popularity of high-priced credit products with low upfront costs, such as subprime mortgages, credit cards with teaser rates, and payday loans.

A. Tempted To Do the Right Thing

If people use high-priced credit products because they are irrationally impulsive, then this would seem to be a knockdown argument in favor of stringent regulation and perhaps outright prohibition of these products. The appealing logic of the marketplace is that when two informed and rational parties enter a consensual exchange, they are each left better off than they were before. This is true even when the terms of the transaction favor one of the parties by allocating a greater share of the surplus or total benefits of the transaction to them. Thus, if lenders and borrowers are

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34 This is not to say that models of present bias can only explain demand for deferred cost credit or individuals who are cash constrained. See, e.g., Paul Heidhues & Botond Köszegi, Exploiting Naïvete About Self-Control in the Credit Market, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 2279, 2279–303 (2010).
39 For example, consider a widget manufacturer for whom the cost of producing and selling each widget is $10. Suppose that the value of a widget to consumers is $20. The social benefit of selling each widget is $10 ($20 - $10). If the price of a widget is $19, then the manufacturer
acting in their best interests, we should be wary of regulating, and perhaps
curtailing, a market that makes everyone better off, even if the distribution
of gains is not what we might prefer.

But if credit products like payday loans, subprime mortgages, title
loans, and tax RALs primarily effect a mere transfer of resources from
low-income households to lenders (rather than create value from a
mutually beneficial exchange) because borrowers are making decisions
that are harmful to their own economic interests, then this appealing logic
does not hold. There would then be at least a prima facie case for
consumer protection regulation of the substantive terms of credit. In this
Section, I argue that it is only a prima facie case. In fact, there are a variety
of circumstances in which an individual would take out a high-priced loan
because she is present-biased and yet she would be strictly worse off if
the high-priced loan was prohibited and only the cheaper loan was
available. The rest of this Section explains how this is possible.

Consider a present-biased individual who is cash constrained so that
she lives hand to mouth and consumes entirely out of her cash on hand.
She is present-biased because she applies a discount factor $\beta$, which is
between zero and one, to all costs and benefits that she experiences in the
future.\textsuperscript{40} For the sake of simplicity, I assume that she does not also
discount future costs and benefits depending on how far into the future
they are, so $10$ spent on consumption yields the same benefit in one year
as it does in two years. For this individual, there is only now and later.
Adding additional conventional assumptions about discounting would not
change the analysis.

In addition to generally discounting future costs and benefits, our
individual might periodically have unexpected needs for cash, such as
those arising from medical emergencies, that affect the relative value of a
dollar today as compared with a dollar tomorrow. Suppose that our

derives $9$ of profit, and the consumer derives $1$ of “consumer surplus.” Both parties are
better off than if they had not transacted, even though the manufacturer derives a greater share
of the benefits.

\textsuperscript{40} For example, suppose that one dislikes physical exertion and that the variable $E$
denotes the burden of an hour’s worth of vigorous exercise. When deciding whether to exercise today,
that hour of exercise will seem daunting, but when evaluating the unpleasantness of that hour
of exercise undertaken in the future, it is conventional to multiply $E$ by a “discount factor”
that is less than one because future costs tend not to loom quite as large in the cost-benefit
calculations being made today. Thus, people tend to put off unpleasant tasks until the future.
As an individual’s discount factor approaches zero, she cares less and less about the future
costs (and benefits) of her actions.
individual is surprised by an unexpected expense so that she has an acute need for cash today and that she can choose between two loans for $50 with five-year terms. The first loan has $16 in upfront fees, and the rest of the loan is repaid in a series of four $12 payments. Call this the “conventional” loan. Under the terms of the second loan, she pays nothing until the end of the fifth year when she makes a single payment of $80. Call this the “teaser” loan. The cash flows from the two loans are shown in the first five columns of Figure 1. In the sixth column of Figure 1 is the net benefit or “utility” that the individual anticipates getting from the cash flows. I assume that, because of the urgent need for cash in year 1, each dollar in year 1 is worth 1.5 units of utility (“utiles”) while each dollar in years 2–5 is worth 1 utile. Moreover, the value of each future utile is discounted using the factor $\beta$. A fully rational individual in this framework does not discount the future. For such an individual, $\beta$ is equal to one, and the seventh column shows the utility she would derive from the two loans. The last column shows the utility a fully present-biased individual, for whom $\beta$ is equal to zero, would derive from the two loans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Rational Person ($\beta = 1$)</th>
<th>Biased Person ($\beta = 1$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash in</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash out</td>
<td>$16 $12 $12 $12 $12</td>
<td>$48 $48 $48 $48 $48</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash in</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash out</td>
<td>$0 $0 $0 $80</td>
<td>$75 $75 $75 $75</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A rational individual will prefer the conventional loan to the teaser loan because the total utility value from the cash flows under the conventional loan is greater (three is greater than negative five). On the other hand, the present-biased individual will prefer the teaser loan because she does not

\[41\] For example, consider the utility from the conventional loan. The net cash received in year 1 is $34, and the utility derived from that cash is $34 \times 1.5 = 51$ utiles. The total cash paid in years 2–5 is equal to $48$, which is worth $48$ utiles. These utiles are discounted by the factor $\beta$ as of year 1, so the expected utility from the loan is equal to $51 - \beta 48$. 


look beyond the current year (seventy-five is greater than fifty-one).

More generally, an individual will prefer the teaser loan as long as she is sufficiently biased, which will be the case whenever $\beta$ is less than $3/4$.

The important difference between these two loans, and the reason that the rational and the present-biased individuals have opposing preferences, is the difference in the timing of costs and benefits. The rational individual cares only about the total amount of utility generated by the loan. The present-biased individual cares only about maximizing her immediate access to cash and completely ignores any costs incurred in the future. Note also that although the biased individual would choose the teaser loan over the conventional loan, she prefers the conventional loan to no loan at all, because her net benefit from the conventional loan is greater than zero. Thus, if the teaser loan were banned, then the biased individual would take out the conventional loan, which is in fact the best outcome for her.

But present bias does not only affect choices among credit products. As discussed above, present bias applies to how people make choices when there are intertemporal tradeoffs in consumption, not (in general) cash flows. Nevertheless, the effect of present bias on regular purchasing decisions has not generally been a point of emphasis in the literature. This is an important omission because some of the most important examples of credit products that exploit present bias are ones that facilitate the acquisition of durable goods.

Durable goods are commodities that generate benefits for the owner over time. Quintessential examples include cars, houses, appliances, and furniture. It is the essence of a durable good that it confers benefits over time, and when the durable good is acquired without financing, it also requires a current cash outlay to purchase. Thus, durable goods invert the temporal pattern of costs and benefits associated with borrowing. Consider the example of a durable good given in Figure 2, which shows the cash flows and utility derived from acquiring the durable good. In contrast to the example in Figure 1, assume that each dollar generates 1

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42 The two extreme cases of perfect rationality and complete present bias are for illustrative simplicity, and the conclusions I draw in this example do not depend on these extreme cases.
43 The utility from Loan 2 is greater than the utility from Loan 1 if $75 - 80 > 51 - 48$. Rearranging the terms in the inequality results in Loan 2 being preferred if $24 > 32$ or $3/4 > \beta$.
44 See supra text accompanying note 31.
utile, whether in the present or the future. The good is purchased for $50 at the beginning of year 1 and provides the owner with $15 of consumption benefits in the first year and $30 for each of the following four years, after which it becomes useless. Evaluated at the beginning of year 1, the utility from owning the durable good is -35 $+\beta120$, which is simply the undiscounted net benefit in year 1 (equal to $15 - $50) and the discounted sum of the future benefits ($30 in each of the following four years). A fully rational consumer (for whom $\beta$ is equal to one) will expect to derive 85 utiles from the purchase. A completely biased individual (for whom $\beta$ is equal to zero) will only give weight to the costs and benefits in year 1 and, on this basis, would not purchase the good because the expected net benefit in that case is -35.

**Figure 2: Preferences over Durable Goods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Rational Person ($\beta = 1$)</th>
<th>Biased Person ($\beta = 0$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$15$</td>
<td>$-35 + \beta 120$</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$30$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$30$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$30$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$30$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The case of durable goods is complementary with the case of deferred-cost credit products. In the latter case, the immediate access to cash and deferred repayment terms of credit cards offering low teaser rates or mortgages with escalating payments tempt people to use a credit product they probably should not. In the former case, the immediate costs and deferred benefits associated with a durable good discourage present-biased individuals from buying something that they should. Thus, the more present-biased an individual is, the less likely she is to invest in durable goods, and the more likely she is to borrow money at higher rates when the costs of repayment are pushed out into the future.46

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46 Present bias compounds a built-in market bias against durable goods that arises from imperfections in financial markets. Professor Rampini shows that durable goods are more expensive than non-durable goods because they are harder to finance; their resale value cannot be fully pledged, so durable assets are more likely to be rented than purchased with credit. Adriano A. Rampini, Financing Durable Assets, 109 Am. Econ. Rev. 664, 665 (2019).
But what if the financing and the durable good are bundled together, as they frequently are, with the proceeds from the loan used to purchase the good? To give an example, suppose that our borrower has $16 in savings, and she can choose one of three options: (1) spend her $16 today and not buy the durable good, (2) use the $16 with the proceeds from the conventional loan to acquire the durable good, and (3) spend her $16 today and buy the durable good with the proceeds from the teaser loan. Figure 3 shows how our borrower values these options. From a rational consumer’s perspective, there is a positive net benefit from purchasing the durable good using either the conventional loan or the teaser loan, but the net benefit is greater if it is purchased using the conventional loan.

**Figure 3: Preferences over Financed Durable Goods**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Utility</th>
<th>Rational Person ($\beta = 1$)</th>
<th>Biased Person ($\beta = 0$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The biased individual will purchase the durable good with the teaser loan because her utility from this option is greater than both buying the good with the conventional loan and not buying the durable good at all.

Rampini argues that credit constrained households are discouraged from buying durable goods because durable goods force households to save, making households with low net worth reluctant to buy [them]. Such households buy “low-quality” non-durable goods because these are cheaper to them as these goods have a smaller up-front cost, whereas households with high net worth buy “high-quality” durable goods because these are cheaper to them since they are less constrained which means that the opportunity cost of the additional funds required to purchase durable goods is lower.

Id. at 697.
However, the biased individual will also only purchase the durable good if the teaser loan is available. If the teaser loan is not available, then the biased individual will not buy the durable good because her utility from financing the purchase with the conventional loan is less than the utility from not buying the good. The best outcome for our biased individual—and the outcome that a rational individual would achieve—is to finance the purchase of the durable good with the proceeds from the conventional loan. However, she is still better off buying the durable good with the teaser loan than not buying the good at all.

How is it that the teaser loan, which is objectively worse for the biased individual than the conventional loan, can make her better off than if the teaser loan were not available? The key is that the teaser loan converts the temporal pattern of costs and benefits associated with the durable good (which from a rational perspective she should buy) from one that is unappealing to her—because it involves incurring current costs to generate future benefits—to one that is appealing because it provides current benefits in exchange for deferred costs. The individual is effectively tempted through the financing to do the right thing with respect to the durable good purchase.47

It is straightforward enough to see from the example above that, as a theoretical matter, we would expect present-biased individuals to under-consume durable goods. But this is not just a theoretical possibility. There is empirical evidence that people fail to consider the long-run cost savings, such as reduced electricity consumption, from buying energy-saving durable goods.48 Moreover, this result is not limited only to durable goods. Any good or service that requires a current outlay of time, money, or effort to acquire, and which yields future benefits, is potentially one

47 Milkman et al. call this general phenomenon “temptation bundling” and demonstrate how bundling a pleasurable “want” experience with a “should” behavior (such as going to the gym) can increase the amount of the “should” behavior that people engage in. Katherine L. Milkman et al., Holding the Hunger Games Hostage at the Gym: An Evaluation of Temptation Bundling, 60 Mgmt. Sci. 283, 283–84 (2014). More generally, one can think of the complementarity between the mode of financing and the durable good purchase decision as a violation of the “separability” hypothesis, which holds that financing decisions and real investment decisions can be evaluated independently of each other. See, e.g., John Wald, Capital Structure with Dividend Restrictions, 5 J. Corp. Fin. 193, 194 (1999).

that is under-consumed by present-biased individuals. These goods or services could become attractive to present-biased individuals if their purchase were financed with the deferred repayment terms that are characteristic of exploitative credit products. One important category of transactions to which this logic applies are those undertaken by citizens to claim social welfare benefits. Applying for benefits is a burdensome and time-consuming task with rewards that are only received in the future.⁴⁹ In Parts II–V, I study how RALs convert the temporal pattern of current costs and future benefits associated with filing a tax return to a different pattern of current benefits and future costs, which is both appealing to taxpayers and likely leaves them better off than if they did not have access to refund loans. In the rest of this Part, I describe some of the credit products that are most often associated with present bias and discuss how the argument I have just outlined applies to those cases.⁵₀

B. Credit Cards

Credit card debt is expensive, and Americans have a lot of it. The average American household has $8701 in credit card debt, and the aggregate amount of credit card debt as of January 1, 2019, was more than one trillion dollars.⁵¹ Americans pay nearly $113 billion per year in interest and fees.⁵² The cost and amount of credit card borrowing is difficult for traditional economic models to explain, and there are a


⁵₀ Although I do not discuss them in this Part, scholars study car title loans by applying insights from behavioral economics. These scholars suggest that the main concern with car title loans is that borrowers underestimate the costs of the title loans, and that borrowers are “overly optimistic” and present-biased, which can lead them to be delinquent on their payments. Kathryn Fritzdixon et al., Dude, Where’s My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1013, 1016–17. The authors of this study report that 19% of their borrowers are present-biased, while 30% have high discount rates but are not irrational. Id. at 1047. Another example is the use of collateralized loans made by pawnshops. One study finds that consumer behavior is consistent both with consumers who are present-biased but are aware of this fact and can take steps to manage it, and with consumers who are fully rational. Carter & Skiba, supra note 33, at 212, 216–17.


variety of puzzles surrounding the use of credit cards that call into question the traditional rational actor model.\textsuperscript{53} For example, many individuals pay high rates of interest on their credit card debt at the same time that they also hold assets that yield lower rates of return.\textsuperscript{54} Why don’t they sell some of these assets and use the proceeds to pay down credit card debt? The net effect would be an improvement in their financial condition. Scholars often offer present bias as an explanation for liquidity puzzles of this kind.\textsuperscript{55} Credit card debt is typically used for consumption, with individuals tending to increase their debt balances whenever their credit allowance increases. The pattern suggests that the people who spend until they approach their credit card limits want to consume a large fraction of each additional dollar of cash they can earn or borrow.\textsuperscript{56} This kind of behavior is consistent with present bias, and indeed, there is evidence that present-biased individuals have more credit card debt than other people even after controlling for borrowing constraints, demographics, and disposable income.\textsuperscript{57}

Moreover, there is direct evidence that consumers often choose credit cards that are more expensive than the alternatives. Credit cards are offered with a variety of fees and rates. Given the choice, a rational consumer would choose the credit card that minimizes their total costs, given their expectations about how likely they are to have to carry a balance and therefore pay interest. In fact, many consumers do this reasonably well. Agarwal et al. report evidence that, given the choice between a card with a high fee and a low interest rate, and another card with no fee and a high interest rate, the majority of consumers choose the

\textsuperscript{53} Angeletos et al., supra note 33, at 61–62 (using hyperbolic models to explain credit card debt).

\textsuperscript{54} Sumit Agarwal et al., Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Contracts?, 4 Rev. Corp. Fin. Stud. 239, 241–42 (2015) (“About one-third of the credit-card borrowers have substantial assets in checking and savings that are beyond levels reasonably needed for cash transactions . . . .”) (citing David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, Do Liquidity Constraints and Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit Card Data, 117 Q.J. Econ. 149, 180 (2002)).

\textsuperscript{55} David Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, A Debt Puzzle, in Knowledge, Information, and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics: In Honor of Edmund S. Phelps 228, 229 (Philippe Aghion et al. eds., 2003).

\textsuperscript{56} Gross & Souleles, supra note 54, at 181.

\textsuperscript{57} Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing, 2 Am. Econ. J. 193, 195 (2010).
card that minimizes their total costs. Nevertheless, roughly 40% of consumers choose the more expensive credit card.

Scholars and regulators tend to be most suspicious of credit cards with low initial interest rates (teaser rates) and higher backend fees, in part because this fee structure seems designed to exploit errors or imperfections in consumer rationality such as present bias. Oren Bar-Gill argues that a “combination of behavioral biases . . . results in the underestimation of future borrowing.” Professors Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren argue that one of these biases is “imperfect self-control” (by which they mean present bias), and they draw on other work arguing that consumers’ preference for credit cards with low teaser rates is precisely because those “consumers are aware of their imperfect self-control and seek credit arrangements that would help them precommit to borrow less.”

To be clear, there are other possible reasons why cards with low teaser rates are popular. One reason is that households may underestimate the likelihood that they will need to borrow using that credit card. Consumers who are subject to excessive optimism “tend to underestimate the likelihood of adverse events that might necessitate borrowing.” If a consumer does not think that she will ever have to pay interest on a credit card balance, the interest rate matters little to her. Professors Bar-Gill and Bubb argue that many credit cards impose high long-term costs and low short-term prices and that “imperfectly rational consumers still find it difficult to understand the cost of credit card borrowing.” They argue that consumers should be told what the expected cost of credit will be based on predicted usage, and that regulation should address low teaser rates as well as high backend fees.

My argument in this Article is that credit products with low initial costs and higher backend costs are less pernicious, and may in fact be

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58 Agarwal et al., supra note 54, at 247–48.
59 The likelihood of choosing the wrong contract falls as the magnitude of the error increases, and consumers who make large errors are more likely to switch to the correct contract. Id. at 252.
61 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 25, at 34.
63 Bar-Gill, supra note 60, at 1375.
65 Id. at 1004–11.
beneficial, when they must be used to finance the purchase of a good or service with deferred benefits. Credit cards, of course, can be used for just about everything. Consumers use their credit cards at least 34% of the time when shopping at department stores and when eating out.66 Some of these purchases, such as eating out, are for non-durable goods that are immediately consumed. But credit cards can also be used to buy durable goods and pay for services such as tax preparation that have deferred benefits. However, data on the high rate of credit card use with online retailers cannot distinguish between the purchase of durable goods—such as appliances—and non-durable goods. Because credit card debt is not necessarily used to finance the acquisition of a durable good, the tempting features of low teaser rates and higher backend fees are more likely to harm present-biased consumers. Given the choice between using revolving credit to purchase immediate consumption or a durable good, the present-biased individual will be tempted to use the money to purchase immediate consumption.

C. Mortgages

Home mortgage debt dwarfs credit card debt by more than an order of magnitude: there was $9.44 trillion of outstanding home mortgage debt in 2019.67 This number includes both loans used to purchase homes and home equity loans, which are often, but not always, used for home renovations.68 This number also includes loans with a wide variety of terms. On one end is the conventional thirty-year fixed-rate mortgage under which the principal of the loan is amortized over thirty years, thereby obligating the homeowner to make a series of equal payments. On the other end are more exotic loans with terms such as a variable rate of interest or deferred interest and principal on the loan so that the borrower does not need to pay anything early in the life of the loan. Loans with adjustable rates (adjustable rate mortgages or ARMs) have historically enjoyed some popularity, despite the risks of adverse interest rate moves. In one study, 25% of those surveyed said that they would

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68 Id.
Myopic Consumer Law

prefer an ARM to a fixed-rate loan.\textsuperscript{69} ARMs are even more popular with young borrowers, those with low incomes, those with only a high school education, and Hispanics and African Americans.\textsuperscript{70}

Many of the loans with these more exotic features were made in the run up to the financial crisis to borrowers who posed a greater risk of default.\textsuperscript{71} Such loans were known as “subprime” loans.\textsuperscript{72} Professor Bar-Gill argues that subprime loans target “[i]mperfectly rational borrowers”\textsuperscript{73} because of two key features that distinguish them from the traditional thirty-year fixed-rate loan: deferred costs and complexity.\textsuperscript{74} Costs are typically deferred through “small down payments and high LTVs [loan-to-value ratios], escalating payments, and prepayment penalties.”\textsuperscript{75} The complexity arises from the wide variety of fees and the circumstances in which they are imposed.\textsuperscript{76} As with credit cards, Bar-Gill asserts that present bias and optimism explain the demand by consumers for products with large deferred costs.\textsuperscript{77} Optimistic borrowers expect that they will be in a better position to make payments in the future than they are now. Present-biased borrowers, of course, under weigh all future costs in their cost-benefit calculations.

In contrast to credit cards and other revolving lines of credit, the most important characteristic of home purchase loans is that the proceeds must be used to purchase a particular good: a house. Homes are the most economically important consumer durable, and they are most households’

\textsuperscript{69} Michael Finke et al., Characteristics of Recent Adjustable-Rate Mortgage Borrowers, 16 J. Fin. Counseling & Planning 17, 18 (2005).
\textsuperscript{70} Id. (“ARMs were preferred by: 32% of respondents 18–24 years old, 33% whose income is < $25,000, 29% with a high school diploma as opposed to 21% with college degrees, and 37% of Hispanics, 31% of African-Americans, and 23% of Whites.”).
\textsuperscript{72} Id.
\textsuperscript{73} Id. at 1079; see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit, Regulatory Failure, and Next Steps 5 (2011) (describing the rise of subprime lending and why borrowers enter these loans); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1255, 1279 (2002) (describing how subprime lenders target “[b]orrowers who present elevated risk levels”).
\textsuperscript{74} Bar-Gill, supra note 71, at 1076–77.
\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 1096.
\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 1121.
\textsuperscript{77} Id. at 1120–21.
most valuable asset.78 By purchasing a home, a homeowner acquires the right to live in it. Thus, if the home is paid for in cash, the purchaser swaps the ability to use that cash for current consumption with a stream of housing consumption that they will enjoy over time. The primary alternative to homeownership for most households is to rent. Under a residential rental agreement, the renter makes periodic cash payments in exchange for the right to live in the property for that period, so cash outlays are roughly contemporaneous with the renter’s enjoyment of the housing.

Buying a home, on the other hand, is a risky investment; it places a large amount of the purchaser’s buying power in one asset that yields only deferred benefits. Those benefits are the ability to live in the home rent free and the accumulated equity that can be extracted when the home is ultimately sold. In this way, housing acts as a savings vehicle. Of course, the value of the property when the homeowner decides to stop living in it is uncertain, but the risk of homeownership is not one-sided. Owning a home also hedges the homeowner against fluctuations in the cost of renting.79 Economically, the longer a household expects to live in a home, the more important this hedge against rent risk becomes, and the relatively less important becomes the risk around its future value when the household sells the property.80

Present-biased consumers undervalue homeownership. In any case where the home is not 100% financed, at least part of the purchase price of a home must be paid up front. Thus, in all but a small number of cases, a homebuyer must have saved enough to make a down payment. Present-biased individuals have difficulty saving and are disinclined to use liquid assets for things other than immediate consumption.81 In exchange for an

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79 Todd Sinai & Nicholas S. Souleles, Owner-Occupied Housing as a Hedge Against Rent Risk, 120 Q.J. Econ. 763, 764 (2005) (“Unlike standard assets, houses effectively pay out annual dividends equal to the ex post spot rent, and so provide a hedge against rent risk. Hence considering asset price risk in isolation fails to account for households’ entire risk position.”).
80 Id.
upfront cash payment, a homebuyer acquires an asset that they can use to save for retirement or bequest, and they also receive the periodic rental value of the property as housing consumption. Both benefits are deferred until the future. Because most home loans are used to acquire or make substantial renovations to a consumer durable (i.e., a house), the temporal pattern of costs and benefits of these loans should be integrated with the pattern of costs and benefits of the durable to determine whether present-biased individuals are likely to be made worse off by the loan.

D. Payday Loans

Every year, roughly two and a half million Americans take out a payday loan, and in 2016 aggregate loan volume was approximately $40 billion, and fee revenue was $6 billion.82 Payday loans are short-term loans of between one and two weeks for generally no more than $1000.83 The loans are very expensive, often costing 10% to 20% of the principal amount,84 and one scholar estimates the all-things-considered cost of such loans (the annual percentage rate or APR) to be between 400% and 600%.85 What explains the high cost of such short-term loans?

Asymmetric information is an important feature of the payday lending market. Specifically, borrowers who choose larger loans tend to be more likely to default (adverse selection).86 Payday loan borrowers also tend to be very credit constrained, with consumption needs that outstrip their cash on hand. Professors Dobbie and Skiba find that payday borrowers will borrow between $0.39 and $0.44 per additional dollar of credit that they are offered.87 By comparison, credit card holders borrow between $0.10 and $0.14 of each additional dollar of credit they are offered.88 The high

84 Id.
87 Id. at 268.
88 Id. at 257.
rate of borrowing when additional credit is available suggests that payday borrowers have a very high demand for credit.89

Are borrowers acting rationally when they take out a payday loan? Direct evidence on this question is scarce, but many payday loan borrowers have capacity on their credit cards when they take out payday loans, even though the annualized interest rates on payday loans are extraordinarily high.90 These individuals often have large monetary losses as a result of using a payday loan rather than a credit card. At the same time, these borrowers have been observed to approach their credit card limits in the period leading up to taking out a payday loan, suggesting that their alternative sources of credit may have been drying up.91

Payday loans are subject to a variety of state regulations, including both substantive limitations on prices and loan amounts and regulations on the process of loan origination. According to Bhutta et al., the principal amount of a payday loan is typically capped at 50% of the applicant’s after-tax paycheck.92 One of the most controversial features of payday loans is the ability of borrowers to pay only loan fees on the due date and rollover the loan principal until the following due date.93 Several states limit the number of rollovers, although these limitations can be difficult to enforce.94 In terms of the application process, applicants are required to provide identification and address verification, along with a recent paystub and checking account statement.95 As of 2012, fourteen states prohibited payday loans in their entirety.96 Professor Skiba concludes that although limitations on rollovers are appropriate, complete prohibitions are misguided, and in fact larger loans can be helpful for borrowers.97 Although the cost of payday loans is high, sometimes the cost of not having access to credit is greater, including bank account overdraft fees and having one’s utilities disconnected.98

90 Agarwal, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 22, at 412.
91 Id.; see also Bhutta, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 83, at 233.
92 Bhutta, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 83, at 227.
93 Id. at 227–28; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 25, at 44.
94 Bhutta, Skiba & Tobacman, supra note 83, at 228.
95 Id. at 227.
97 Id. at 1046.
98 Id. at 1045.
What are payday loans used for? Payday loans are generally used to cover ordinary living expenses, although sometimes they are used to cover emergency expenses such as car repairs or medical costs. One study reports that, among first-time payday loan borrowers, “69 percent used it to cover a recurring expense, such as utilities, credit card bills, rent or mortgage payments, or food; 16 percent dealt with an unexpected expense, such as a car repair or emergency medical expense.”

Survey respondents said that if they were unable to get a payday loan, then they would cut expenses, sell possessions, delay paying other bills, or rely on friends and family to help see them through. The terms of payday loans do not restrict the use to which the funds can be put, so it is unsurprising that they are used for a variety of purposes. Given the modest size of these loans, however, it is unlikely that large consumer durables would be a significant use of the loans.

As between credit cards, home mortgages, and payday loans, home purchase and home equity renovation loans are the ones that regulators should be most wary of evaluating in isolation from the underlying purchase. Excess demand for debt created by the terms of a subprime mortgage may be just the thing that a present-biased individual needs to finance a home purchase that is in their best interest, but they would not otherwise make. The same logic applies to seller financing of cars, appliances, and energy efficiency-enhancing home improvements. In fact, the logic extends beyond the purchase of goods to the purchase of services as well. In Parts II–V, I report evidence that high-price loans may help present-biased individuals avail themselves of tax preparation assistance that results in larger refunds of the EITC than they would otherwise obtain. The stakes are high. The EITC is one of the largest social transfer programs for low-income households and has been shown to have


100 Id.

101 There have been very few empirical studies of RALs and RACs. The study that is closest in spirit to this one is Maggie R. Jones, A Loan by Any Other Name: How State Policies Changed Advanced Tax Refund Payments 2–3 (CARRA Working Paper Series, No. 2016-04, June 2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2016/adr-m/carra-wp-2016-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/TBQ9-FYA3]. Jones examined the effect of disclosure regulations and interest rate caps on RALs and RACs. Jones finds no effect of disclosure laws on the availability of RALs but does find evidence suggesting that state interest rate regulation may have driven households to cross state borders to obtain these products.
positive effects on infant health, the decision to work, poverty, childbearing, and marriage.

II. TAX RETURN PREPARERS AS LENDERS

Paid tax return preparers stand between many households and the U.S. Treasury. These households find that completing an individual income tax return is too burdensome to do on their own, and so tax return preparers satisfy a market demand that, if unmet, could result in lower tax compliance rates and higher rates of non-filing. At the same time, many preparers also sell to their customers financial and non-financial products that are paid for out of the taxpayer’s tax refund and that some believe are exploitative. National tax preparation chains, such as H&R Block and Jackson Hewitt, as well as used car dealers and payday lenders, all provide tax preparation services and generally attempt to bundle some other good or service with those services. Uneasiness about the financial products sold by paid preparers has led to increasing regulation of the tax preparation industry.

Regulation of the financial products sold by tax return preparers has largely been done within federal and state consumer protection frameworks. RALs, in particular, have drawn a great deal of criticism from consumer groups. This criticism culminated with a regulatory change in 2011 that nearly extinguished the market for RALs. The demise of RALs has been viewed as a victory by consumer protection advocates, who believe that the loans are harmful to the people who use

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Like payday loans and car title loans, RALs have very high APRs and tend to be purchased by low-income individuals. And so, like those loans, they raise suspicions of exploitation. Consumer advocates argue that their terms are unfair and that taxpayers would be better off without them. RALs are unquestionably expensive, but a more elusive question is whether the households who use RALs are acting in their own best interests. If they are, then the disappearance of RALs, distasteful though they seem, may have been harmful for those households.

But focusing on the consumer protection concerns arising from financial products such as RALs neglects the fact that these products are economic complements with tax preparation assistance, and interventions into the markets for these financial products could affect the use of tax preparers, with collateral effects on tax compliance and the take-up of transfers such as the EITC or the health insurance premium tax credit. What distinguishes RALs from other high-cost credit products such as payday loans is that RALs are closely linked to the tax system, to the collection of taxes, and to the distribution of benefits through tax law. Because RALs are bundled with tax preparation assistance, the price and availability of RALs is likely to affect the use of paid preparers, and the decision to use a paid preparer has consequences for tax compliance. Thus, an evaluation of the RAL market should consider its effects on the use of paid return preparers, income tax return filings rates, and tax compliance generally.

In Part IV, I report the first evidence of the effect of the RAL market on the demand for tax preparation assistance and the collateral effects on EITC take-up and demand for an alternative credit product, known as a refund anticipation check (RAC). I find that eliminating RALs is associated with reduced demand for tax preparation services, decreased rates of EITC take-up, and substitution of RACs for RALs. In one set of regression estimates, I find that 67% of RAL borrowers shifted to a RAC.


107 Id.
while 18% of RAL borrowers shifted to self-preparation and 6.2% stopped claiming the EITC.\textsuperscript{108}

There are several challenges to identifying the causal effect of RALs on EITC take-up and other tax filing outcomes, rather than merely identifying correlations that could be attributable to other factors. First, taxpayer characteristics that are associated with low incomes, EITC eligibility, credit constraints, and the need for tax preparation assistance are also likely to affect demand for RALs. Second, since RALs are secured by tax refunds—generally EITC refunds—an increase in EITC claims will tend to cause an increase in RALs. As a result, it could be that changes in EITC claims drive the change in RALs, rather than the other way around.

My solution to these challenges is to take advantage of a large regulatory intervention by the IRS that caused the near total disappearance of the market for RALs in 2011. On August 5, 2010, the IRS announced that it would no longer provide lenders with a “debt indicator,” which revealed to lenders whether the refunds that secured RALs would be subject to garnishment for child support or other debts.\textsuperscript{109} Without the debt indicator, the number of RALs in 2011 fell by 84% from the prior year.\textsuperscript{110} The regulatory change applied nationally but had different effects across the country depending on the number of taxpayers who were RAL users before 2011. The effect on RAL use was greatest in places where RALs were most popular before 2011.

The data do not allow me to differentiate between rational taxpayers—who would be harmed by an intervention that reduces the set of filing options available to them—and taxpayers who may be made better off by eliminating RALs because they are subject to some self-defeating bias. However, the high degree of substitution from RALs to RACs and the reduction in EITC claims suggest that many of the taxpayers who previously obtained RALs place a high value on paid preparation assistance and are either credit constrained or extremely impatient in the

\textsuperscript{108} This suggests that 15% of former RAL borrowers continued to use a paid preparer without purchasing a financial product. These are the estimates from the final regression in each of Tables 3–5, which uses the most years of data and the most control variables.

\textsuperscript{109} Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 105.

early months of the calendar year.\textsuperscript{111} I report survey evidence corroborating this. These results suggest that regulators should be wary about current efforts to curtail the market for RACs, since this product provides one of the last financing options for taxpayers who need tax assistance but are otherwise credit constrained and do not have cash on hand.

Consumer regulation of tax-time financial products must work hand in hand with tax administration, taking into account the effect of changing the availability of the regulated products on the demand for preparation assistance, and the changes in compliance that may result from inducing more taxpayers to prepare their own returns.

\textit{A. Refund Loans}

RALs are short-term loans, usually of one to two weeks. Tax return preparers help originate the loans for the financing entity (usually a bank) with which they work, and the preparers often acquire an economic interest in those loans. A taxpayer who takes out a RAL will have her tax refund directly deposited in a checking account owned by the financing entity, and the proceeds of the refund will be applied to pay off the principal of the loan, interest, and loan origination fees, as well as fees for the tax preparation itself. If the refund is less than the amount owed on the loan plus fees, then the taxpayer is liable for the difference. The following short summary of how RALs work appears in H&R Block’s Annual Report for 2009:

RALs are offered to our U.S. clients by a designated bank primarily through a contractual relationship with HSBC Holdings plc (HSBC). An eligible, electronic filing client may apply for a RAL at one of our offices. After meeting certain eligibility criteria, clients are offered the opportunity to apply for a loan from HSBC in amounts up to $9,999 based on their anticipated federal income tax refund. We simultaneously transmit the income tax return information to the IRS and the lending bank. Within a few days after the filing date, the client receives a check, direct deposit or prepaid debit card in the amount of the loan, less the bank’s transaction fee, our tax return preparation fee and other fees for client-selected services. Additionally, qualifying

\textsuperscript{111} When one form of high-interest credit is unavailable, individuals shift to other forms of high-interest credit. Neil Bhutta et al., Consumer Borrowing After Payday Loan Bans, 59 J.L. & Econ. 225, 227 (2016).
electronic filing clients are eligible to receive their RAL proceeds, less applicable fees, in approximately one hour after electronic filing using the Instant Money service. A RAL is repaid when the IRS directly deposits the participating client’s federal income tax refund into a designated account at the lending bank.\footnote{\textsuperscript{112} H&R Block, 2009 Annual Report 3 (2009), https://investors.hrblock.com/static-files/67f56d6f-c381-4f7b-a58c-e827657695b7 [https://perma.cc/S6TA-H7CZ].}

At their peak, in 2002, there were 14.1 million RAL applications filed.\footnote{\textsuperscript{113} Chi Chi Wu & Jean Ann Fox, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr. & Consumer Fed’n of Am., All Drain, No Gain: Refund Anticipation Loans Continue to Sap the Hard-Earned Tax Dollars of Low-Income Americans 3 n.3 (2004), https://nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/ral/2004-ral-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SUC6-YXXT].} In 2010, the year before the debt indicator was eliminated, H&R Block originated 2.1 million RALs, with an average amount of $3000 and terms of between ten and eleven days.\footnote{\textsuperscript{114} Cynthia Lin, Tax Preparers Regroup After IRS Moves To Limit Refund Loans, MarketWatch (Aug. 13, 2010, 5:44 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/tax-preparers-regroup-after-irs-move-on-rlas-2010-08-13 [https://perma.cc/6MGR-Q87G].} Each loan issued through H&R Block cost the taxpayer about $62, or 2.1\% of the loan principal.\footnote{\textsuperscript{115} Id.} Depending on the preparer and lender, total tax preparation and RAL fees could approach $500.\footnote{\textsuperscript{116} Id. at 18.}

RALs have been especially common in low-income communities. Taxpayers who file their returns early in the year, many of whom are EITC claimants, are most likely to use RALs and other tax-related financial products. As a result, critics have long argued that RALs are a drain on funds intended for low-income households, particularly the EITC. For the 2008 tax year, 64\% of RAL customers were EITC recipients, and 49\% of EITC claimants with a qualifying child obtained a RAL or RAC, as compared with only 9\% of taxpayers who did not receive the EITC.\footnote{\textsuperscript{117} Brett Theodos et al., Urban Inst., Who Needs Credit at Tax Time and Why: A Look at Refund Anticipation Loans and Refund Anticipation Checks 15 (2010), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27166/412304-Who-Needs-Credit-at-Tax-Time-and-Why-A-Look-at-Refund-Anticipation-Loans-and-Refund-Anticipation-Checks.PDF [https://perma.cc/R7W8-J2ST].} The Urban Institute reports that the median adjusted gross income of RAL borrowers was less than $20,000 and that a quarter of taxpayers with incomes between $10,000 and $25,000 used a RAL.\footnote{\textsuperscript{118} Id. at 18.}
America (CFA) calculate that RAL loan fees, preparer add-on fees, and tax preparation fees cost at least $292 per EITC taxpayer for a total drain on the EITC program of $1.3 billion in 2009. A series of reports by the NCLC and the CFA also found that African American and Latinx taxpayers disproportionately receive RALs, and in 2008 the New York State Division of Human Rights sued Jackson Hewitt and Liberty Tax Service for targeting minorities for RAL sales.

RALs would not, at first glance, appear to be a substitute for RALs; they do not allow the taxpayer to access her refund immediately. With a RAC, the taxpayer’s refund is deposited by the U.S. Treasury into an account opened at a participating bank. The taxpayer is given the refund from that account, net of a fee, at that time. H&R Block’s annual report describes their RAC product as follows:

Refund Anticipation Checks are offered to U.S. clients who would like to either: (1) receive their refund faster and do not have a bank account for the IRS to direct deposit their refund; (2) have their tax preparation fees paid directly out of their refund; or (3) receive their refund faster but do not qualify for a RAL under the existing credit criteria. A RAC is not a loan and is provided through a contractual relationship with HSBC.

RACs have a couple of features that are relevant for the purpose of comparing them with RALs. The first is that they allow the taxpayer to have her refund directly deposited into a checking account, which allows her to receive it more quickly than if she had to wait for a paper check to be mailed. A refund that is sent by direct deposit generally arrives a week before a refund check is received in the mail. The second feature is that RACs allow taxpayers to defer paying tax preparation fees because the fees are subtracted from the refund when it is disbursed to the taxpayer.


121 H&R Block, supra note 112, at 3.
Tax preparation firms have historically differed in their reliance on revenues from financial products such as RALs and RACs. For example, consumer advocates have noted that Jackson Hewitt is more reliant on fees from RALs and other financial products than H&R Block. This difference is reflected in the segmentation of the market and the different clientele served by the firms. In 2010, H&R Block sold a RAL to 16.8% of its clients. In 2009, Jackson Hewitt sold a financial product to 93% of its customers and derived 24% of its revenues from financial product fees. Liberty Tax, the third largest individual return preparer, derived 29% of its revenues from RAL and RAC fees in 2009.

B. Tax Preparers

More than half of all taxpayers use a paid professional to help prepare their tax return, and paid preparers are especially common in areas with large numbers of EITC claimants. Use of a paid preparer is especially common among Hispanic and African American households, households with lower educational attainment, and households with lower incomes. What explains the demand for paid tax preparation assistance? Taxpayers cite a lack of understanding of tax law, the amount of time that it would take to file tax returns without help, and the belief that using a preparer will reduce the likelihood of an audit. Thus, some of the demand for paid preparation appears to be caused by the complexity of the income tax and the burden of complying with filing obligations. In fact, these two concerns are something that EITC-eligible taxpayers have in common with high-income taxpayers with sophisticated business.

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122 Theodos et al., supra note 117, at 7 (noting that H&R Block’s revenue from such fees totaled 5.5% of its total revenue, while Jackson Hewitt’s represented 24%).
123 Wu & Fox, supra note 119, at 20.
124 Id. at 21–22.
125 Id. at 22.
127 See infra Table 1 (counties with more RALs have more EITC claimants and more tax preparers).
129 Book, supra note 116, at 96.
dealing.\textsuperscript{130} In light of the importance of tax complexity as a source of demand for tax preparation assistance, it is unsurprising that tax compliance varies with the use of preparation assistance.\textsuperscript{131}

Tax preparation assistance affects the likelihood that a taxpayer will claim the EITC and causes them to adjust how they report their income in response to the incentives created by the EITC refund schedule.\textsuperscript{132} An IRS audit of EITC claims for tax years 2006–2008 found that, among low-income filers who reported knowing about the EITC, 80\% of those who used a paid preparer claimed the credit whereas only 70\% of those who prepared their own return did so.\textsuperscript{133} One likely cause of the effect of paid preparation on EITC claims is that tax professionals can navigate the complexity of the EIC schedule and Form 1040, which has been shown to be a deterrent to take-up of the EITC.\textsuperscript{134} Another cause is the high-powered incentives that preparers have to obtain a refund for their clients.

If tax preparers develop a reputation for obtaining refunds for their clients, they may encourage clients to claim the EITC.\textsuperscript{135} It is likely that some complex


\textsuperscript{132} See Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an Experiment with EITC Recipients, 5 Am. Econ. J. 1, 6, 18, 26 (2013); Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman & Emmanuel Saez, Using Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods To Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings, 103 Am. Econ. Rev. 2683, 2684, 2699 (2013).

\textsuperscript{133} Maag, supra note 128, at 5. I do not evaluate whether all of the increase in EITC claims associated with paid preparation is meritorious. There is some evidence of a correlation between audit adjustments and RAL applications. See Book, supra note 116, at 102. While some have found that tax preparers increased EITC take-up following the introduction of electronic filing, see Wojciech Kopczuk & Cristian Pop-Eleches, Electronic Filing, Tax Preparers and Participation in the Earned Income Tax Credit, 91 J. Pub. Econ. 1351, 1366 (2007), others have not found tax preparation to have an effect on EITC claims, see Marsha Blumenthal, Brian Erard & Chih-Chin Ho, Participation and Compliance with the Earned Income Tax Credit, 58 Nat’l Tax J. 189, 210 (2005).

they are likely to attract additional customers. Moreover, if preparers file refund claims for their clients, then they may also be able to sell RALs, RACs, or other non-financial goods or services to be paid from the proceeds of these refunds. These incentives make it less likely that preparers will overlook a potential EITC claim, but also enhance the risk of fraudulent claims.

C. Demand for RALs

The profit motive explains why tax preparers sell RALs and RACs, but what explains why taxpayers want them? On the one hand, these products make it possible to borrow the cost of tax preparation and receive refunds more quickly. These are real benefits that a rational taxpayer might decide are worth the cost. On the other hand, consumer advocates argue that these products exploit unsophisticated filers and that they offer little benefit at a high cost.135 RAL and RAC use is correlated with low incomes, youth, head of household filing status, EITC receipt, and lower educational attainment, but these factors are all consistent with strained financial circumstances that would explain why a taxpayer may need to borrow the cost of tax preparation.136 RAL take-up is highest in the $5,000 to $10,000 AGI range.137 Among low- and medium-income households, unbanked households are more than twice as likely as similar banked households to take out a RAL, and many respondents say that they take out the RAL to get their refund sooner so they can pay down other debt or pay tax preparation fees.138 On the other hand, for some taxpayers, the relationship between tax preparation and the RAL is reversed: these taxpayers go to preparers primarily for the loan and view the tax return filing fee as part of the cost of the RAL.139

One challenge of evaluating whether RALs benefit taxpayers is that the costs of a RAL can easily be determined but the benefits of a RAL to the borrower generally cannot. One study by the Urban Institute reports that there may be considerable benefits for RAL borrowers from receiving a tax refund even a couple of weeks earlier than they otherwise would;

135 Theodos et al., supra note 117, at 1.
137 Theodos et al., supra note 117, at 49.
139 Elliehausen, supra note 136, at 72.
borrowers use them to discharge financial obligations and defer payment of tax preparation fees that they may not otherwise be able to finance.\textsuperscript{140} RAL and RAC applications are overwhelmingly filed in the first few weeks of filing season, and there is evidence that many customers become delinquent on rent, utilities, and other expenses over the winter holidays with the expectation of receiving their RAL in late January or early February and using it to get current on these other obligations.\textsuperscript{141} Deferring payment of these already delinquent liabilities even another couple of weeks could be very costly, potentially leading to eviction or utilities being cut off. The liquidity constraints of these households make even paying tax preparation fees burdensome. Half of those surveyed in the study said that paying the tax preparation fees was an important motivator in taking out a RAL or RAC.\textsuperscript{142}

In addition to present bias and credit constraints, two important variables that influence the relative benefits of tax financial products and the use of paid preparers are whether consumers have a checking account into which their refund can be directly deposited and whether they have internet access that they can use to electronically file their return. Direct deposit provides a one-week timing benefit over receiving a refund check by mail, and unbanked taxpayers may also incur check cashing fees if they receive a paper refund check. E-filing provides an even larger timing benefit; it allows taxpayers to get their refunds at least three weeks earlier than they would by paper filing. Survey evidence suggests that these timing benefits are important. RAL borrowers often lack a bank account or are mistrustful of banks, and are motivated by post-holiday financial strain, unexpected expenses, the inability to pay cash for tax preparation assistance, and an inability or unwillingness to use credit card debt to pay for tax assistance.\textsuperscript{143}

\textbf{D. The Disappearance of RALs}

In 2011, the market for RALs disappeared almost entirely. RAL applications fell by 84.5\%, from 6.85 million to 1 million, and by 2013

\textsuperscript{140} Theodos et al., supra note 117, at 13–14.
\textsuperscript{141} Id.
\textsuperscript{142} Id. at 31. But see Elliehausen, supra note 136, at 61 (“Less than one percent of customers mentioned paying for tax preparation as the primary reason for obtaining a refund anticipation loan.” (emphasis added)).
\textsuperscript{143} Theodos et al., supra note 117, at 32.
there were only 100,000 RAL applications.\textsuperscript{144} This precipitous decline was caused by a single regulatory change and two other market disruptions in the supply of RALs. The regulatory change was that the IRS stopped providing to preparers a debt indicator, which revealed whether a RAL applicant would have their refund garnished for back taxes, other government debts such as federally funded student loans, and child support arrears. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation subsequently notified the banks providing RAL financing that making loans without the debt indicator was unsafe and unsound.\textsuperscript{145} In addition, JPMorgan, which had provided financing to 13,000 independent preparers, exited the RAL market. HSBC, which had provided financing to H&R Block’s clients, was forced out of the market by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which prohibited it from making the loans.\textsuperscript{146} As a consequence, in 2011, only three small, state-chartered banks made RALs: Republic Bank & Trust, River City Bank, and Ohio Valley Bank/Fort Knox Financial Services.\textsuperscript{147} Even for banks that continued to make RALs, the loss of the debt indicator reduced the size of the maximum RAL that the banks would provide. For 2011, the maximum loan available from Republic Bank was $1500, and from River City Bank it was $750. Previously, RALs had been offered up to $10,000.\textsuperscript{148}

In response to the pressure of reduced RAL revenues, Jackson Hewitt and Liberty Tax began charging additional fees for any RALs that they facilitated. Ultimately, the loss of RALs had a significant effect on Jackson Hewitt, which was heavily reliant on revenue from the product. In addition to the loss of RAL fees, Jackson Hewitt lost 15\% of its retail customers because it was unable to provide RALs at half its locations.\textsuperscript{149} Jackson Hewitt’s business fell by 8\% in markets where it remained able to provide RALs, suggesting that some of the decline in its business was due to other factors, but the 21\% decline in markets where it was unable to provide RALs suggests that the inability to provide refund loans had a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{145} Wu & Fox, supra note 119, at 2.
\item \textsuperscript{146} Id. at 5.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Id. at 6.
\item \textsuperscript{148} Id. at 11–12.
\item \textsuperscript{149} Id. at 21–22.
\end{itemize}
significant effect on their tax preparation business. In Parts III and IV, I test this claim more rigorously and examine some of the collateral effects of the elimination of the RAL market.

III. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS

My empirical analysis of the relationship between RALs, tax return preparation, and EITC take-up is based on annual tax return data from the IRS’s Statistics of Income Division. These data were aggregated to the county level and merged with information on county demographic characteristics from the U.S. Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics. I also collected data on the locations of paid tax preparer offices for the three largest national tax preparation chains. This study is the first to exploit detailed location data of paid tax preparers.

A. County Data

Data on aggregate tax return filings at the zip code level were provided by the Brookings Institution, which obtained the data from the IRS. These data include the number of filings in thirteen different brackets of adjusted gross income, the number and amount of EITC claims, the number of self-prepared returns, and the number of RALs and RACs issued. Figure 4 shows the number of RAL applications by year for 2007–2014 and illustrates the precipitous and discontinuous decline in RALs for the 2011 filing season. Data on RALs and RACs are unavailable for 2012.

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150 Id. at 22.
152 Data are available at https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/earned-income-tax-credit-eitc-interactive-and-resources/ [https://perma.cc/R43N-LA2U].
The zip code level data were aggregated up to the county level using information provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This was done so that my analysis could include information on population, racial demographics, and poverty and unemployment that is only available at the county level. Allocation of zip codes across county boundaries, where necessary, was done according to the share of residential addresses in each county. Estimates of local population demographics and poverty rates were obtained from the U.S. Census, and employment data were taken from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics series generated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{B. Tax Preparer Data}

I obtained data on the locations of the three largest national tax preparer chains from AggData LLC, which has collected location data from the websites of H&R Block, Jackson Hewitt, and Liberty Tax at least

\textsuperscript{153} These data are available at https://www.bls.gov/lau/ [https://perma.cc/C8A5-4T88].
annually since January 2010. Individual tax preparation locations have detailed location information, including zip codes. As discussed above, the three national chains differ in the degree to which they rely on revenues from financial products sold in connection with tax preparation. Figure 5 shows that in counties where Jackson Hewitt offices make up the majority of national chain preparer offices, the average share of taxpayers applying for a RAL was greater than in counties where H&R Block or Liberty Tax is dominant. Although the gap between these three groups of counties disappeared by 2013, there remained a one percentage point gap in 2011, reflecting the fact that Jackson Hewitt was able to secure limited RAL financing in that year.

Figure 5: RAL Applicants by Majority Tax Preparer

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154 Data on file with author.
155 In certain years, AggData collected location data more than once. When this was the case, I used the locations listed on the first collection date after January 1. For the two filing seasons that are the focus of this study, these dates are January 14, 2010, and January 20, 2011.
156 See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
Table 1, in the Appendix, shows summary statistics for U.S. counties in 2009, the tax year generally corresponding to the 2010 filing season. Counties are divided into three groups (terciles) according to the percentage of taxpayers who applied for a RAL, and each row reports the average characteristic of counties in each group. Counties where RALs are more popular tend to have more EITC and child tax credit claims and a higher share of refunds. RAL use is associated with more RAC use, lower rates of self-preparation, higher rates of direct bank deposits for refunds, and lower filing rates overall. Counties with high rates of RAL use also tend to be smaller and poorer, with higher unemployment rates, lower labor force participation, and higher shares of black and Hispanic residents. Interestingly, high RAL-use counties tend to have more tax preparers despite being smaller than low RAL-use counties. Differences in the supply side of tax preparation services are also apparent. Jackson Hewitt is the dominant tax preparer in 19.9% of the high RAL-use counties, but it is the majority preparer in only 3.7% of the low RAL-use counties. Figure 6 shows how RAL use was distributed across the country in 2010, with the dark blue counties representing where the highest fraction of taxpayers sought a RAL.\textsuperscript{157}

\textsuperscript{157} Counties are divided in quartiles according to the fraction of tax filers that applied for a RAL. For counties colored white, less than 1.5% of taxpayers applied for a RAL. For counties colored with the lightest shade of grey, between 1.5% and 2.5% of taxpayers applied for a RAL. The next darkest shade of grey indicates counties where between 2.5% and 4.1% of taxpayers applied for a RAL, and the darkest shade of grey indicates counties where between 4.1% and 13.4% of taxpayers applied for a RAL.
Before 2011, RAL use was positively correlated with RAC use, the number of EITC claims, and the share of tax return filings with less than $30,000 in adjusted gross income, and it was negatively correlated with the share of returns that are self-prepared.158 The correlations between RAL and RAC use, EITC claims, and low-income taxpayers may be attributable to these taxpayers being severely credit constrained, present-biased, or something else altogether. Clearly, the mere correlation of these variables is not enough to conclude that RALs have a causal effect on RAC use, EITC take-up, or demand for paid tax preparation assistance.

Table 2 compares the counties that had RAL application rates of more than one percent in both 2010 and 2011 to show the effects of eliminating the debt indicator and the characteristics of counties in which RALs were still available after 2010. Recall that among the three national tax preparer chains, Jackson Hewitt was the only one that was able to make RAL loans in 2011. The few counties in which RALs were still available are those where demand is likely the highest. These are smaller counties in which 12.4% of filers claim the EITC, unemployment and poverty rates are higher, and residents have lower incomes. These counties also have more than twice as many black residents, on average, as counties with high RAL use in 2010. In 2011, Jackson Hewitt was the majority tax preparer in 27% of the counties where RALs were still available.

158 See infra Table 1; these correlations are all statistically significant at conventional levels.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

As discussed in Part III, refund loans correlate with economic and demographic factors that make it difficult to isolate the effect of RALs. Fortunately, a regulatory change that took effect for the 2011 filing season provides just the kind of natural experiment that makes it possible to disentangle the effect of RALs from other factors driving the use of paid tax preparers and EITC claims. Before 2011, the IRS provided tax return preparers with a debt indicator that revealed whether a RAL applicant would have their refund garnished for back taxes, other government debts such as federally funded student loans, and child support arrears. On August 5, 2010, the IRS announced that it would not provide RAL lenders with the indicator for 2011.159

This decision was the result of a process that began in January 2008, when the IRS issued a request for comments about whether it should limit the information it made available to lenders to facilitate the sale of certain financial products.160 The IRS was specifically concerned about whether these products (the profitability of which depend on taxpayers’ refunds) encouraged preparers to file false refund claims.161 The elimination of the debt indicator was a national policy change that affected all tax return preparers and financial institutions. However, variation across counties in the share of taxpayers using RALs meant that the number of taxpayers affected by the change varied widely by county.

There were two other disruptions to the supply of RALs in 2011. JPMorgan Chase voluntarily stopped providing RAL financing for the numerous small tax preparers with which it had historically worked, and the OCC ordered HSBC, which provided loans for H&R Block’s clients, to stop making the loans as well.162 Jackson Hewitt’s stock jumped 30% when news of the OCC’s decision was released.163 In 2011, only three small banks stood ready to make RALs. Jackson Hewitt continued to offer

159 Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 105.
161 Id. at 1132.
162 See Wu & Fox, supra note 119, at 5.
RALs at only some of its offices, but H&R Block and the small preparers that had relied on JPMorgan were excluded from the market entirely.

A. Empirical Approach

I use the elimination of the debt indicator and the other disruptions to the supply of RALs in 2011 as a natural experiment to test the effect of RALs on the number of taxpayers who use paid preparers, the number of EITC claimants, and the demand for RACs. Before 2011, the number of RALs varied considerably by county because of differences in the demographics of the local taxpayer population. In 2011, however, RALs were unavailable almost everywhere because of supply-side disruptions that took effect at a national level. My empirical approach exploits this national policy change by implementing what is known as a “difference-in-difference” research design. This approach compares the change in EITC claims before and after the elimination of the debt indicator (the first difference) between counties with high RAL use in 2010 and counties with low RAL use in 2010 (the second difference). If there is a larger decline in EITC claims in counties that had high RAL use in 2010 than the decline in counties that had low RAL use in 2010, then I attribute this to the elimination of the RAL market. The key empirical assumption in this approach is that the trends in the outcomes of interest are not different for counties that had high RAL use before the debt indicator was eliminated. Figures 7a–7c provide evidence that this assumption is valid. The Figures show the average value of the outcomes of interest for the years 2007–2011 for each of five groups of counties, defined by the RAL use in those counties in 2010.
Figure 7a: RACs by Year and 2010 RAL Use
Figure 7b: EITC by Year and 2010 RAL Use
Figure 7c: Self-Preparation by Year and 2010 RAL Use

Figure 7a shows the trends in the share of RAC applicants by year for the years 2007–2010. The trends appear parallel across all five groups. However, there is a noticeable jump in the number of RAC applicants in 2011 for those counties with the most RALs in 2010. This is the first evidence that eliminating the RAL market caused taxpayers to substitute to RACs. Figure 7b shows that the pre-2011 trends of EITC claims also track each other fairly closely. A close inspection suggests that the decline in EITC claims in 2011 may have been greater in counties with the most RALs in 2010, but the visual effect is subtle. In 2011, EITC participation rates did drop in thirty-nine states, an unusually large decline in participation compared with the declines in 2010 and 2012 of five states and eighteen states, respectively.

Figure 7c shows the trends in the share of self-prepared returns over time. The large jump in the number of self-prepared returns for 2008, particularly among the counties with the most RALs, is due to the 2008 federal tax stimulus payments that were only distributed to eligible taxpayers who filed a return for the 2007 tax year. This caused a large increase in the number of filers who were not otherwise obligated to file a return. Focusing on the change in number of self-filers from 2009 to
2010, the trends appear similar. In 2011, there was a general increase in the share of self-prepared returns across all counties, but the largest increase was concentrated in counties where at least 4.5% of filers had a RAL in 2010. Taken together, the visual evidence suggests that counties that had high rates of RAL use in 2010 were not trending differently in these key outcome variables before the elimination of the debt indicator.

B. Regressions

I test the effects of RALs by implementing the difference-in-difference empirical strategy using county-level data and estimating two different statistical regression models. In the first regression model, I focus on just the 2010 and 2011 tax filing years and estimate how changes in RALs within each county from 2010 to 2011 affected changes in tax filing outcomes, while controlling for demographic and local economic changes over the same period. In my second regression model, I use a longer data series including the 2009–2013 filing seasons.164

Although the elimination of the debt indicator caused the almost complete disappearance of the RAL market in 2011, there remained a limited supply of RALs in some regions depending on the dominant tax return preparer in the area. H&R Block lost its financing partner in HSBC while Jackson Hewitt and Liberty Tax remained able to make limited RALs in some regions. For this reason, I also estimate the effect of RALs separately depending whether the dominant preparer was H&R Block, Liberty Tax, or Jackson Hewitt.165

C. Results

Tables 3–5, in the Appendix, report the estimates for the effect of RALs on refund checks, self-prepared returns, and EITC claims, respectively. In my preferred regression specification, using the longer data series and the most control variables, I estimate that roughly 67% of RAL applicants

164 I cannot also include the 2008 filing season because the surge of tax filings prompted by stimulus payments made in that year make the population of returns in that year incomparable to other years. Data on RAL use in 2012 are not available. Estimating equations are in the Appendix.
165 Specifically, I interact the RAL variable with categorical variables indicating which of the three preparers was the majority preparer in the county.
switched to RACs, 18% of RAL users switched to self-preparation, and 6.2% stopped claiming the EITC.\textsuperscript{166}

1. The Effect of RALs on RACs

Table 3 reports estimates of the effect of RALs on RACs. The estimate on Post09#RAL09 in column IV is the primary number of interest; a one percentage point increase in RAL claimants in 2010 caused a 0.67 percentage point increase in RAC use in 2011, on average. This estimate is larger when I use fewer control variables (reported in column II), and even larger when I focus on the change in RAL use between 2010 and 2011 (reported in columns I and III for the $\Delta RAL$ variable). For example, the regression estimates in column I report the correlation between a change in RAL use from 2010 to 2011 and a change in RAC use. The estimate for $\Delta RAL$ indicates that a one percentage point decline in RAL use from 2010 to 2011 is associated with a 0.826 percentage point increase in RAC use in 2011. Columns III and IV also show estimates of how the effect of RALs differs according to the dominant tax preparation firm in the county (i.e., the firm, if any, with more than half of the offices in the county attributable to the three national chains).

The coefficients of these effects reveal that the substitution from RALs to RACs was stronger in counties where Jackson Hewitt or H&R Block was the dominant tax return preparer as compared with counties where there was no dominant preparer. It is possible that Jackson Hewitt and H&R Block marketed RACs more aggressively than other preparers or that they had relationships with banks that made them better able to offer this product than smaller preparers whose relationships with the banks were limited to the refund loan market. On the other hand, in counties where Liberty Tax was the dominant preparer, there was significantly less substitution to RACs. I cannot tell using these data whether this is due to differences in changes in demand for RACs relative to RALs in Liberty Tax counties or to differences in Liberty Tax’s business practices.

The estimated relationships between RAC use and demographic and economic factors are generally consistent with the summary statistics. RACs are more common in counties with higher shares of black and Hispanic residents. RAC use is also greater in counties with higher unemployment rates and lower incomes.

\textsuperscript{166} This assumes that all the effects of eliminating RALs were on the population of RAL claimants from the prior year.
2. The Effect of RALs on Demand for Paid Preparers

Table 4 reports the estimates for the effects of RALs on the share of filers who prepare those returns themselves, rather than through a paid preparer. The coefficient of 0.183 in column IV corresponds to a 0.183 percentage point increase in the share of returns that are self-prepared in 2011 for every percentage point increase in the share of filers obtaining a RAL in 2010.

Estimates of this effect vary somewhat—between 0.091 and 0.203—across the different regression models represented in Table 4, but the estimates are all statistically significant, meaning that the estimated relationship between RALs and the use of paid preparers is very unlikely to have arisen by chance. If we interpret these estimates together with the estimated effect of RALs on RAC demand, this suggests that more than 85% of the taxpayers who took out RALs in 2010 switched to RACs or abandoned paid tax preparation the following years when RALs were no longer available. There is no strong evidence that the effect of the RALs on demand for paid preparation services differs depending on the majority tax preparer in the county.

3. The Effect of RALs on EITC Claims

RALs provide an inducement for taxpayers to use a paid preparer, and they also provide the preparer with an incentive to claim the refundable EITC on the taxpayer’s behalf. Thus, eliminating RALs could reduce the number of EITC claims either because taxpayers who prepare their own returns are less likely to claim the EITC than ones who go to a paid preparer, or because paid preparers are less motivated to seek an EITC refund for the taxpayer.

Table 5 reports estimates of the effect of RALs on the share of returns for which the EITC was claimed. In column IV, I report that the effect of having one percentage point more RAL claimants in 2010 is associated with a roughly 0.062 percentage point decline in EITC claims in 2011. In columns I and III, I report the estimates from the regression model that focuses only on changes from 2010 to 2011. The estimated effect in these models is 0.019 percentage points or 0.025 percentage points. These estimates must be interpreted cautiously, since the estimated effect of RALs on EITC claims is relatively modest, and I cannot rule out that there may be subtle differences in the pre-2011 trends of EITC claims that are biasing my estimates.
The data do not permit me to identify whether the decline in EITC claims is attributable to taxpayers who began to prepare their own returns and failed to complete the EIC schedule or to those who continued to use a paid preparer. If one assumes that the decline in EITC take-up is concentrated among those who shifted to self-preparation, the estimates suggest that taxpayers are 34% less likely to claim the EITC as a result of self-preparation than with the use of a paid preparer.167 This is in line with prior research. Recall that the IRS audit described in Part II found a ten percentage-point reduction in EITC claims for those who decide to prepare their own return.168 As with the self-preparation estimates, there is no strong evidence that the effect of RALs on EITC claims varies with the identity of the preparer in the county. This is expected if the decline is concentrated among non-filers.

V. CASE STUDY DISCUSSION

Until 2011, most taxpayers had five mutually exclusive options: use a paid preparer and get a RAL, use a paid preparer and get a RAC, use a paid preparer and get neither, file a return without assistance, or do not file a return. Eliminating RALs necessarily increases the number of taxpayers who choose the latter four options, but it is hard to know a priori which of those remaining options will be most appealing to the taxpayer who formerly used refund loans. The answer depends on the perceived costs and benefits of each option, and there is reason to expect that RAL users would switch to RACs or forego paid preparation altogether.

The benefit of both RACs and RALs is the earlier receipt of tax refunds, and the cost of these products is the out-of-pocket fees. All costs and benefits of a RAL are experienced immediately; a taxpayer receives her refund, net of fees, generally within a day of filing her taxes. If the taxpayer gets a RAC, the out-of-pocket cost of tax preparation is deferred (along with the RAC fees) until the refund is deposited into the checking account set up on the taxpayer’s behalf by the preparer. If the taxpayer pays for tax preparation without a RAL or RAC, she must pay that cost at the time of filing but will not receive her refund for another two or three weeks, depending on whether she has a bank account into which her

167 To the extent that the decline in EITC claims is associated with taxpayers who continued to use a paid preparer, 34% is an overestimate of the effect of self-preparation on EITC take-up.

168 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
refund can be directly deposited. Finally, if she prepares her return herself, she will receive the maximum possible refund (net of fees), but she must incur the immediate time and hassle cost of preparing her own return, and the timing of her refund will depend on her banking status and method of filing. For example, if the taxpayer does not have ready access to online filing, she must file a paper return, which will delay her refund by an additional three weeks. Thus, the benefits of going to a paid preparer include not just the avoided time and hassle costs of self-preparation but also the benefits of electronic filing for those taxpayers who would otherwise file paper returns. In 2011, 44% of tax returns were still filed on paper.  

While the RAL generally provides only a current net benefit (the refund, net of the cost of the loan and the cost of tax preparation), and the RAC provides only a future net benefit, the other two filing options offer the combination of a current cost (either the time spent preparing one’s return or the out-of-pocket cost of paid preparation) and a larger future benefit. The sequence of costs and benefits implicates the time preferences of the taxpayer. A taxpayer will choose a RAL or RAC if she has a high discount rate for future benefits.

Consider the following example of the taxpayer’s choice. Assume that the taxpayer is entitled to a $2000 refund. Assume also that the price of tax preparation is $150, the price of a RAL is $100, and the price of a RAC is $30. With either a RAL or a RAC, the refund will be deposited by the Treasury one week from filing, but with a RAL the funds are advanced by the lender to the taxpayer immediately. Therefore, a taxpayer will prefer a RAL to a RAC only if she prefers $1750 today to $1820 in one week. This is a high rate of discounting. On an annualized basis, the taxpayer’s time preferences become stark: she will be indifferent between $2000 in one year and $260 today. A taxpayer with such

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170 If the taxpayer gets a RAL, she will immediately receive her refund ($2000) less the cost of tax preparation ($150) and the cost of the RAL ($100), which is $2000 - $150 - $100 = $1750. If the taxpayer gets a RAC, she will receive, one week later, her refund ($2000) less the cost of tax preparation ($150) and the cost of the RAC ($30), which is $2000 - $150 - $30 = $1820.

171 The discount rate that makes someone indifferent between $1820 in a week and $1750 now is 4%. The present value of $2000 at this rate is $2000 / 1.04^5 = $260.
preferences who is already banked and has access to e-filing will prefer a RAL to self-preparation if the hassle costs of self-preparation are at least $173.\textsuperscript{172} If she is unbanked and must file by paper, then she will need to wait four weeks to get her refund, and in that case she will always prefer a RAL to self-preparation.\textsuperscript{173} Since taxpayers who prefer RALs tend to discount the future relatively heavily, when RALs are eliminated, they will tend to choose RACs because self-preparation and paid preparation both require paying immediate costs (in time and hassle or in cash) in exchange for future benefits. This is consistent with the high degree of substitution from RALs to RACs that we observe in the data.

From a welfare perspective, removing any filing option for rational individuals can only make them worse off. Arguments against RALs tend to assume that consumers are making a mistake in purchasing them and that the products are exploiting some sort of cognitive error or bias. One natural candidate for the explanation of RAL demand that might justify intervention in the market is if taxpayers are present-biased and credit constrained. The behavioral and welfare effects of eliminating the RAL market depend on the preferences of the taxpayers. Eliminating RALs would be expected to cause both rational and present-biased taxpayers to switch to RACs and cause some biased individuals to switch to self-preparation. The welfare effects for biased individuals who should optimally have either a RAC or only tax preparation services will be positive, and the welfare effects for rational taxpayers and some biased individuals who should be preparing their own return will be negative. Accounting for the net effect of eliminating RALs would require identifying the proportion of taxpayers of each type in the filing population. I cannot do this with my data, but the topic is worthy of further study.

Although I have focused on the effects of RALs on present-biased individuals, there are salutary effects of encouraging even non-present-biased individuals to obtain tax preparation assistance. My results are consistent with arguments made by Jacob Goldin, who argues that “efforts to increase EITC take-up should focus on inducing EITC-eligible individuals to file a tax return using an APM [assisted preparation

\textsuperscript{172} The present value of $2000 received in one week is $2000 / 1.04 = $1923, and the value of the RAL option is $1750. The difference is $173.

\textsuperscript{173} The present value of $2000 received in four weeks is $2000 / 1.04^4 = $1710, which is less than the value of the RAL option.
method].” APMs assist taxpayers with the computational complexity of preparing a return, which he argues is an important reason for the low take-up of certain tax benefits. If he is correct that “efforts to increase the EITC take-up rate should primarily focus on getting EITC-eligible nonfilers to file their returns,” then the vitality of the RAL and RAC market may have an important role to play even if computational complexity, rather than present bias, is the dominant reason for low EITC take-up.

The discussion thus far has assumed that the primary concern with the delivery of social benefits, and the EITC in particular, is low take-up. Of course, if the overarching policy goal is the delivery of social benefits to only those who are entitled to them, then there is a converse problem of individuals who are not entitled to benefits fraudulently claiming them. It is also clear that this concern about fraudulent claims was part of the motivation for the IRS’s elimination of the debt indicator. Reducing tax preparers’ strong incentives to file EITC claims on behalf of their clients was expected to reduce the number of fraudulent claims. It is certainly plausible that the elimination of the refund loan market reduced both meritorious claims and fraudulent claims, but the data do not allow me to separately identify the two effects. I cannot distinguish these in the data. The relative importance of these two kinds of errors is a political judgment, which the federal system has frequently resolved in favor of reducing fraudulent claims at the expense of meritorious ones. In light of the problem of fraudulent claims, perhaps there is another way to increase take-up without also providing preparers with a strong incentive to lure (or manufacture) EITC claimants. In the remainder of this Part, I briefly discuss several interventions that might both increase take-up and reduce the costs incurred by present-biased taxpayers in claiming the EITC.


175 Id. at 50.

176 For a description of the role of RALs in fraudulent refund schemes, see Refund Anticipation Loan (RAL) Fraud, Bankers Online (Aug. 1, 2004), https://www.bankers-online.com/articles/107376 [https://perma.cc/J3LU-KB4B].

177 I do not discuss the possibility of debiasing the individuals themselves. For an example of how intermediaries can act to achieve debiasing of the endowment effect, see Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Institutions, 44 J. Legal Stud. 143 (2015).
A. Free Tax Preparation

The IRS already makes available free tax preparation service through its Volunteer Income Tax Assistance program (VITA). Free tax preparation services are available for people who make $56,000 or less, persons with disabilities, and taxpayers with limited English language fluency. However, VITA tax preparation serves only about 3.5 million taxpayers each year, which is less than four percent of eligible taxpayers.

A renewed commitment to increasing the availability of free tax preparation assistance would almost certainly increase the filing rate and, in all likelihood, the take-up rate of the EITC. However, there remains the burden of collecting tax documents and finding time to sit down with a VITA preparer, even if taxpayers do not need to pay anything out of pocket for assistance. These costs are borne immediately, but the benefits associated with a tax refund are not received until a future date. Thus, even free preparation will not be very effective at attracting present-biased taxpayers. Moreover, unless free tax preparation is coupled with access to a checking account or some other method that helps expedite the receipt of the refund, free tax preparation may look less attractive than even paid preparers. Of course, the costs of increasing free tax preparation services must be compared against the costs of alternative solutions, including the status quo with its large role for private tax preparation. It is far from clear that the wider availability of free tax preparation assistance would be more effective at encouraging tax filing and EITC claims by present-biased taxpayers than the current state of affairs, in which tax preparation is costly but the benefits of the tax refund are immediate.

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Another way to encourage tax filing and EITC take-up would be to simplify the process of completing a tax return and schedule EIC, including the important determination of whether the applicant has a “qualifying child.” Low-income taxpayers cite anxiety about the complexity of filing a return as one of the reasons for seeking paid preparation assistance and as the reason that they are discouraged from preparing their own returns.\footnote{181} Thus, simplification may lead to more self-prepared returns and perhaps more EITC claimants among those who prepare their own returns.

Simplification (particularly of the tax law) always sounds good in the abstract. Of course, complexity is sometimes necessary to tailor the law to its intended purposes. For example, one could imagine providing a refundable tax credit of a specified amount to everyone who earns any wages at all in a given year. This would be a very simple alternative to the EITC, but it would not be well targeted to those who may need it most, such as single-parent households and those with modest incomes. As the underlying normative criteria for providing benefits become more complicated, so does the law. It is plausible that simplification of the EIC schedule would lead to greater error rates in the distribution of the EITC credit or increases in the rate of fraud. For these sorts of reasons, the optimal amount of legal complexity is not generally the minimal amount of complexity.\footnote{182}

Even if the tax filing and EITC application process can be simplified without introducing much error or fraud, this is only likely to go so far, particularly for present-biased individuals. The fundamental temporal ordering of costs and benefits that play such an outsized role for biased taxpayers is unchanged. So long as the benefits of filing a return are deferred for a period of weeks, the cost-benefit calculus will still be relatively unattractive.


\footnote{182}{See Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 150 (1995).}
C. Advance EITC

If filing a return and completing the burdensome EIC schedule is a significant barrier for present-biased individuals to claim the EITC, one possible remedy is to advance those individuals an estimated portion of their EITC credit at regular intervals through the year, in installments. Economically, receiving the EITC refund over the course of the year increases the present value of those payments (although only very modestly), but more importantly it provides EITC-recipient households, which are typically very credit constrained, with liquidity when they need it.183

Nevertheless, the advance EIC program has historically been extremely unpopular, with many low-income taxpayers refusing to enroll in the program. Government agencies have struggled to explain low take-up of the advance EIC program,184 and interventions designed to reduce the information, administrative, and stigma costs of the advance EIC have had only modest effects on a very low level of overall take-up, increasing participation from 0.35% to 1.2%.185 When asked, taxpayers have often expressed concern that they might overestimate their eligibility and therefore be obligated to repay the excess when they file their tax return.186

Moreover, the modest increase in the present value and acceleration of the timing of the receipt of EITC benefits is unlikely to be very attractive to present-biased taxpayers. The key distinction for present-biased individuals is the difference between now and later. The difference between later and a little bit later does not loom nearly as large, and so these timing benefits are unlikely to increase EITC take-up overall. Changing the timing of EITC benefits seems unlikely to have much of an effect on take-up.

D. A Public Option

If interventions to lower the upfront cost of tax preparation will have only modest effects for present-biased taxpayers, we must consider ways to accelerate the benefits of filing to replicate the temporal pattern that has so successfully been made available through RALs. A natural option is to couple greater access to VITA tax preparation with government-funded RALs. The federal government has already shown its willingness to extend credit to such taxpayers through its experiment with the advance EITC, and there is much less risk in extending this credit at the time of filing because the taxpayer’s eligibility can be determined with a high degree of certainty at that time.

One advantage of having the federal government, rather than the market, provide refund loans is related to the different incentives facing the government when originating these loans. Whereas for-profit preparers have an incentive to file returns that claim EITC refunds, even when those claims may not be meritorious, in order to pay for the high-priced anticipation loans, a government lender presumably would not have those same incentives. Thus, providing government-funded RALs may induce higher rates of take-up without also encouraging fraudulent filings.

On the other hand, the strong incentives for tax preparers to submit returns claiming refunds of federal income taxes have benefits as well. These incentives may make it less likely that they will overlook deductions or other features of the taxpayers’ circumstances that entitle them to the EITC. A government loan originator will not have those same incentives and therefore may be less likely to increase EITC take-up. Moreover, the partnerships between some of the large national tax preparation chains and their financing partners may work very efficiently at delivering refund loans due to competition within this industry. It is not certain that the government could provide the financial infrastructure necessary to deliver RALs at lower cost than the private sector. An overall cost-benefit assessment of a public option is beyond the scope of this Article, but if a significant number of EITC claimants are present-biased, then it seems likely that ensuring a high degree of EITC take-up will require either providing such an option or tolerating a private market for these loans.
VI. Exploiting Financial Intermediaries

As the case of RALs illustrates, the policy evaluation of even unambiguously exploitative financial transactions can be more nuanced than it first appears. We must determine what the debt is being used for to determine whether the borrower would be better off without the loan. The brief discussion of a public option for RALs in the previous Part suggests that the profits of financial intermediaries should not be understood as a uniquely pernicious leak in the delivery of those benefits, but instead should be viewed as only one expression of the costs of delivery and not necessarily the most expensive one. Moreover, these costs are symptomatic of a system of taxes and transfers that is too burdensome for individuals to navigate themselves.

Identifying the least-cost mechanism for delivering benefits such as the EITC requires interrogating all aspects of the delivery process. The demand for RALs and other high-price credit products arises from households’ circumstances and psychology and from the institutionalized system of taxes and transfers. The best solution is likely to involve reducing this demand for RALs by providing more efficient EITC delivery mechanisms rather than driving up the costs of RAL supply through regulation or prohibition. A thorough cost-benefit analysis of financial products like RALs must therefore be based explicitly on the reasons that buyers have for using these products and whether they are behaving rationally out of financial distress or instead acting in ways that are against their own interests. It must also analyze high-price consumer credit in context, both the context of the borrower’s economic affairs and in the context of the market for goods and services or social transfers that are financed. In this Part, I describe how such an analysis can proceed.

A. Getting Borrower Psychology Right

The first step to less myopic regulation of consumer debt is to get the borrower’s psychology right. From one perspective, RALs and RACs are exploitative of taxpayers’ financial circumstances. That is, taxpayers may be better off with a RAL or RAC than without one, but the price that they pay for these products is too high, and they are not made as well-off as they should be. The right solution, on this account, is simply to lower prices and increase the gains from the transaction that accrue to the borrowers. In general, market competition may be the best way to achieve this goal, as competition tends to drive the costs of a financial product
down to the lender’s costs and eliminate inefficiencies in contractual terms.\textsuperscript{187}

The mere fact that RALs and RACs are costly does not mean that these products are not worth the cost, either to borrowers or to the system of federal taxes and transfers as a whole. Some advocacy groups argue that RAL and RAC fees siphon federal transfers away from their intended beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{188} This is true, in a sense, but the important question is whether these costs are smaller than the costs of the alternatives, and whether those alternatives will generate comparable rates of take-up. In addition to overcoming the temporal pattern of immediate costs and future benefits associated with filing a tax return, RALs have the added benefit of encouraging the use of professional tax preparers, which can help taxpayers navigate the complexity of filing a federal tax return. Filing a tax return and completing the EIC schedule are complex and daunting tasks for many low-income households, and they may not do so unless they have tax preparation assistance.\textsuperscript{189} If taxpayers are rational, then the monetary cost of tax preparation is less than the cost of preparing their own returns. In these cases, we should accept, if not celebrate, financial market participants that reduce the economic costs of delivering social benefits to rational taxpayers. At the same time, the fees that preparers charge should be a signal to us of the magnitude of the complexity and other costs that make self-preparation unpleasant for so many households.

If taxpayers cannot be trusted to make rational borrowing decisions, then, of course, our cost-benefit analysis must change. One possibility is...
that taxpayers use paid preparers because they are mistaken about how difficult it would be to prepare their own returns. In that case, it might be best to nudge them or even coerce them into preparing their own returns. It is worth noting that no one seems to endorse these sorts of radical interventions. We do not question the judgment of individuals who decide that they would rather pay cash to avoid the time and anxiety of preparing their own tax return and get expert advice about how to do so. And yet we do question the rationality of individuals who purchase high-priced credit products, including RALs and RACs, even though there are good reasons even for rational individuals to take out a RAL or a RAC, including allowing the taxpayer to borrow the cost of tax preparation. Very low-income taxpayers may lack the cash on hand to pay for tax preparation assistance. For such individuals, eliminating the availability of RACs and RALs could make it impossible for them to get that help.

The possibility I explore in this Article is that RALs and RACs exploit present bias. Even in this case, these products may make those biased individuals better off. Assertions to the contrary typically rest on the unstated assumption that biased individuals who could not obtain a RAL would pay for tax preparation services out of pocket and receive their refund in full when it is distributed by the Treasury Department. However, as I have argued, without the temptation of a RAL or RAC to induce them to file a return with a paid preparer, the taxpayer would face the choice between paying for a paid preparer out of pocket, diligently preparing her own return, preparing her own return in a cursory way, or not filing at all. If the taxpayer chooses one of the latter two options, she might not do the paperwork necessary to claim the EITC.

Thus, against the backdrop of imperfect rationality and the possibility that the taxpayer might not claim the EITC because the burden of doing so is immediate while the benefits are in the future, perhaps RALs and RACs are not so bad after all. From this perspective, the usefulness of RALs and RACs could be viewed as an illustration of the counterintuitive logic of the second-best. The key intuition from this line of research is

190 At the same time, I have not offered an all-things-considered defense of loans that exploit present bias. Another way that lenders may do this is by making loans for much larger principal amounts that would be attractive to the present-biased borrower but would not be in her interest. There may be a good reason to regulate the size of loans but not the structure of repayment timing.

191 Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 11, at 11–12.
that remedying individual defects in the conditions that are necessary to achieve the best outcome may not make for a better outcome. For example, suppose that steel manufacturing is characterized by a monopoly and that the harmful emissions of the production process impose an externality on the surrounding neighbors. The best outcome might be one in which steel production has many competitive suppliers and the emissions are subject to a tax that aligns private incentives with the public interest. However, fixing only one of these problems could make things worse overall. An antitrust action that leads to greater competition among steel manufacturers would result in lower prices and greater output, but it will also exacerbate the emission problem because of the increased production. The net effect of an improvement in the supply of steel and a worsening of the pollution cannot be determined in the abstract and must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Similarly, the best outcome for a present-biased individual who uses RALs may be to use a paid preparer and not purchase any financial products, but removing the option of taking out a RAL may exacerbate the adverse effects of her present bias and cause her not to obtain a refund at all. Since policy changes typically happen in a piecemeal fashion, it is crucial to understand the particular biases that can lead to poor borrowing choices so that we can anticipate what taxpayers will do if those choices are limited.

B. Credit Contextualization in Two Steps

Developing consumer law that operates in the interests of consumers requires opening the lens through which we evaluate financial transactions to view those transactions in the context of how they fit into consumers’ economic affairs. It also means viewing these transactions in

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192 Id.
193 An important distinction that is made in the behavioral economics literature that I do not discuss here is between naïve and sophisticated individuals with present bias. Sophisticates know that they are biased while naïfs do not. Sophisticates are able to anticipate what they will do if they are put in situations where they are tempted and can take actions that prevent it from happening. Most famously, Odysseus tied himself to the mast knowing he would be unable to resist the siren song. Homer, The Odyssey 306–07 (Emily Wilson trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 2018). Thus, there is a market for goods and services that help individuals overcome their biases. RALs are not marketed on this basis, but they have salutary effects on severely present-biased individuals. What is noteworthy is that they benefit both sophisticates (who know they need the temptation of a RAL to obtain an EITC refund) and naïfs (who do not).
the context of the economic ecosystem that creates the demand for them. I suggest in this Section that a more thoroughgoing evaluation of consumer products with apparently exploitative features should proceed in two steps. The theme of this two-part analysis is that once we are committed to a model that explains why a product should be regulated or prohibited because it exploits consumers’ inability to make decisions that are in their best interest, we must carry over that same model of consumer behavior to the other decisions that they make in thinking about how prohibiting that product will affect them.

The first step is to be explicit about identifying the model of consumer decision-making that we think generates demand for the product in question. When consumers are acting rationally, there should be a high bar for justifying the regulation of the substantive terms of the product or service. If the buyer and seller are rational, then the exchange leaves both of them better off than they were before. Although we might consider regulating the terms of trade in order to affect redistribution between the buyer and the seller, there are compelling arguments that redistribution is best handled through the tax system.\textsuperscript{194} Even where redistribution provides a partial justification for regulating the substantive terms of trade, regulators must also be wary that this shift does not cause the market for such goods or services to contract or disappear.

However, when consumers are operating subject to some sort of bias or error, it is possible that they will make purchasing decisions that are not in fact in their best interests. Here, we must be explicit about exactly what sort of error or bias afflicts the consumer in order to understand what led them to desire a product that was bad for them to begin with. For then we must ask what \textit{that type} of consumer will do without the prohibited product. For example, consider an individual subject to present bias. Such a consumer may be inclined to take out loans at very high rates of interest that she will subsequently regret because she cannot resist the temptation of spending now and paying back later. This model of consumer behavior predicts a very particular pattern of choices but does not imply that our consumer is irrational in all respects. For example, if our consumer were

choosing between two credit cards with identical terms except that one had an annualized interest rate of 200% and the other had an annualized interest rate of 250%, there is no reason to think that such a consumer would choose the one with the higher rate. Her bias is between current and future consumption only.

What then would we expect such a consumer to do if we banned the credit card with the 200% annualized rate of interest? If her present bias is strong enough, we would expect her to switch to the credit card with the higher rate of interest. We would not expect her to switch her psychology and suddenly become patient simply because the first credit card was no longer available. This seems obvious; however, the point is easily neglected if one adopts a piecemeal approach to exploitative financial products, identifying exploitative products and prohibiting them without considering what will happen in their absence. Scholars have observed that when certain high-interest credit options are heavily regulated, consumers switch to other, costlier alternatives. 195

This step of the analysis also requires thinking not just about how behaviorally biased consumers will substitute across products and services at a given point in time but also how putatively exploitative products and services are connected with downstream decisions. This is illustrated by the case of RALs. If the only individuals who take out RALs are those who exhibit present bias, then we must ask how those present-biased individuals will make decisions about tax return filing in the absence of a refund loan inducement. My study indicates that decisions about paid preparation are sensitive to the availability of RALs and RACs. If the failure to use a paid preparer would be against the present-biased consumers’ interests, then we must ask whether such consumers are better off preparing the returns themselves or using paid preparers at a relatively high cost. Of course, all of this complicates the regulatory analysis significantly. Goods and services, including goods and services purchased by biased consumers, have substitutes and complements. Regulating the terms or prohibiting the availability of a good or service will have a collection of collateral effects on those substitutes and complements, some of which may be good for the consumer, and some of which may not be.

The second step is to place the product not only in the context of the consumers’ own financial affairs and in light of their individual biases,

195 See, e.g., Bhutta et al., supra note 111, at 227.
but also in the context of the broader economic and legal system in which demand for the product arose. Doing this allows us to ask what demand for this product tells us about the system. The key is to recognize that when individuals incur significant costs to purchase goods or services, this tells us something about consumers’ opportunity costs. Specifically, the amount they pay is a lower bound on how much they will otherwise have to pay, one way or another, to achieve the same outcome. For example, a taxpayer who spends $400 for tax preparation services is telling us that it is worth at least (and perhaps very much more than) $400 to her to not have to prepare her own return. The lesson that we should take from the ubiquity and expense of paid tax preparation is not that tax preparation assistance is bad but that the perceived burden of preparing and filing a return is too much for a typical individual to bear.

One of the most valuable features of markets is their ability, through prices, to reveal information about consumers’ wants and the supply of solutions for those wants. Eliminating markets, including markets for expensive credit products, deprives us of valuable information. The price of RALs, for example, tells us just how valuable it is for certain taxpayers to access their tax refunds as soon as they are available, rather than wait even a few weeks. Using the high price of certain credit products as information encourages us to consider a much wider array of solutions to the problem that is revealed by the high-priced loan. Opening the aperture of our lens to view the entire system of taxes and transfers as providing the underlying causes of RAL popularity allows us to inventory all the ways that we might set about providing a wage subsidy to low-income households that targets families with children. The best solution may involve substantive reforms to the EITC itself, including eligibility simplification, or it may involve procedural changes in the way that the EITC is delivered. In any event, it is by viewing high-price credit as a symptom rather than only as a disease that we can consider the various ways that households are driven to overpay for consumer credit and have the best chance of identifying the least-cost intervention to improve consumer welfare.

**CONCLUSION**

In this Article, I exploit a change in the regulation of RALs to identify the effect of the RAL market on the supply and demand for paid tax preparation, EITC take-up, and the use of RACs. Nearly eliminating RALs is associated with increased use of RACs and reduced use of paid
tax preparers and EITC claims. The implication for tax administration policy is that decisions to regulate tax preparers and limit the scope of their businesses must take into account the effects on taxpayer compliance that may follow from inducing more taxpayers to prepare their own returns.

Consumer groups, which argued persistently for elimination of the RAL market, have set their sights on RACs, which they also view as exploitative. The framework in this Article provides reasons to be especially cautious about eliminating the RAC option, because it is the sole option available to taxpayers that allows them to file with assistance without incurring immediate out-of-pocket costs. In the absence of this option, individuals who heavily discount future cash flows, or are credit constrained and cash poor, may prepare and file only cursory and inaccurate returns, or not file at all. More generally, the welfare effects of financial products that resemble RALs, such as payday loans and other alternative financial products, are often evaluated in isolation from the other choices (such as filing a tax return) that may be dependent on that borrowing. Determinations about whether these products are beneficial must take these collateral consequences into account.

The example of RALs is illustrative of the need for scholars operating in a behavioral law and economics framework to focus on what consumer credit is being used for. When the credit product can only be used to purchase a good or service with deferred benefits, the very features that make a loan exploitative may be the ones that make present-biased consumers better off by tempting them to do something that is in their interests.

* * *

APPENDIX

This Appendix includes a description of the regression equations I estimate to identify the effect of RALs on various tax compliance outcomes. I estimate the parameters from two equations. First, I model the change in the outcome of interest from 2010 to 2011 in each county $c$ as a function of the change in RALs and change in economic and demographic characteristics $X$:

$$\Delta D_{V_c} = \alpha + \beta \Delta RAL_c + \Gamma \Delta X_c + \epsilon_c$$

(1)
Each variable in the estimating equation is the difference in the level value of the variable from 2010 to 2011. The variable $\Delta RAL_c$ is the change in the share of tax returns in county $c$ for which a RAL was obtained, and $\Delta DV_c$ is either the change in number of RACs, self-prepared returns, or EITC claims as a share of all returns filed. The coefficient $\beta$ is the parameter of interest and the causal effect of RALs on the dependent variable under the assumptions of the model. Second, I estimate the following equation for the years 2006–2012:

$$DV_{c,t} = \alpha + \gamma_c + \beta_1 POST + \beta_2 RAL_{2010} + \beta_3 POST \times RAL_{2010} + \Gamma X_{c,t} + \epsilon_{c,t}$$

(2)

The variable $POST$ is a dummy variable for the year 2011, and $RAL_{2010}$ is a continuous variable measuring the share of returns for which a RAL was obtained in 2010. $\beta_3$ is the parameter of interest in the model. The control variables include a quadratic year trend.

Columns I and II of each regression table report the estimates for equations (1) and (2), respectively, and columns III and IV include estimates for the interaction terms of RALs with the majority tax preparer in each county. Coefficient estimates for the demographic and economic controls and number of returns filed are omitted, but I summarize those estimates in the text.

To test the robustness of my results, I estimated regression equations similar to those reported here at the zip code level. Because of the greater number of zip codes, the hypothesis tests at this unit of analysis have much more power, but economic and demographic controls are not available. The estimates for the effect of RALs on RACs differ slightly in magnitude but corroborate the county-level estimates: declines in RALs caused a roughly 72% offsetting increase in RACs from 2010 to 2011, and the effects were stronger in areas where Jackson Hewitt or H&R Block was the dominant preparer. The zip code analysis also indicates that the decline in RALs caused taxpayers to shift toward self-preparation and that the effect was larger in zip codes where Jackson Hewitt or H&R Block was the majority preparer. The estimate for the effect of Liberty Tax as the majority preparer is of the same sign, but the scarcity of counties where Liberty Tax was dominant makes the estimate too imprecise to be statistically significant at conventional levels.

The estimated effect of RALs on EITC claims is of the same direction, and of similar magnitude, and is statistically significant at the zip code
level. The estimates for the interaction terms indicate that the positive effect of RALs on EITC claims is larger in counties where Jackson Hewitt or H&R Block is the majority preparer, by 2.2 and 2.7 percentage points, respectively. Taken together with the effects on self-preparation, these results are consistent with the decline in EITC claims being concentrated in the population of taxpayers who shifted away from paid preparation assistance.
## Table 1

2009 County Summary Statistics of Counties by Tercile of RAL Use

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<tr>
<th>Share of Returns</th>
<th>2009 Share of Returns with RALs</th>
<th>0–1.8%</th>
<th>1.8–3.5%</th>
<th>3.5–13.3%</th>
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<th>1.8–3.5%</th>
<th>3.5–13.3%</th>
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### Table 3
Effect of RALs on RACs

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<td>(0.013)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.001**</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
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<td>JH Majority Preparer</td>
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<td>0.012***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.002)</td>
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<td>0.003***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
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Table 4
Effect of RALs on Self-Preparation of Returns

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<th>IV</th>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Table 5
Effect of RALs on EITC Claims

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### Myopic Consumer Law

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Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1