PROPERTIZING FAIR USE

Abraham Bell* and Gideon Parchomovsky**

In its current form, fair use doctrine provides a personal defense that applies narrowly to the specific use by the specific user. The recently issued Supreme Court ruling in the landmark case of Google v. Oracle illustrates why this is problematic. While the Court ruled that Google’s use of Oracle’s Java API packages was fair, the ruling does not protect the numerous parties that developed Java applications for the Android operating system; it shelters only Google and Google’s particular use. This is not an isolated problem; the per use/per user rule cuts across fair uses of copyrighted works, and it always leaves follow-on users in the cold. Authors, musicians, documentary filmmakers and media outlets who win fair use cases cannot freely market their works that incorporate fair use content, since their victories do not carry over to other users. Fair use under extant law is a very limited privilege.

This Article proposes a far-reaching reform not only of copyright law as applied to software, but of the fair use doctrine itself. Our proposal consists of three interlocking elements. First, we call for the introduction of a new in rem conception of fair use, under which a fair use ruling would serve as a property remedy that shelters all subsequent users of works who fairly incorporate preexisting materials. Under this new conception, a finding of fair use would run with that new work, like an easement to all other distributors, broadcasters, publishers, performers and others who use it. The introduction of this new type of in rem fair use would result in the division of fair use into two conceptions—one in rem and one in personam—that would co-exist alongside one another. Second, we would grant judges discretion to decide which fair use conception, if any, should be granted in any

* Professor, Bar Ilan University Faculty of Law and University of San Diego School of Law. Visiting Fellow, Harvard Law School Project on the Foundations of Private Law.
** Robert G. Fuller Jr. Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law and the Edward Silver Professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Faculty of Law. The authors are grateful to David Abrams, Shyam Balganesh, Lital Helman, Neil Netanel, Lydia Loren, Jennifer Rothman, Guy Rub, Christopher Yoo, Eyal Zamir and participants at workshops and conferences at the University of Pennsylvania Carey School of Law and Stanford Law School for invaluable comments and criticisms. Isabel Redleaf and Ziqian Tao provided excellent research assistance.
particular case. Judges would be able to employ the traditional in personam rule, allowing fair use to avail only the specific defendant before it, or they could adopt an in rem fair use ruling, creating a property entitlement that runs with the work embodying the fairly incorporated content. Third, we propose two default rules to assist judges in making their decisions. Specifically, we propose that the default setting of fair use would depend on the type of use being examined. Where the claimed fair use consists of incorporating the protected copyrighted material in a new copyrighted work—such as the Android operating system—the default fair use would be of the in rem variety. However, in all other cases of claimed fair use, the traditional, familiar in personam conception would be the default setting. This approach would create clarity about the status of follow-on fair uses, but permit judges to tailor their rulings case by case.

Implementation of our proposal would yield several significant improvements to the current fair use doctrine. It would permit judges to take account of the potential for future uses of the fair use work, without handcuffing them to a single approach. Moreover, it would increase certainty with respect to the use of copyrighted work by lowering transaction and litigation costs for creators of new works. Finally, the version of fair use we advocate would enhance the use of copyrighted content.
INTRODUCTION

Fair use is one of the most celebrated doctrines in the law.1 It is widely seen as a key component of the law of copyright, balancing the exclusive rights of copyright owners with the public interest in the use and enjoyment of works after their creation.2 It is not only the most significant and most capacious defense against copyright infringement;3 it is also,
according to the Supreme Court, an indispensable part of the constitutional balance between freedom of speech and protected copyrighted expression. Unsurprisingly, the fair use doctrine has attracted considerable academic attention and has been the subject of discussion and debate. Yet a critical aspect of the doctrine, which goes to the core of the fair use doctrine, has not been analyzed to date.

There is a sharp asymmetry between the design of the exclusive rights granted to authors under the Copyright Act and the design of the fair use defense intended to protect user interests. The asymmetry is found in copyright’s protection of works, as opposed to fair use’s protection of uses. Copyright protects a list of rights in a particular work allocated to the owner of the copyright, whereas the fair use defense only pertains to a specific use by a particular user. Put differently, fair use is an agent-specific defense that is analyzed on a use-by-use basis. The fair use defense does not and cannot offer prophylactic immunity for using the work; it does not carry over to similar uses by the same user or identical uses by other users. As a result, the doctrine of fair use is far narrower than is generally appreciated.

To see why this is a problem, consider the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. The case concerned Google’s copying of thirty-seven packages, comprising roughly 11,500 lines of code, in Java’s Application Programming Interface for use in the such as reproduction, public performance, and public display, fair use offers protection against all violations of all rights.


5 See generally sources supra note 1 (delineating several aspects of fair use discussion).

6 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . .”), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”).

7 Julie E. Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 347, 362 (2005) (“In most fair use cases, the identity of the user is known, the use has already been made, and the only question is whether or not it passes muster.”).

programs used by Android phones.\(^9\) (Application Programming Interfaces, or APIs, can be defined for simplicity’s sake as code orders that enable interfaces between programs.)\(^10\) Oracle claimed that Google violated its copyright in the API and the Java commands contained therein.\(^11\) In its defense, Google claimed that the commands were insufficiently original to warrant copyright protection,\(^12\) and that even if the commands were sufficiently original, other doctrines blocked copyright protection.\(^13\) The trial court held for Google, finding that the commands were insufficiently original and generally outside of copyright protection.\(^14\) However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, determining that Java’s API is copyrighted, and remanded the case to the trial court for examination of Google’s fair use defense.\(^15\) Back in the trial court, Google claimed that its use of the Java commands in the programming language for Android phones was a fair use,\(^16\) and again Google won at the trial level.\(^17\) Once more, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the jury decision and ordered the trial court to proceed to the remedies phase.\(^18\) Before the trial court could take up the question of remedies, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision. The Supreme Court held that Google’s copying of the API was a protected fair use, while assuming arguendo that the API was copyrightable.\(^19\)

In ruling that Google’s copying of thirty-seven Java packages from Oracle’s API was a fair use, the Court cleared the way for Google to continue using the copied Oracle software. However, the Court did not consider whether programmers for Android phones could use Google’s software, even though such programmers would thereby necessarily copy,

---

9 Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1204.
10 See United States v. Microsoft Corp, 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“Operating systems also function as platforms for software applications. They do this by ‘exposing’... routines or protocols that perform certain widely-used functions. These are known as Application Programming Interfaces, or ‘APIs.’”).
11 Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1194.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 1194–95.
16 Id. at 1195.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 1186.
in part, Oracle’s software.\(^{20}\) Importantly, as the Court noted, all fair use rulings are case by case.\(^{21}\) Other companies that duplicated part of the thirty-seven packages that Google had copied in order to program for the Android phone could not be sure that their use of the Java commands would be considered a fair use. The fair use approved by the Supreme Court is Google’s use, not that of any other user. Indeed, even Google could not be sure that any future Google use of Oracle’s API would be permitted. Google can only be confident that the particular uses considered in the case were fair uses; any other use of the Java commands in a different program or use of different commands in the Java API in the same program would potentially be vulnerable to an infringement suit.

A similar problem arises in other contexts, from music to literature. 2 Live Crew famously won a Supreme Court victory in *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.* on a claim of fair use, allowing it to continue to use portions of the melody of Roy Orbison’s song “Oh Pretty Woman” in its parody “Pretty Woman.”\(^{22}\) However, a different user who wishes to use 2 Live Crew’s song in another context—for example, by incorporating it as background music in a film or performing the song at a high school dance—is barred from doing so, even if she were to secure permission from 2 Live Crew.\(^{23}\) The Supreme Court’s ruling that 2 Live Crew’s use is fair does not mean that the subsequent use would be deemed fair too. Similarly, if a screenwriter wanted to produce a movie based on Alice Randall’s book, *The Wind Done Gone*, and she properly purchased rights from Alice Randall, she would not be readily able to embark upon this task. Although Alice Randall’s use of Margaret Mitchell’s *Gone with the Wind* was ruled to be fair,\(^{24}\) every subsequent user of her work would be

---

\(^{20}\) See Horace G. Ball, *The Law of Copyright and Literary Property* 260 (1944) (“Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that the appropriation is reasonable and customary.”); Ned Snow, *The Forgotten Right of Fair Use*, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 135, 141 (2011) (“Fair use now represents an excuse to justify infringement, or in other words, an exception to the norm of speech suppression through copyright.”).

\(^{21}\) *Oracle*, 141 S. Ct. at 1198.


\(^{23}\) The industry practice for obtaining licenses for musical performance is sufficiently well-developed and complex that the would-be user would likely be able to obtain the relevant licenses without direct communication with either Campbell (who owns the rights to 2 Live Crew’s song) or Acuff-Rose (who owns the rights to Orbison’s). For purposes of our example, we ignore the industry practice.

\(^{24}\) See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that “a viable fair use defense is available” for *The Wind Done Gone*’s potential infringement of Suntrust’s copyright in *Gone with the Wind*).
exposed to an infringement claim, unless she secured a license from the owners of *Gone with the Wind* who, as one may recall, refused to license Alice Randall’s use. Fair use findings are in personam; they only pertain to a specific user. Copyright protection, by contrast, is in rem; it avails against the rest of the world. This creates a vast amount of uncertainty.

In this Article, we propose a dramatic reformation of the fair use doctrine, consisting of three complementary steps. First, we introduce a new conception of fair use, under which fair use could constitute an in rem, property remedy. This new conception of fair use would supplement, rather than supplant, the existing fair use doctrine. Under the new in rem property conception, a fair use finding would assist not only the particular defendant who raised the fair use defense but also all subsequent users of a work that had been found to fairly incorporate copyright content. Thus, the in rem version of fair use would take on the form of a property incident that benefits all future users, and it would therefore enhance the marketability of follow-on works employing the fair use.

Second, we would grant courts the power to decide which conception of fair use, if any, to adopt in each case. Upon a finding of fair use, the judge could adopt either the traditional in personam version or our new in rem version of fair use. Judges would not be required to adopt the in rem version of fair use in every case. In appropriate circumstances, the judge could stick to the traditional approach to fair use, limiting it to the specific user and the specific use. The upshot of our proposal would be a legal menu with three options: denying fair use, finding an in personam fair use, or finding an in rem fair use.

Third, we propose a set of default rules for all fair use cases. Where judges choose not to specify whether their finding of fair use is of the in personam or in rem variety, we propose that default rules make that decision. However, the default setting of fair use would depend on the type of use being examined. Specifically, where the claimed fair use consists of incorporating the protected copyrighted material in a new copyrighted work—such as the Android operating system, or the “Pretty

---

25 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in Three Dimensions, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1015, 1032 (2008) (“[P]roperty rights, as defined by the government, are rights in rem, which avail against the world . . . .”); Guy Pessach, Toward A New Jurisprudence of Copyright Exemptions, 55 Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 287, 291 (2015) (“Copyright owners’ entitlements are *in rem* exclusive property rights . . . owners have the right to exclude the rest of the world from utilizing their copyrighted works for uses that fall within their bundle of exclusive uses.”).
Woman” song—the default fair use would be of the in rem variety. In such cases, if the judge failed to specify otherwise, future users of the fair use follow-on work could utilize that work without having to relitigate the issue of infringement with the owner of the original copyrighted work. However, in all other cases of claimed fair use, the traditional, familiar in personam conception of fair use would be the default setting. This set of default rules would create clarity about the status of follow-on fair uses, but permit judges to tailor their rulings case by case.

We propose that the result of a successful invocation of an in rem fair use defense should create effects like those in the world of property. Under our suggested interpretation, where the judge chooses the in rem variety of fair use, a fair use ruling in favor of any particular user would continue to run with the work for the benefit of subsequent users with respect to the relevant content covered by the ruling. Specifically, any unlicensed incorporation of copyrighted material that was ruled a fair use would be seen as creating a permanent copyright defense that runs with the work, akin to a property easement. Were a court to rule that a particular user made fair use of a preexisting work, subsequent users of the follow-on work that was found to fairly use preexisting material would also be protected by the ruling. These subsequent users could utilize the preexisting material in the follow-on work with assurance that their use too would be deemed fair. For example, if Google’s use of Oracle’s Java APIs were not merely a fair use but an in rem fair use, not just Google but every programmer for Android phones who uses Google’s Android system will be sheltered from liability, even though Android incorporates 11,500 lines of code from Oracle’s API.26

Our proposal has three significant advantages relative to extant fair use doctrine. First, our proposal would increase certainty with respect to the use of copyrighted work. Currently, a fair use finding only helps the named defendants in the case. It does not pertain to other users who wish to make the same use of the copyrighted work. Under current law, other users either have to take their chances in court or negotiate a license from

---

26 Perhaps due to the litigation, Google ultimately abandoned use of Oracle’s Java API, and later versions of Android did not involve any copying of Oracle’s copyrighted work. Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1191. Our comments relate to early versions of Android that still incorporated Oracle’s work. An early ruling in favor of in rem fair use for Google might have left parts of Oracle’s API in the Android program.
the owner. The adoption of our proposal would allow judges in fair use cases to put other potential users on solid ground by allowing them to engage in the same use that was ruled fair. At the same time, our approach would permit tailoring remedies to the needs of the fair use. Judges could take account of the potential for future uses of the fair use work, and deny future in rem employment of a fair use remedy, when appropriate. The default settings of fair use would create clarity about the meaning of fair use decisions in any particular case where the judge chose not to elaborate.

Second, our proposal would potentially lower transaction and litigation costs for creators of new works. As we explained, current doctrine requires users of works that fairly incorporate materials from preexisting works to negotiate licenses from both the original owner and the fair user or plead their own new fair use in court. Both options are costly. Our proposal potentially alleviates this burden, conserving judicial resources while lowering costs for the parties themselves.

Third, and finally, our proposal would increase the productive use of copyrighted content. The sheltering principle would enable multiple downstream users to create new works that incorporate past works that were found by courts to make fair uses of older works.

The remainder of the Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we explain the shortcomings of extant fair use doctrine, focusing on the inherent limitations arising from fair use’s understanding as a personal, use-specific defense to copyright infringement. In particular, we discuss the costs that current fair use jurisprudence imposes on follow-on creators. In Part II, we turn to the world of property, where one finds such doctrines as market overt and the law of easements, which promote the marketability of rights and give use rights an in rem character. In Part III, we draw on our discussion of property law to call for the introduction of a brand-new conception of fair use that would operate as a property incident, in the sense that it would benefit all subsequent users of a work that obtained a fair use status. Finally, in Part IV, we provide an important context for our amended understanding of fair use by showing that other

---

27 See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 890 (2007) (stating that since the fair use doctrine is ambiguous and the cost of losing an infringement case is prohibitively high, “even a risk-neutral actor with a good fair use claim would choose to secure a license rather than take the small risk of incurring a severe penalty”).

28 For discussion, see infra Section I.B.
parts of the law of copyright that struggle with similar problems have employed mechanisms that bear a great deal of resemblance to our proposal.

I. THE LIMITATIONS OF FAIR USE DOCTRINE TODAY

A. Extant Fair Use Law

Fair use is an equitable defense to copyright infringement, originally developed judicially despite the statutory origins of copyright.\(^2^9\) Importantly for our purposes, fair use is highly contextualized. Section 107 of the Copyright Act, in which the modern fair use doctrine is enshrined, provides courts with two anchors in making fair use determinations.\(^3^0\) The preamble of section 107 gives courts a non-exhaustive list of presumptively fair uses, such as criticism, news reporting, commentary, teaching, research, and scholarship.\(^3^1\) Courts may use this list to determine if the use at hand falls within one of the enumerated categories of fair uses. The latter part of section 107 gives courts four factors to consider and balance in making their final decision on fair use. Section 107 instructs courts to consider: (1) the purpose of the allegedly infringing use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work allegedly being infringed; (3) the amount and substantiality of the copyrighted material taken by the allegedly infringing use; and (4) the effect of a fair use finding on the actual and potential value for the allegedly infringed upon copyrighted work.\(^3^2\)

In construing the statutory criteria, courts at different times have weighted certain factors more heavily than others. At present, courts tend to focus on the transformativeness of the claimed fair use when compared to the original work, leading courts to pay particular attention to the purpose of the defendant’s use and the use’s effect on the value of the copyrighted work—statutory factors (1) and (4), respectively.\(^3^3\) That said,


\(^{3^1}\) Id.

\(^{3^2}\) Id.

\(^{3^3}\) Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 179, 189 (1995) (“[T]he Court has emphasized . . . that the fourth factor—the impact on the potential market value of the plaintiff’s work—is to receive the most weight.”).
fair use cases are notoriously difficult to rationalize; as Pamela Samuelson has shown, fair use rules are highly context-dependent, and it is difficult to summarize all fair use law in a single approach.\textsuperscript{34}

Fair use is probably the most celebrated doctrine in the law of copyright and often the fulcrum on which authors’ rights and users’ interests are balanced against each other. Yet, by virtue of the fair use doctrine’s current design, it has only a limited ability to ensure broad use of works. As it stands, the fair use doctrine provides a very limited privilege, or shelter, to users.

Fair use findings are individualized in two central ways: 1) per user and 2) per use. Take the example of a blogger who excerpts a short quotation from a copyrighted political speech as part of a blog entry on politics. If a court were to find this use fair, this finding would necessarily be confined to the specific blogger and her individual circumstances. If subsequently a mainstream media outlet were to quote exactly the same words from the same copyrighted political speech in its own news report, the mainstream media outlet could not be certain that its own use would be considered a fair use. Indeed, even if the mainstream media outlet secured permission from the blogger to utilize the entire blog entry, and its only use of the quotation was in the context of reprinting the blog entry in its entirety, the media outlet would still need to negotiate its own license with the writer of the speech or make its own, separate claim of fair use over the quote. The same is true for other online users. They, too, could not reproduce, adapt or circulate the content of the blog even with the blogger’s permission. The blogger’s fair use finding would be of no avail to them. Their use would not be part of the blogger’s fair use.

No less importantly, even the original blogger who won a court ruling in favor of her fair use of the quotation in her blog entry could not be sure that the use would still be fair if she then adapted her blog entry into something else. For example, if she were to turn the blog entry into a book chapter, add accompanying video of the speech to the original blog entry, or add a few words to the quotation, she would again expose herself to a risk of copyright liability. While the use of the copyright content in a particular literary form was ruled fair, it does mean that its incorporation into a different literary form, or a different copyrighted non-literary form would qualify as fair, as well.

\textsuperscript{34} Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, supra note 1, at 2540–41.
Accordingly, if in the famous Supreme Court case Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme Court had found the Nation’s quotations from Gerald Ford’s autobiography, Time to Heal, fair, other magazines and reporters could still not reproduce the content of the Nation’s article, even with permission from the magazine. The fair use ruling would not pertain to them.

This inherent limitation of fair use is especially problematic when information moves through interconnected networks. As many scholars have noted, the norm among internet users is to share content instantaneously. It is unreasonable to expect users to understand the fine details of copyright law. There is little reason to suspect that users will have any idea that content that was uploaded lawfully based on a fair use finding may not be further downloaded and further distributed by them. Paradoxically, fair use findings can become a trap to the unwary. They “clear” rights for a single user who was sued and prevailed in court, allowing her to continue to use the content in the particular manner authorized by the court, but have no effect on other users.

This shortcoming of fair use can be seen in the most dramatic way in the recent Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle, widely recognized as a critically important fair use case. The matter was brought to court after Oracle accused Google of copying thirty-seven

---

37 See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Alain Van Hiel & Sven Vanneste, Copyright Backlash, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1251, 1253 (2011) (“Sharing unlicensed copyrighted materials is now a part of teenagers’ everyday lives.”); Madhavi Sunder, IP³, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 263 (2006) (observing that we are living in the “Participation Age” of remix culture, blogs, podcasts, wikis, and peer-to-peer filesharing,” which in turn leads a “new generation [to view] intellectual properties as the raw materials for its own creative acts, blurring the lines that have long separated producers from consumers”); John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 537, 548 (pointing out that digital technology “has enabled unparalleled manipulation and use of creative works by ordinary individuals”).
39 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Clark D. Asay, Saving Software’s Fair Use Future, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 535, 536–37 (2018) (“How the Federal Circuit decides Oracle’s appeal of a jury verdict in favor of Google’s fair use defense will have significant implications for future software copyright fair use cases because Oracle, in effect, calls into question the viability of fair use defenses in all API reuse cases (and perhaps in software cases more generally).”).
packages from its API. Oracle’s predecessor, Sun Microsystems, had developed a programming language called Java that included a number of elements including the Java API. Google incorporated the structure and organization of the contested API into the Android operating system. As part of the process, Google rewrote the Java API, but many of the commands in the Android API remained identical to Oracle’s API. In total, 11,500 lines of code were copied.

Java API was originally developed by Sun Microsystems, and Google sought a negotiated license from Sun to use the API and other elements of Java. Negotiations failed to reach fruition, and a bitter clash arose. Oracle bought out Sun, and with the company, ownership of the API. In 2010, Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement. The case proceeded in two rounds. The first round concentrated on the eligibility of APIs for copyright protection. The District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that APIs were uncopyrightable as “there is only one way to declare a given method functionality, [so that] everyone using that function must write that specific line of code in the same way.” Citing various copyright doctrines ranging from the judicial “merger” doctrine to the statutory exclusion of “methods of operation,” the court determined that the challenged parts of the code were outside the scope of copyright protection. The Federal Circuit reversed, ruling that APIs were entitled to copyright protection. Google’s petition for certiorari was denied.

This gave rise to the second round of litigation, revolving around the issue of fair use. In 2016, a jury agreed that Google’s use of the API qualified as a fair use. To the dismay of many commentators, the

---

40 Oracle, 141 S. Ct. at 1193.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1186.
44 Id. at 1190.
47 Id. at 996 & n.7 (citing Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Protection, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1921, 1921 (2007)); id. at 997, 1001–02.
48 750 F.3d at 1381.
Federal Circuit reversed the decision again, holding that Google’s use was not fair as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{52}

The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in 2021, reversed the Federal Circuit’s second decision.\textsuperscript{53} Stressing that fair use is “flexible,” requiring “judicial balancing, depending upon relevant circumstances,” where “application may well vary depending upon context,” the Court endorsed Google’s argument that copying parts of Oracle’s Java API was a transformative use, and therefore non-infringing, fair use of Oracle’s Java program.\textsuperscript{54} This absolved Google of liability. However, the ruling does not shelter any other technology companies that use Google’s program copying parts of the Java API in their apps written for Android phones. The Android operating system is employed in such a large number of applications that any attempt to estimate that number would be a mere conjecture. The favorable decision for Google does not carry over to any of the other companies that use the code. Of course, Google’s fair use victory serves as a precedent and, as such, might make it more difficult for Oracle to prevail against other companies that used Google’s code with permission and encouragement from Google. However, many of them may simply not have the financial wherewithal to fight the case in court and may choose to settle with Oracle or, worse, cease to operate.\textsuperscript{55}

This scenario demonstrates the limitation of fair use as a personal privilege that applies to the particular defendant, as opposed to the work. Had fair use attached to the protected work, i.e. the copyrighted expression, be it code, lyrics, audiovisual content, or other forms of art, it would shield all subsequent creators who use the content. The work at issue in \textit{Oracle v. Google} was an open-source operating system that was purposefully designed and distributed to be used by multiple individuals and companies.\textsuperscript{56} Such works expose the limited ability of fair use to ensure broad use privileges. However, even in cases involving other copyrightable subject matter, the same problem arises.

To see this, consider the case of \textit{Campbell v. Acuff Rose}, in which the Supreme Court ruled that 2 Live Crew’s version of Roy Orbison’s “Oh

\textsuperscript{52} Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
\textsuperscript{54} Id. at 1204.
\textsuperscript{55} Google ultimately stopped using the copied code. Android programmers utilizing later versions of the program are therefore shielded from liability to Oracle, despite the limited nature of the fair use defense. Supra note 26.
\textsuperscript{56} 886 F.3d at 1186–87.
Pretty Woman” constituted a parody of the original and thus qualified as a fair use.\textsuperscript{57} The Supreme Court’s ruling allowed 2 Live Crew to continue to perform the song and distribute it. If, however, a subsequent creator wanted to use 2 Live Crew’s song in a movie or a video game, she would not be able to do so even though she obtained permission from 2 Live Crew without also obtaining rights to the Roy Orbison song. Subsequent uses are not directly affected by a fair use finding.

As another example, consider Alice Randall’s \textit{The Wind Done Gone}, a literary adaptation of Margaret Mitchell’s \textit{Gone with the Wind} that presented the story from the vantage point of the African-American characters.\textsuperscript{58} After a prolonged legal battle, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that Alice Randall’s book was a parody of \textit{Gone with the Wind} and hence constituted fair use.\textsuperscript{59} The decision enabled Alice Randall’s publisher to continue with the distribution of the book. However, if she were to try to sell her movie rights to a studio, the fair use ruling would not carry over. Similarly, if an independent theater wished to produce a play based on the book, it would be risking an infringement suit. The fair use ruling pertains to Alice’s Randall’s use alone. It does not protect Randall’s book in any other context.

\textbf{B. The Costs of Fair Use in Its Current Form}

Under the current regime, users who desire to use content that fairly incorporates preexisting copyright materials have two options: they can either obtain licenses from all the rightsholders involved, past and present, or use the content without permission, risk a lawsuit, and put their faith in the fair use defense. The first option raises the twin specters of high transaction costs and strategic behavior. This is especially true when multiple parties hold copyrights to the content, as in the case of documentary films.\textsuperscript{60} The second option implies litigation costs and uncertainty about the legal outcome. The fair use defense has many

\textsuperscript{57} 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
\textsuperscript{58} Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).
\textsuperscript{59} Id. at 1277.
\textsuperscript{60} See generally Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use and Motion Pictures, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 715, 717–18 (discussing how documentary filmmaking has contributed to “the increasing reliance of motion picture production on the appropriation of reality . . . giv[ing] rise to tensions that have been expressed in terms of conflicts over copyright”).
virtues, but certainty is not one of them. If the fair use defense fails in court, the defendant who raised it may not only lose her right to use the material but may also be ordered to pay statutory damages to the plaintiff, far in excess of the value she derived from the use. The higher costs associated with the use of works that fairly incorporate preexisting copyrighted materials significantly impair their marketability. We elaborate on this problem below.

1. Licenses

Users who wish to use (copy, display, perform, etc.) a copyrighted work can secure a license to do so from the relevant rightsholders. In fact, this is the point and purpose of establishing copyright protection in the first place. Copyright law does not reward authors and creators with cash payments upon creation of a new work. Rather, the law grants them a bundle of exclusive rights. The expectation is that authors will earn their rewards from users who pay for licenses to perform one or more of the rights that would otherwise be exclusive to the author. Users, in other words, pay to use the content, and it is the payment that is the point of making the rights exclusive in the first place.

This dynamic applies no less to works that incorporate preexisting copyrighted materials, which are ubiquitous. Films are often adaptations of copyrighted written work. News broadcasts incorporate film clips
created by various authors. Computer programs often include previously copyrighted graphics or code. A movie theater that wants to screen a film to the public must obtain a license not only from the studio that owns rights to the film, but also from the copyright owners of the previously copyrighted written work on which the film was based. This means that the more preexisting copyrighted works are incorporated into a new work, the greater the number of licenses that must be obtained to use the new work.66

As is the case with any system that relies on market transactions, purchasing licenses inevitably involves transactions costs. Transaction costs typically include the cost of identifying the relevant rightsholder, negotiating with her, formalizing a legal agreement, and enforcing it. Typically, the higher the number of rightsholders whose consent needs to be obtained, the higher the transaction costs. In the simplest case of a new work utilizing an older work, users would have to secure a license from at least two rightsholders: the copyright owner in the original work and the copyright owner in the follow-on work who fairly employed expressive content from the original work. For example, a fan wishing to start a “Grateful Dead” webpage and include in it photos of poster art from the book Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip would be thwarted from doing so, even though the use of the photos in the original book was ruled fair.67 The fact that a court ruled that Dorling Kinderseley’s use of the photographic content was fair does not carry over to other users.

It is easy to see how the attempt to secure permission from all necessary rightsholders might run aground due to high transaction costs. For instance, a filmmaker who plans to negotiate with all the relevant rightsholders would need to expend substantial resources in the process: the mere task of identifying all the rightsholders may require resources in excess of the expected revenues from the movie. It is therefore not surprising that documentary filmmakers often do not even try to negotiate with all the relevant rightsholders and rely on fair use instead. But even in cases where the relevant rightsholders are readily identifiable, a user

---

66 The law and economics literature points to a positive correlation between the number of rightsholders and the level of transaction costs. See generally Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Copyright Trust, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 1015, 1060 (2015) (“Multiparty agreements typically involve higher coordination costs and as the number of parties grows, so does the likelihood of an impasse.”).

67 See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s “copyrighted images in its book Illustrated Trip is fair use”).
still needs to negotiate the terms of the use with them and formalize an agreement to this effect. In some cases, enforcement costs are also likely to arise. The expenditures a user incurs in the process—namely, the transaction costs—go to waste; they do not benefit the copyright owner or the user. In some cases, the benefit a user derives from the use of a work would justify incurring the transaction costs, as well as paying the copyright owner her asking price.68

Our discussion so far ignored a different problem that is likely to arise in negotiations with multiple rightsholders: strategic holdouts. When a party must secure permissions from multiple rightsholders, each of whom holds a veto power over the enterprise as a whole, there is no reason for any of the veto holders to sell easily.69 Each rightsholder knows that the revenue for the entire project depends on her consent. Each rightsholder therefore should demand the maximum share of the revenue she can get without bringing the project to a halt, up to the full value of the project. The price each rightsholder demands is therefore strategic—it depends not only on the value of the rights to the rightsholder but also, more importantly, on an evaluation of the prices other rightsholders will demand and receive. None of the rightsholders has any reason to moderate her demands excessively. This increases the likelihood that negotiations will fail, especially when the negotiations are often undertaken in situations of imperfect information and miscalculations. Each of the rightsholders is trying to outwit the other rightsholders in order to end up with the highest achievable share—one rightsholder may end up demanding too much, leading to the failure of the entire project.

2. Fair Use

Failed negotiations are not necessarily the end of the line for follow-on works. The author, attempting to create a new work incorporating old works, may decide that the licensing efforts are not worth it, or the author

68 It is precisely for this reason that Wendy Gordon listed market failure—including prohibitive transaction costs—as the first prerequisite for recognizing fair use by her lights. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 1, at 1614–15, 1627–28.

may try to obtain the relevant licenses and fail, but the author may still proceed on the basis of the fair use doctrine. Stated bluntly, the author may gamble that the use of the older works without a license will be found a “fair use” by courts, obviating the need to obtain a license. Indeed, the author may decide to initiate this gamble even if transaction costs are not prohibitive, in order to try to obtain the rights for free.

Alas, fair use is not a straightforward gamble. The problem with fair use is its vagueness—indeed, it is so vague that Larry Lessig famously defined fair use as “the right to hire a lawyer.” Judge Pierre Leval openly posited that fair use is vague by design and admitted that even judges do not have a shared understanding of what fair use is. Other scholars have argued that the vagueness of the fair use test is a welcome and necessary feature of the doctrine.

The ambiguity of fair use imposes a real cost on users. Users who rely on the fair use defense cannot know for certain how their defense will be treated by the court. As is true of other open-ended standards that rely on a balancing test, fair use inevitably leads to overdeterrence and underuse of works. Users cannot know in advance whether their use is fair, and the harsh consequences of error will deter much use of copyrighted works. A potential user who considers a use to have a high likelihood of being fair may nevertheless forego the use for fear of losing in court and exposing herself to the risk of having to pay the plaintiff large amounts of

---


71 See generally Leval, supra note 1, at 1106 (“Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use.”).

72 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 121, 140 (1999) (“[F]air use appears to be employed in situations of high transaction costs, where a muddy entitlement may be appropriate . . . . The ‘muddy’ four-part balancing standard of fair use allows courts to reallocate what the market cannot.”).

73 Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1483, 1486 (2007) (“The Supreme Court’s decision to favor ex post fairness over ex ante certainty comes at a steep cost for potential users of copyrighted works.”).

74 See, e.g., John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965, 995 (1984) (noting that when the “probability [of liability] declines as defendants take more care, then defendants may tend to overcomply”); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 279, 280 (1986) (arguing that overcompliance is a common effect of some types of uncertain rules); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 873 (1998) (observing that “if injurers are made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful precautions may be taken . . . and risky but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed”).
money. It should be borne in mind that the Copyright Act entitles successful plaintiffs to the defendant’s profits\textsuperscript{75} from the infringement and to statutory damages of up to $150,000 per willful infringement.\textsuperscript{76} Hence, users who have blind faith in fair use take a high-stakes gamble.\textsuperscript{77} The safer bet may be to obtain a relatively low-cost insurance policy in the form of an unnecessary license.

In an influential article, James Gibson pointed out that the vague nature of fair use leads to “right accretion” by copyright holders.\textsuperscript{78} Since many users are understandably reluctant to take a chance on the fair use doctrine, many of them prefer to obtain licenses from copyright holders even for potentially fair uses. This dynamic invariably leads to an expansion of the rights of copyright owners and a contraction of the domain of fair use. Over time, as this process repeats itself with respect to more and more uses that could be ruled fair, copyright owners gain more control over the use of their work.\textsuperscript{79}

Of course, users also have the option of not using the work at all. Per our earlier discussion, they would resort to this option when transaction costs are high or when they expect strategic holdouts to arise and block the path to a successful license. Indeed, all courses of action that are open to users are costly. These additional costs undermine the marketability of the works involved and could be avoided if subsequent users were sheltered by the original fair use finding received by the first user.

II. PROPERTY LAW AND THE PROBLEMS OF FAIR USE

Our proposal to reform fair use law draws its inspiration from the world of property. In order to explain our proposal, we restate in property terms our observations in Part I about the flaws of fair use. The two central flaws of extant fair use law can be described in property terms as follows. First, extant fair use doctrine recognizes personal use rights rather than rights

\textsuperscript{75} 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (2018) (stating that a copyright infringer is, by default, liable for any of “the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer”).

\textsuperscript{76} 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2018).


\textsuperscript{78} Gibson, supra note 27, at 887–95.

\textsuperscript{79} See id.
in rem. Second, and relatedly, the fair use rights recognized by law are not marketable. Each of these flaws is analogous to problems that potentially appear in many property contexts, and each of these flaws has typically associated property solutions. In this Part, we explain how property law provides analogous solutions to each of these flaws.

A. Use Rights

Let us begin with the first of the two flaws. As we noted, fair use doctrine recognizes the right of a particular user to a particular use of a particular work. 80 2 Live Crew’s fair use right to parts of Roy Orbison’s “Oh Pretty Woman” in its own “Pretty Woman” song is limited personally to 2 Live Crew; the band’s victory in its own fair use case does not ensure that a different band parodying Orbison’s song would win. Likewise, 2 Live Crew’s victory is limited to a particular use of a particular work; we could no longer be certain that it was a fair use if 2 Live Crew used Orbison’s song in a different work (say, “Prettier Man”) or used more of Orbison’s song in the same work.

It may seem obvious that any fair use that is limited to a particular use of a particular work must necessarily be personal and limited to a particular user. However, the law of property teaches otherwise.

While we tend to think of property as centered on objects or things, 81 property law often deals with use rights. 82 The law of servitudes—easements, covenants, equitable servitudes, profits à prendre, and others—gives rightsholders legal authority to use realty 83 even though

80 Supra Part I.
82 Chang & Smith, supra note 81, at 23.
83 Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 982–89. Easements can also be negative. A negative easement entitles the holder to prevent a certain use of the parcel to which the easement applies. Traditionally, the common law recognized only four negative easements: (1) blocking windows, (2) interfering with air flow in a defined channel, (3) removing artificial support for buildings, and (4) interfering with the flow of water in an artificial channel. See Jesse Dukeminier, James E. Krier, Gregory S. Alexander & Michael H. Schill, Property 736 (6th ed. 2006).
another person owns the land. Consider a standard right-of-way easement between Blackacre owned by Alice and Greyacre owned by Beatrice. The most convenient route for Alice to drive to Blackacre is over a strip of Greyacre. Property law allows Alice to secure a right to drive over Greyacre without purchasing title to the necessary strip of land. Instead, Alice can purchase an easement—a use right—that leaves title to the strip of land in the hands of Beatrice, but gives Alice a right to drive to and from her garage over that strip of land that is recognized and protected by the law of property. Easements, by their nature, attach to the land. The burdened land (known as the servient tenement in property law)—Greyacre in our example—is subject to the easement even if there is a change in ownership. Accordingly, if Beatrice transfers Greyacre to Claire, Alice will not need to repurchase the easement from Claire. Rather, the easement is embedded in Claire’s title; she acquired title to the land subject to the easement. Typically, easements are appurtenant, meaning they attach to the land on the benefited side as well (in property terminology, the benefited land is known as the dominant tenement). Thus, if the benefited parcel—Blackacre in our example—is transferred from Alice to Danielle, Danielle would benefit from the easement as it is part of the title to Blackacre.

Easements are flexible tools. For instance, they can be constructed with time limits. Alice and Beatrice might agree, for example, to give the

---

84 John H. Pearson, Easement Defined, in 7 Thompson on Real Property § 60.02 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994) (“[A]n easement is one of several ways in which one may obtain rights in the land of another, for the benefit of one’s own property or for one’s own personal benefit.”).

85 Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 983; Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1261, 1264 (1982).

86 Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60.07(a) (“The very nature of an easement, and a major point justifying its existence, is to guarantee that an arrangement for the non-possessory use of land survives the transfer of that land into the hands of another.”).

87 Id.

88 Indeed, English law originally refused to recognize the validity of easements in gross. French, supra note 85, at 1267–68.

89 Property law also recognizes easements in gross. Unlike appurtenant easements, easements in gross do not attach to the land and do not run with the title to it. Rather, they are personal in nature and benefit particular individuals. In our previous example, Beatrice could have made the easement personal to Alice, rendering it an easement in gross. In such a case, the easement would continue to benefit Alice even if she sold her title to Blackacre and moved elsewhere, but it would not automatically benefit Danielle who purchased title to Blackacre from Alice. In the past, easements in gross were considered non-transferrable. This is no longer the case. Under modern property law, even easements in gross are transferable. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 83, at 714–16.
easement a five-year life. At the same time, many features of easements are dictated by property law and cannot be modified by the parties. For instance, an easement is the necessary result of the transfer of a non-possessory right in real property properly attested to by deed, even if the parties did not know they were creating an easement. Thus, in the case of Baseball Publishing Co. v. Bruton, the court determined that an agreement giving Baseball Publishing a five-year right to place an advertising billboard on the side of Bruton’s building was an easement in gross even though the agreement described the right as a “lease” and Bruton claimed the right was merely a “license.” According to the court, a property right becomes an easement according to its features (in this case, a written agreement to create non-possessory, exclusive use right in real property) without regard to the terminology preferred by the parties.

Property law even accommodates the possible right to prevent a certain use of land. A negative easement, for instance, gives the easement holder the right to prevent the owner of land from undertaking certain acts. A conservation easement (a popular type of negative easement) gives the easement holder the right to block high-impact development of the burdened land. Other negative easements may prevent owners of the burdened land from building in such a manner as to block a view or to remove a support wall.

Property law accommodates other use rights as well. Where easements cannot be stretched to cover a particular non-use right, property law permits the use of covenants or equitable servitudes. Covenants and equitable servitudes are commitments to perform or not to perform actions that “touch and concern” land, and they are anchored in property

91 Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 988.
92 See generally Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60.02(e)(4) (“The conservation easement is a negative easement that prevents the fee owner from making use of the land in ways that would compromise its preservation”); Jeffrey A. Blackie, Note, Conservation Easements and the Doctrine of Changed Conditions, 40 Hastings L.J. 1187, 1193–94 (1989).
93 See generally Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60.02(a) (noting that an easement “[m]ay involve the right to act upon the land of another”); J.B. Ruhl, The “Background Principles” of Natural Capital and Ecosystems Services—Did Lucas Open Pandora’s Box?, 22 J. Land Use & Env’t L. 525, 534 (2007) (noting that the four types of traditionally recognized negative easements were: “the rights to stop other landowners from (1) blocking one’s windows, (2) interfering with the flow of air in a defined channel, (3) removing artificial support for buildings, and (4) interfering with the flow of water in an artificial channel”).
94 Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 983.
law rather than contract law. Where the covenant or equitable servitude is successfully created, successors to title in the land are bound by the commitments of their predecessors. For instance, in the famous case of *Tulk v. Moxhay*, Moxhay became the owner of Leicester Square garden, which had once been owned by Tulk. In 1808, Tulk had sold the garden to Elms, a predecessor of Moxhay in title, and Elms promised to maintain the premises as a garden and never to build in the garden. The court held that Moxhay could be held to Elms’s promise because the promise was one that ran with the land to successors in title, under a doctrine that came to be known as equitable servitude.

Use rights are an indispensable form of property rights in condominiums and other common interest communities. Fellow owners in the common interest community need to know that their neighbors will continue paying for the upkeep of common areas, for example, and that they will respect parking arrangements. A buyer of a condominium unit, therefore, does not merely buy title to land. She also subjects herself to a complex set of property arrangements concerning use that are anchored in a document called the Declaration or the Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (“CCR”). The use rights and burdens in the Declaration are a crucial part of the property package owned by every owner in the common interest community.

All these use rights in land have a common feature. They are recognized and enforced by property law and attach to someone other than the owner of the burdened land. When Eloise owns an easement over

---

97 Id.
100 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, *Governing Communities by Auction*, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2014) (noting that “[i]n homeowners’ and condominium associations, the servitudes are generally aggregated in a large document called the covenants, conditions, and regulations (CCR)”)
101 See, e.g., *Villa Milano Homeowners Ass’n v. Il Davorge*, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 6 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“[A] major distinction between the typical adhesion contract and CC&R’s is that, once the homeowners have made their purchases, they ordinarily have the collective power to
Francine’s land, both Eloise and Francine own property rights, but only Francine has title in the burdened land. Francine continues to have an exclusive right of possession (subject to Eloise’s easement). Francine can sell her land, mortgage it, transmit ownership of it by will, and do all the other things an owner can, subject only to the caveat that her ownership and that of any successor in interest will continue to be subject to the use right protected by Eloise’s easement.102

As we will explain later in this Part, our proposal would create an option for judges to treat fair use rights as durable use rights in the way property law treats use rights. Ownership of the copyrighted work would continue to remain with the author or the successor in interest. However, the fair use too would take on the features of a legally cognizable use right that is not merely personal.

B. Market Overt

We now turn to the second of the two flaws we noted in Part I: the lack of marketability of fair uses. As we noted, fair uses are restricted to the particular use by the particular user. Follow-on users undertaking uses identical to the fair use cannot be certain that they too will be found to have used the copyrighted work fairly. The term marketability is used in a number of different ways in property law; what interests us here is the ability to turn a personal privilege into a durable property right that can be transferred to others in certain circumstances. This is perhaps best understood by considering the property doctrines of “market overt.”

Market overt literally means open or “public market,”103 but when property lawyers speak of “market overt,” they are referring to the set of doctrines under which a seller with defective title can transfer good title to a bona fide purchaser.104 There are different rules of market overt for chattels and realty. As we shall see, the market overt rules of realty are of particular interest for our proposal.

102 See generally Pearson, supra note 84, at § 60 (describing the law of easements).
103 See J.G. Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 375, 375 (1908) (“Market overt’ means a public market . . . .”).
One of the basic principles of property law in transfers of title is *nemo dat quod non habet*, which means one cannot transfer what one does not have.\(^{105}\) As a general rule, a buyer cannot acquire better title than the seller had. If Irene owns 50% of Blackacre, she cannot sell to Jacqueline more than 50% of Blackacre; if Irene has no ownership interest at all, she cannot sell anything to Jacqueline. The rules of market overt are an important exception to *nemo dat quod non habet*.\(^{106}\) Under the rules of market overt, if the buyer purchases a good in good faith, and fulfills other conditions, she can acquire good title in the object even though the seller did not own the object at all.\(^{107}\)

The term “market overt” is taken from a medieval English doctrine that provided a very broad exception to the general rule of *nemo dat*. In the medieval doctrine, anyone who purchased chattel in a chartered or customary marketplace in the open, in a transaction conducted in public, would acquire good title to the good, no matter what its provenance.\(^{108}\) Eventually, the term came to be applied to the whole family of doctrines giving purchasers good title contrary to the rule of *nemo dat*.\(^{109}\) Today, the most familiar of those doctrines is found in the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which describes in section 2-403 two distinct situations in which a good faith purchaser can acquire perfect title to an object despite buying it from a seller with defective title.\(^{110}\) The two doctrines can be roughly described as sales involving voidable title and sales by an entrustee.

---


\(^{106}\) See generally Deborah A. DeMott, *Artful Good Faith: An Essay on Law, Custom, and Intermediaries in Art Markets*, 62 Duke L.J. 607, 609 (2012) (“In the United States, long-standing rules of property and commercial law embody the nemo dat quod non habet principle—no one can give what one does not have—with the consequence that a thief cannot convey good title, not even when stolen property passes through the hands of an intermediary to a good-faith purchaser.”).


\(^{108}\) Shyamkrishna Balganesh, *Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers*, 104 Cal. L. Rev. 269, 277 (2016) (“The market overt doctrine sought to protect purchasers who bought their goods from sellers in ‘open’ fairs and markets, which formed the principal channel for trade during the time.”); see also Pease, supra note 103, at 375 (describing the common law rule).

\(^{109}\) See generally Weinberg, supra note 104.

The entrustee rule is the easier one to summarize. According to section 2-403(2), “[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives [the entrustee] power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in [the] ordinary course of business.”\footnote{U.C.C. § 2-403(2).} Section 2-403(3) goes on to define entrusting as including “any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor’s disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law.”\footnote{Id. § 2-403(3).} The entrusting rule can be easily illustrated. Imagine that Zena owns a car and that her friend Yolanda owns a business selling used cars. If Zena lends her car to Yolanda for the weekend in order to drive to a vacation cabin, and Yolanda instead drives the car to the used car lot and sells it to Xuan during business hours as if the car were part of the used car lot inventory, Xuan will acquire good title to the car even though Yolanda never owned the car and was not authorized by Zena to sell it.

The voidable title rules are more complex. The voidable title rule in section 2-403(1) states that “a person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.”\footnote{Id. § 2-403(1).} Unfortunately, the rule fails to provide its own definition of “voidable” title, and it does not clarify its connection to the common law of voidable title. Instead, the rule goes on to say that

when goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a ‘cash sale’, or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.\footnote{Id.}

This may be interpreted as an elaboration of the traditional common law categories of voidable title or, perhaps, as the UCC’s own illustration of the potential types of voidable title.\footnote{For discussion see Gilmore, supra note 110, at 608–20. One classic type of voidable title that is clearly part of the common law and the UCC rule is a case where someone acquires defective title through a fraud in inducement such as payment by a bad check. Consider, for instance, the case of Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry. Nowlin Jewelry, the original owner of a watch,}
The doctrine that good faith purchasers can acquire good title from sellers with defective voidable title is not limited to chattels. The common law also recognizes a market overt-type rule that grants good title to good faith purchasers of real property rights when they purchase those rights from a seller with voidable title.\textsuperscript{116} If, for instance, Lena acquires a deed to Blackacre from Katherine, paying with bad checks, and Mary then buys Blackacre from Lena in good faith, Mary can establish good title to Blackacre, notwithstanding the voidability of Lena’s title.

However, the most important exception to the ordinary rule of \textit{nemo dat quod non habet} in real estate comes from an entirely different source. Recording acts for real estate transfers establish broad exceptions permitting purchasers to acquire valid rights to purchased land, even though the title of the transferor was lacking.\textsuperscript{117} The classic case covered by the recording acts is one where the owner of land sells the same land to multiple purchasers. A straight application of the logic of \textit{nemo dat quod non habet} would tell us that the first purchaser would acquire good title and subsequent purchasers nothing. For instance, if Celeste were to sell Blackacre to Darlene, and then to Elsa, the logic of the situation would dictate that Elsa would get nothing because when she “purchased” Blackacre from Celeste, Darlene already owned it and Celeste had nothing to sell. The recording acts may dictate a different result. Under the recording acts, a subsequent purchaser for value of real estate may establish good title by complying with the recording act’s conditions.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin {footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{116} Merrill & Smith, supra note 81, at 895–99.

\textsuperscript{117} Jesse Dukeminier, James E. Krier, Gregory S. Alexander, Michael H. Schill & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Property 662 (9th ed. 2018) ("[R]ecording acts have the function of protecting purchasers for value and lien creditors against prior unrecorded interests.").

\textsuperscript{118} Id. at 662–63.
\end {footnotesize}
The conditions required of the subsequent purchaser can be roughly divided into three categories. In “race” jurisdictions, a subsequent purchaser can establish good title by recording the purchase before the prior purchaser.119 In “notice” jurisdictions, the subsequent purchaser can establish good title if she purchases in good faith without notice of the prior transaction (if the prior purchaser’s transaction is already recorded at the time of the subsequent purchase, the subsequent purchaser will be deemed to have “constructive notice” of the prior transaction).120 In “race-notice” jurisdictions, the subsequent purchaser can prevail only if she records first and she purchased without notice of the prior transaction (i.e., if she meets the conditions to win in both a race and a notice jurisdiction).121

The title granted by a recording act has some peculiar features. Generally, a subsequent purchaser who acquires good title by meeting the conditions of the recording act can convey that good title to anyone else. To return to the earlier example, let us suppose that Celeste owns Blackacre and that she sells Blackacre, first to Darlene, and then to Elsa. Let us further suppose that Darlene fails to record her purchase, and that Elsa has no knowledge of the earlier sale to Darlene, and that Elsa properly records her purchase in the office of the recorder of deeds. The recording act (whether of the race, notice, or race-notice variety) would grant Elsa good title, because even though Celeste lacked title to Blackacre at the time of the sale to Elsa, Elsa bought without notice of the prior sale, and she recorded her purchase first. But let us imagine that the chain of transactions continues. Darlene finally records her purchase, and then Elsa sells Blackacre to Francine. Does Francine have good title? The answer is yes, due to what is called the “shelter rule.” The shelter rule clarifies that “one who is not a bona fide purchaser, but who takes an interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, may be sheltered in the latter’s protective status.”122 That is to say, a subsequent purchaser who acquires good title as a result of the recording act does not merely enjoy a personal privilege, but actually enjoys the rights of any owner with good title, including the right to transfer that title to others.123

119 Id. at 682–85 (discussing different types of recording acts).
120 Id.
121 Id.
123 M.J. Higgins, The Transfer of Property Under Illegal Transactions, 25 Modern L. Rev. 149, 149 (1969). While the shelter rule provides wide protection for the good faith purchaser,
Like the rules of market overt, our proposal seeks to make fair use rights marketable, enabling fair use findings to “shelter” follow-on users. As in the case of the market overt, it is not necessary for all subsequent uses to be sheltered by the initial fair use finding. However, without a fairly broad shelter rule for fair uses, fair uses could not rightly be described as marketable.

III. A SECOND CONCEPTION OF FAIR USE

In this Part, we introduce our proposal to transform fair use rights into marketable, durable use rights. The gist of our proposal is to introduce a novel conception of fair use alongside the existing type of fair use. Our new kind of fair use is modelled as a property defense that shelters all subsequent users of the work that won a fair use status. In our vision, this new conception would complement, not replace, the existing fair use defense. We also explain how judges would choose between the two conceptions of fair use in individual cases. We show that our proposed addition would improve the workings of our copyright system. After presenting our proposal, we show that our proposal to reform fair use law is consistent with the general trend in copyright law to create rights for the creators of follow-on works in order to enhance works’ marketability.

A. A Proposal for Reforming Fair Use Law

Our reform proposal consists of three interlocking steps. First, we introduce a new conception of fair use, under which the doctrine would constitute an in rem property remedy. This new conception is intended not to supplant existing fair use doctrine but, rather, to complement it. The vision we present below consists of two conceptions of fair use: the in
personam, familiar form and a new in rem fair use exception. This would lead to a two-option fair use menu. Second, we give judges the ability, in appropriate cases, to shelter not only the particular defendant before them but also all subsequent legitimate users of the defendant’s work. Judges could do this by ruling in the particular case that the fair use finding is in rem and marketable. Third, to ensure clarity, we propose two default rules that determine which of the two conceptions of fair use would apply if the court failed to choose explicitly between the competing conceptions of fair use.

As we explained, extant fair use is an in personam defense that applies on a per use basis. Our first innovation is to introduce a different conception of fair use that is fashioned as a property defense. Under our proposed in rem conception, fair use would take on the character of an easement on a copyrighted work. Once a certain use had been declared fair by a court, the classification would carry over to other users who want to make use of the same expression. In other words, a court’s finding of fair use would have the same effect as market overt rules in property: it would allow defendants whose use was ruled fair by a court to give use rights free of claims by prior authors whose content was incorporated into the work. Fair use, in other words, would have sheltering power.

If the Supreme Court were to have incorporated this conception of fair use in finding that Google’s use of Oracle’s APIs was fair, the benefit of the ruling would inure not only to Google but also to all the developers of all the applications that run on Android. Since they operated with Google’s blessing and clearly had permission from Google to offer their content to Android users, they too would be sheltered from potential lawsuits from Oracle.

It should be emphasized that this proposed property conception of fair use is not meant to replace the traditional fair use defense. Rather, it is designed to complement it. Hence, the introduction of the property version of fair use would result in a simple legal menu with two fair use conceptions: (a) the traditional in personam fair use defense that avails only the specific individual defendant and would cover only the particular use she has made of the plaintiff’s work and (b) the property version of fair use that protects not only the defendant herself but all subsequent users who received permission from her to use the work.

The introduction of a fair use menu would require judges to choose among three options in fair use cases (as opposed to the two familiar options they choose from today). Judges could deny fair use altogether,
find traditional fair use, or grant the property version of fair use. Importantly, the criteria for making the decision would remain the same. We do not propose changing the traditional fair use test enshrined in section 107 of the Copyright Act. Hence, judges will not have to retrain themselves. Substantively, they would be asked to perform the same familiar task they have always performed. Only the consequences would change. The introduction of the property version of fair use would enable judges to redefine the ramifications of a fair use ruling by extending their decision to a much larger group of users.

Judges would have the power to grant the expansive property version of fair use, irrespective of the defendant’s pleadings. In fact, defendants would not be required to specify which of the two fair use varieties they argue. As today, they would simply argue fair use. The reason is simple: if defendants were forced to choose between the two options and their choice would bind the court, defendants would likely prefer to err on the side of safety and raise the traditional fair use defense. Hence, it should be the judge, not the defendant, who gets to decide which of the two conceptions of fair use to adopt.

Since our proposal does not affect the ability of judges to find traditional fair use, it should not raise any concern that it would adversely affect the willingness of judges to find fair use. Judges who were wary of ruling in favor of an in rem fair use could reject that option and stick with the traditional fair use finding. Judges, in other words, could always take the safe and conservative approach.

The third part of our proposal is to establish a set of default rules that would determine which of the two versions of fair use would obtain where judges fail to address this point. Where judges remain silent (accidentally or deliberately) as to whether they adopted the in personam or in rem version of fair use, we propose that the determination be made in accordance with the following guidelines. In cases in which the alleged infringement consists of incorporating copyrighted content into a new work, as in the case of the Android operating system or the “Pretty Woman” song, the property version of fair use should be the legal default. This is because, in such cases, the marketability of the putatively infringing derivative work is a paramount concern and a broad fair use finding would benefit all future users of this work. In all other cases, the traditional, in personam conception of fair use would constitute the default setting. For example, if a college professor plays a short video to her students and gets sued by the copyright owner, the traditional in
personam version of fair use should apply. Here it is important to grant protection to the professor on a personal, per use basis. There is no need to extend protection beyond her. Marketability is not a paramount concern, and the traditional version of fair use therefore suffices.

To illustrate, consider the famous case of *Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios*. In that case, Sony, the manufacturer of the Betamax video cassette recorder, argued that home users of the recorder could lawfully record over-the-air television programs in order to watch them later. The Supreme Court agreed, finding that such copying for the purpose of “time-shifting” fell within the boundaries of fair use. In large part, the Court adopted the analysis of the trial court, which viewed the noncommercial personal use of the recordings as central to the finding of fair use. In cases where the finding of fair use is grounded primarily or solely in the fact that the work is for personal use, there is little utility to a potential fair use easement. In such cases, even where the judges fail to specify what type of fair use they prefer, it should be obvious that the fair use ruling is in personam.

### B. Our Proposal Compared to Collateral Estoppel

At this point, some readers may wonder if our proposal is not made superfluous by the non-mutual collateral estoppel doctrine. As we will explain, the answer is no. Non-mutual collateral estoppel has branched out of its more familiar cousin, mutual collateral estoppel. Both doctrines deal with issue preclusion, a subset of res judicata. They exist to economize judicial resources. The basic idea is “that once a person has been afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate a particular issue, that person may not be permitted to do so again.” Historically, issue preclusion arose only between the same litigants. Thus, the doctrine was called mutual collateral estoppel. Over time, the mutuality

---

125 Id. at 454–55 (“[H]ome time-shifting is fair use.”).
128 See Gramatan Home Invs. Corp. v. Lopez, 386 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (N.Y. 1979) (explaining that issue preclusion is necessary “to conserve judicial resources by discouraging redundant litigation”).
129 Id.
requirement has been eroded, primarily out of fear of inconsistent rulings by different courts, and non-mutual collateral estoppel was born.

The potential validity of non-mutual collateral estoppel was first recognized for defensive purposes by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, a patent infringement case, the U.S. Supreme Court gave its approval to the use of defensive non-mutual collateral estoppel. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, the respondent, whose patent was ruled invalid in prior litigation, tried to assert the same patent against a different corporation. The Court ruled that collateral estoppel applied, even though different parties were in court, and the patent claim was therefore barred. Subsequently, in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, the Court also recognized the possibility of using non-mutual collateral estoppel offensively, granting trial courts “broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.” In addition to its place in federal law, non-mutual collateral estoppel doctrine has been adopted in a majority of states, although a sizeable minority continues to insist on mutuality.

The doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel has been criticized by commentators on both fairness and efficiency grounds. Without wading into this debate, our aim is to explain why the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel falls short of the in rem fair use conception we propose in this Article. Most importantly, unlike validity determinations, whose applicability is universal (a copyright or a patent is either valid or not), fair use determinations are invariably context-specific. For this reason, non-mutual collateral estoppel will rarely, if ever, come into play in fair use cases. Differences in party identity and even minor differences in use ensure that it is nearly impossible for a fair use issue to arise in precisely the same manner in proceedings between different parties, even over the same work or set of works.

131 122 P.2d 892, 894 (Cal. 1942).
133 Id. at 347, 350; see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1483, 1512 (2013) (classifying patent invalidation as a general in rem defense).
135 Id. at 331.
137 For review, see id. at 1469–75.
Our in rem fair use conception, by contrast, is tailored to provide substantive, as opposed to procedural, shelter. It does not require downstream users to show that their use is exactly the same as that of a previous fair user, and it is unlikely that the uses will ever be precisely identical. The easement analogy is illuminating here too. An in rem fair use ruling, similar to an easement, runs with the asset to all future users. A court that decides to award an in rem fair use is presumed to have taken into account the possibility that follow-on users might use the content in different ways and found that appropriate. As we emphasize throughout this Article, the in rem conception is not applicable to all cases and, where it is inapplicable, a court can select the standard in personam fair use or deny fair use altogether. But once it adopts the conception we propose, all future users of the specific content will be sheltered.

Finally, we should note that our proposal obviates the need to litigate. An in rem fair use ruling would avail all future users, giving them peace of mind and a true sense of security. Non-mutual collateral estoppel cannot achieve this. It should be borne in mind that the cost of litigation and the uncertainty that accompanies it often combine to stifle individual creativity and limit the use of existing copyrighted content.

C. The Advantages of Our Proposal

Our proposal offers three potential advantages relative to the current regime of fair use. First, the introduction of that in rem property version of fair use would increase certainty with respect to the use of derivative works that fairly incorporate preexisting copyrighted content. As we explained, the adoption of our proposal would allow judges in appropriate fair use cases to shelter other potential users by allowing them to engage in the same use that was ruled fair. At the same time, our approach would permit tailoring remedies to the specific circumstances of fair use cases. Currently, all fair use cases are treated in the same manner. Extant doctrine allows judges to take account of societal concerns, but at the end of the day, the ruling affects only the defendant. The proposed property version of fair use would allow judges to take account of the potential for future uses of the fair use work, without being constrained to a single conception. Under our proposal, judges would have the ability to consider the implications of fair use claims for other users and fashion their rulings accordingly. Moreover, the default settings of fair use we proposed would ensure clarity about the particular meaning of fair use rulings in those cases where the judge chooses not to specify which version to apply.
Second, our proposal would have the salutary effect of lowering transaction and litigation costs for follow-on creators. Current fair use doctrine forces creators of expressive works that rely on prior derivative works to obtain licenses from both the original owner and the fair user, or plead their own fair use case anew in court. Both options are costly. To a large degree, our proposal alleviates this burden. In cases in which judges would find a property fair use, the ruling would economize on transaction costs for follow-on users and conserve judicial resources for courts. This is because, unlike existing fair use rulings, in rem fair uses would clear the path for all subsequent users of the work involved in the litigation.

To illustrate, imagine that the Supreme Court had incorporated our proposal in Google v. Oracle and had determined that Google was entitled to a finding of property fair use. Such a ruling would shelter not only all the companies that created Android-enabled applications but also all future companies that produce such applications as well. This, in turn, would free up considerable resources for the relevant parties.

Third, and finally, our proposal would enhance the use of copyrighted content. The sheltering principle would enable multiple downstream users to create adaptations of derivative works that were found by courts to make fair uses of older works. Any finding by a court of an in rem fair use would permit downstream users to utilize the fairly used content without worrying about being exposed to legal liability for incorporating it into a new work. The addition of the property conception of fair use will open up new creative avenues for follow-on creators and users and, in the aggregate, increase the liberties that the public at large would have with respect to copyrighted content. Needless to say, these options would arise when a court deems them appropriate. As should be clear, the availability of the broad fair use conception is born out of judicial determination or implicit judicial approval in appropriate cases. In all other cases, the familiar view of fair use would apply.

IV. EXISTING COPYRIGHT LAW AND MARKETING

Having proposed our suggested reform of fair use law, we now turn to show how it is consistent with the general trend in copyright law.

As we have noted, fair uses often involve the creation of a follow-on work to an already copyrighted original work. Even when the use is fair,
and the creation of the follow-on work lawful, copyright ownership in the original persists undisturbed, including in those pieces of the original incorporated in the follow-on work. In the absence of a mechanism like our proposal, this doctrinal feature of copyright sets up future clashes between the rights of the creator of the follow-on work (the fair user) and the rights of the owner of the original work. Every use of the follow-on work (such as a public performance) necessarily involves a use of the original work, and thus, absent our proposal, the follow-on work can never be used without a license from the owner of the original work.

Fair uses are not the only instances in which copyright law has had to cope with the fallout of the lawful creation of a follow-on work that incorporates parts of an original work owned by someone else. Indeed, the world of copyright is replete with instances of follow-on works being created lawfully with permission from the owner at the time, only to have ownership of the original work reassigned to someone else who no longer permits use of the derivative work. Fortunately, as we shall see, copyright law has created a number of compromise solutions where owners of an original deny permission to the owner of an already existing follow-on work. These solutions ensure some measure of durability and marketability of rights in a follow-on work after the reassignment of ownership. These compromise solutions share many features with our proposed reform of fair use law.140

Copyright’s termination rights, for instance, give former owners of copyrights the ability, in some cases, to terminate a prior transfer of ownership and thereby to recover ownership of a copyright after many years in which the rights had belonged to the transferee.141 In some cases, the former transferee/owner had properly authorized the creation of a derivative work, but the post-termination owner (the original owner) no longer wishes to license the use of the derivative work. Without some arrangement to ensure the durability and marketability of rights in the now-problematic derivative work, use of the derivative work will depend on the decision of the original owner. That original owner could veto all uses of the derivative work and essentially render it worthless.

140 For a different proposed approach to follow-on works, as part of a comprehensive approach to copyright improvements, see Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989, 992 (1997).
141 See infra Section IV.B.
Fortunately, the law of copyright termination provides for the continued exploitation of derivative works following termination.\textsuperscript{142} In the remainder of this Part, we examine the law of termination rights and other situations in which copyright law has confronted potential clashes between the rights of owners of a copyright in a work and the rights of the owner of a follow-on work. We show that, in such situations, Congress and the courts have employed doctrinal mechanisms similar to our proposed version of fair use to preserve and enhance the marketability of expressive content and prevent copyright holders from blocking the use of works that rely on preexisting content. Specifically, in the remainder of this Part, we discuss three instances that illustrate this dynamic: renewals of copyrights, termination of copyrights, and restoration of copyright protection. In each case, we illustrate the potential problem of durability and marketability and look at the solution already incorporated in copyright law.

\textit{A. Renewals}

Our first example concerns renewal rights. Since the inception of legal copyright protection,\textsuperscript{143} copyrights have been limited in time; no one owns a perpetual copyright in a work of authorship. Today, in most cases, copyrights persist for seventy years after the death of the author.\textsuperscript{144} This unitary term of protection is an innovation of the 1976 Copyright Act.\textsuperscript{145} Historically, the copyright protection term was not unitary. Authors would receive an initial term of protection (fourteen years under the earliest copyright statutes,\textsuperscript{146} but twenty-eight years under the 1909 Copyright Act)\textsuperscript{147} and a right to renew that protection for a second “renewal term” of equal length (another twenty-eight years under the 1909 Act).\textsuperscript{148} While the first protection period was granted to authors

\textsuperscript{142} See id.
\textsuperscript{143} Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., C. 19 (Eng.) (establishing what is commonly understood to be the first legal copyright protection).
\textsuperscript{144} Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
\textsuperscript{146} See id. at 450 n.39 (surveying the history of copyright protection terms under various copyright acts).
\textsuperscript{148} Id.
automatically, the second term was not; authors had to obtain it by following the procedure for renewing their rights.\footnote{Id.} When the 1976 Copyright Act introduced unitary terms, it did not retroactively unify the terms of all copyrights then in existence. Unitary terms applied under the 1976 Act prospectively only; copyrights created on or after the Act’s effective date of January 1, 1978 enjoyed a unitary term.\footnote{See 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 9.01 (Matthew Bender ed., 2021) (reviewing the history of the copyright terms).} Copyrights created earlier than that continued to have bifurcated terms—an original term for twenty-eight years and a longer renewal term (the 1976 Act extended the renewal term to forty-seven years, and later legislation extended it again to sixty-seven years).\footnote{Id. § 9.05.}

This meant that, even after passage of the 1976 Act, owners would have to file their renewal papers on time, and in the proper format, in order to enjoy the full potential term of protection for works created in the decades before the effective date of the 1976 Act. In 1992, Congress relaxed this burden by making renewal automatic.\footnote{Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (1992).} This meant that works created and published with notice between the years of 1964 and 1977 would get the full seventy-five (and later ninety-five) years of protection, but that protection would be divided between a twenty-eight-year original term and an automatically received forty-seven (later sixty-seven) year renewal term.\footnote{Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 9.05.}

From the outset, courts viewed ownership of the renewal right as separate from ownership of the copyright in the initial term of protection.\footnote{See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding the renewal right “creates a new estate, and the few cases which have dealt with the subject assert that the new estate is clear of all rights, interests or licenses granted under the original copyright”).} This was not a far-fetched interpretation. Section 24 of the 1909 Act, for example, specified that “[t]he copyright secured by this title shall endure for twenty-eight years from the date of first publication” before separately establishing that

the author of [a copyrighted] work, if still living, or [the successor designated by law] shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a further term of twenty-eight years when application for such renewal and extension shall have been made to the
copyright office and duly registered therein within one year prior to the expiration of the original term of copyright.\textsuperscript{155} Similar treatment could be found in earlier copyright acts.\textsuperscript{156}

The bifurcation of copyright into two separate sets of rights—one associated with the initial term, and the second associated with the potential renewal term—could be decisive in copyright disputes. If, for instance, Jane Doe wrote a short story, and then sold rights in the story to BigBook Publishing House, courts would view Bigbook as the owner of the first twenty-eight-year term of copyright protection in the short story, but not necessarily as the owner of the renewal right. Unless there were some reasons to read the license otherwise, it would be Doe who retained the renewal right. If Doe properly filed renewal forms in the twenty-eighth year of copyright protection, the short story would then enjoy an additional twenty-eight years of copyright protection, and Doe would be the owner of the copyright during that renewal term.

In the landmark 1943 case of \textit{Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons}, the Supreme Court determined that authors could transfer renewal terms before they were secured.\textsuperscript{157} Thus, a single transfer of rights could cover both the initial term and the renewal period.\textsuperscript{158} In our example, Jane Doe could sell to BigBook Publishing House her renewal term together with the original term of copyright protection if she so desired. However, courts placed some limits on the transfer of renewal terms. The courts noted that the statute did not unambiguously give renewal terms to the author;\textsuperscript{159} the 1909 statute granted the renewal term to the author “if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author’s executors, or in the absence of a will, his next of kin.”\textsuperscript{160} Courts determined that if the author died before securing the renewal term the attempted transfer of the renewal term would be ineffective because the author never had any rights to give; instead, the rights to the renewal

\textsuperscript{156} See Seymour M. Bricker, Renewal and Extension of Copyright, 29 S. Cal. L. Rev. 23, 24 (1955) (outlining the history of copyright renewal and ownership rights in the common law).
\textsuperscript{158} Id.
\textsuperscript{159} See, e.g., De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573 (1956) (“The statute is hardly unambiguous, however, and presents problems of interpretation not solved by literal application of words as they are ‘normally’ used.”).
term would pass to the statutory designees who would be free to ignore the transfer.\footnote{See Jeffrey M. Lowy, When Does the Renewal Term Vest: Before and After the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, 13 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 437, 438–40 (1993).}

This judicial scheme provided the background for the dilemma addressed by the Second Circuit in \textit{Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.}\footnote{551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977).} The 1977 case concerned the George Fitzmaurice film, \textit{The Son of the Sheik} (starring Rudolf Valentino), which had been based on an earlier novel, \textit{The Sons of the Sheik}.\footnote{Id. at 486.} The novel had been written by Edith Maude Hull, who had sold the motion picture rights to Joseph Moskowitz.\footnote{Id.} On the basis of that sale, a film was made, and the film copyright was subsequently sold several times, ending up in the hands of Killiam Shows.\footnote{Id.} Unfortunately, Hull (the author of the novel) died too early to renew her copyright, and the renewal right ended up with her daughter, Cecil Winstanley Hull, who ended up selling all rights in the novel to Rohauer.\footnote{Id.} Thus, Rohauer held the copyright in the novel during the renewal period, while Killiam Shows owned the copyright in the film. Rohauer sought to block a television broadcast of the film. There was no question that the film had been lawfully made and that Killiam Shows lawfully owned the copyright in the film. However, there was also little doubt that the film incorporated large copyrighted parts of the novel (such as its plot).\footnote{Id. at 487.} Rohauer therefore argued that his ownership of the copyright in the novel was sufficient to prevent broadcast of the film.\footnote{Id. at 492–94.}

The court disagreed. Emphasizing that the filmmaker had invested far more in creating the work than an owner of a renewal right who acquired it solely by surviving the original author of the novel, the court found that where a copyright had been established in a derivative work lawfully created by license during the original term, the invalidity of the license in the renewal term due to the untimely demise of the original author could not prevent continued exploitation of the derivative work.\footnote{Id. at 492–94.} Acknowledging that its finding did not precisely match the text of the statute, the court claimed that the statute’s ambiguity, together with
compelling policy reasons, pointed towards viewing the creation of the derivative work as the creation of a broad property right that could override the rights of the owner of the renewal term.\textsuperscript{170} As Nimmer unhappily summarized what he called the “new property right theory” at the heart of the case,

once a derivative [or collective] work is created pursuant to a valid license to use the underlying material, a new property right springs into existence with respect to the entire derivative work, so that even if the license is thereafter terminated, the proprietor of the derivative work may nevertheless continue to use the material from the underlying work as contained in the derivative [or collective] work.\textsuperscript{171}

The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit’s Rohauer ruling in the 1990 case\textit{ Stewart v. Abend}.\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Stewart v. Abend} involved the fate of the famous 1954 Alfred Hitchcock movie \textit{Rear Window}, starring Jimmy Stewart. The movie was based on a 1942 short story by Cornell Woolrich, entitled \textit{It Had to Be a Murder}.\textsuperscript{173} Woolrich had sold motion picture rights to the short story for both the original and renewal terms to BG De Sylva Productions;\textsuperscript{174} eventually the rights were purchased from De Sylva’s successors in interest by Alfred Hitchcock and Jimmy Stewart’s company, Patron.\textsuperscript{175} Unfortunately, Woolrich died in 1968 without getting the opportunity to renew the copyright. Woolrich’s transfer of the renewal term was thus ineffective (because Woolrich had never owned it), and ownership of the renewal term fell to the executor of the estate and, ultimately, to Sheldon Abend.\textsuperscript{176} The movie \textit{Rear Window} came out in 1954, during the initial term of copyright, and therefore was solidly within the terms of Hitchcock and Stewart’s right to create and exploit the derivative work during the copyright’s initial period of protection (1942 to 1970). However, in 1971, ABC television broadcast \textit{Rear Window} on the basis of a license from Stewart and Hitchcock.\textsuperscript{177} Abend objected. According to Abend, while Stewart and Hitchcock rightly owned the copyright in \textit{Rear Window}, there were plot elements of the movie that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{171} Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 3.07.
\item \textsuperscript{172} 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
\item \textsuperscript{173} Id. at 211–12.
\item \textsuperscript{174} Id. at 212.
\item \textsuperscript{175} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{176} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Id.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
came from the short story, and those elements were not part of the *Rear Window* copyright but, rather, part of the short story copyright. Abend claimed that as the owner of the copyright in the short story during the renewal term, he had the right to prevent any broadcasting of the plot elements in any form, including in the form of a legitimately created derivative work.

Rejecting the reasoning of *Rohauer*, the Supreme Court sided with Abend. The Court found that nothing in the language of the Copyright Act granted any rights to the owners of follow-on works to continue using material within the copyright of the original work without permission. The Court brushed aside policy concerns, saying “[t]hese arguments are better addressed by Congress than the courts.”

Congress did not take long. Only two years after the Court’s ruling in *Stewart v. Abend*, Congress enacted the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, which provides in relevant part that

If an application to register a claim to the renewed and extended term of copyright in a work is not made within 1 year before the expiration of the original term of copyright in a work, or if the claim pursuant to such application is not registered, then a derivative work prepared under authority of a grant of a transfer or license of the copyright that is made before the expiration of the original term of copyright may continue to be used under the terms of the grant during the renewed and extended term of copyright without infringing the copyright, except that such use does not extend to the preparation during such renewed and extended term of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by such grant.

This turgid provision, appearing today in section 304(a)(4)(A) of the Copyright Act, partially reverses the ruling in *Stewart v. Abend* and partially restores the rule of *Rohauer v. Killian*. However, the reversal only applies in a narrow set of cases—in cases where the owner of the renewal term failed to file the required forms and instead relied upon the Copyright Act’s automatic renewal for works published between the

---

178 Id.
179 Id. at 212–14.
180 Id. at 223–24.
181 Id. at 228.
years of 1964 and 1977.\footnote{See Lowy, supra note 161, at 468–69 ("The main purpose of the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 is to provide a system of automatic renewal of copyrights.").} In that narrow set of cases, anyone who made a properly licensed derivative work during the original term of protection could continue to use it during the renewal term as if the grant for the original term remained in force throughout the renewal term.\footnote{Id. at 473.} In all other cases, the ruling in \textit{Stewart v. Abend} continues to apply.\footnote{Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).}

Congress’s decision to overturn the Supreme Court ruling in \textit{Stewart v. Abend} in part and to allow for the continued marketability, use, and enjoyment of preexisting derivative works is consistent with the logic of our proposal. Our proposal, like Congress’s corrective legislation, aims to nurture downstream markets by clearing away unnecessary and burdensome transaction and coordination costs.

\textbf{B. Terminations}

A related instance in which copyright law has incorporated protections for the durability and marketability of follow-on works can be found in the law of terminations.

As we noted, the 1976 Copyright Act replaced the two-term copyright protection of previous versions of the copyright act with a unitary term.\footnote{Lowy, supra note 161, at 471–72.} In doing so, the 1976 Copyright Act ensured that legal difficulties associated with renewal terms would gradually disappear, since copyrighted works created after the effective date of January 1, 1978 would not require renewal. (Old works continued to have a renewal term, but renewal became automatic.)\footnote{17 U.S.C. § 203(a).} This reform ought to have greatly simplified questions of ownership. It did not.

While phasing out the renewal term, Congress created a new mechanism for undoing copyright transfers. The Copyright Act now allows authors (or their designated successors) to terminate most transfers and to regain the copyright after a certain period of time.\footnote{17 U.S.C. § 203(a).} The termination rules are exceptionally complex, requiring notice to be served upon transferees two to ten years before the precise date of termination, which must fall within a statutorily defined five-year window. The statute creates six different ways to calculate the five-year window, depending
on the date of the transfer, whether the work was published, and whether the transfer had previously been eligible for termination.  

Generally, the aim of the scheme is described as openly paternalistic—to give authors the opportunity to resell copyrights after having already sold them a first time. On this view, authors benefit by being forced to sell fewer rights in an initial transaction so they can then sell the remaining rights in a later transaction, after the market for the copyrighted work has fully developed (or disappeared). A different explanation for the termination rules focuses on the windfall resulting from the extended terms that were adopted after the reform of copyright rules. Together, the 1976 Act and the later Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 retroactively extended the duration of copyright rights by as much as thirty-seven years. These extensions bestowed a windfall on the owners of valuable copyrights. Termination rights permit authors to seize a part or all of the windfall from transferees, in a situation where neither anticipated the future windfall at the time of the initial transfer.  

As with the ownership rules of renewal terms, termination rights create the potential for a clash between owners of rights in the original work, and owners of rights in a lawfully created follow-on work. It is possible, for example, for a comic book author to sell to a movie studio all motion picture rights and then, many years later, for the author to terminate the sale and recover all the previously transferred rights in the comic book. If, in the meantime, the movie studio had made several movies on the basis of the rights it had purchased, the studio would still own copyright in the film, but it would be unable to use the films because the films would

---

190 Id. §§ 203(a), 304(c)-(d).  
191 See, e.g., Kristelia A. Garcia and Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term, 71 Ala. L. Rev. 351 (2019) (noting that “[l]ike termination rights, rights reversion gives the creator a second bite of the apple by reversing an artist’s original transfer of copyright ownership, thereby transferring ownership over a work’s copyright back from an intermediary to the original artist”).  
192 Lydia Pallas Loren, Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the “Inalienable” Right to Terminate, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 1329, at 1345–46 (2010).  
193 See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 11.02[A][3].  
naturally incorporate characters, plot lines, and even dialogue from the comic books.

Congress, however, more adroitly navigated this potential clash of interests than it did with respect to conflicts over renewal terms. Section 304(c)(6)(A) of the Copyright Act provides that

[a] derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its termination may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after its termination, but this privilege does not extend to the preparation after the termination of other derivative works based upon the copyrighted work covered by the terminated grant.\(^{196}\)

The result of this provision is that if the lawfully created follow-on work is a derivative work, as the term is defined by the copyright, the owner of the follow-on work should prevail in a clash with the owner of the original rights. The owner of the follow-on work, and other lawful licensees of the follow-on work, will be able to continue using the work, so long as they abide by the terms of the pre-termination grant. This arrangement shares the logic of our proposal: to facilitate the use of legitimately created follow-on works.

\textit{C. Restored Copyright}

Problems associated with transitory personal rights have also arisen in cases of “restored copyrights.” Restored copyrights are the result of a pair of laws adopted by Congress as part of the United States’ accession to the Berne Convention: the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988\(^{197}\) (effective date March 1, 1989), in which the United States joined the Berne Convention, and the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994\(^{198}\) (effective date January 1, 1995), in which the United States amended its copyright law in various ways to fall into line with legal standards demanded by international trade treaties. The new laws granted retroactive copyright protection to foreign works, which had enjoyed copyright protection in other countries but were not protected in the United States due to their failure to abide by legal formalities that were once part of the law but are no longer—such as the requirement to place

The laws created a category of “restored copyrights”—copyrights in works that had spent years or decades in the public domain in the United States but, as of January 1, 1996, found themselves “restored” to the hands of the original author.

To understand how restored copyrights work, consider the following example. Alexis Author, a resident of London, wrote and published a novel in 1955 called *Good England*. In 1958, Alexis Author authorized American Publishers, Inc. to sell copies of the novel in the United States; unfortunately, American Publishers failed to include the copyright notice in each copy required by U.S. law at the time. Publication without notice in 1958 thus stripped the novel of any copyright protection in the United States even though the novel continued to enjoy copyright protection in Britain. Section 104A of the Copyright Act (as rewritten by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994) automatically restored Alexis Author’s rights to *Good England* in the United States as of January 1, 1996; Alexis’s U.S. rights in her novel will therefore remain in force for ninety-five years, through 2053.

Restored copyrights have the potential to pose problems for follow-on works created during the period when the work lacked copyright protection. Consider what would happen if, in the above example involving Alexis Author’s British novel, the American company Movie Studios, Inc. decided to make a film version of *Good England* in 1960, during the period when the novel *Good England* was in the public domain in the United States. Obviously, in 1960, Movie Studios would not need any sort of license to create its movie, since the novel was in the public domain at the time. However, after January 1, 1996, any public showing of the movie would necessarily involve a public performance of those parts of the novel incorporated in the film. As in the cases of derivative works in the renewal term, or after termination, the film would be a follow-on work that had been lawfully created but could no longer be lawfully used.

In the case of restored copyrights, the problem did not escape the notice of Congress. Section 104A specifically addresses the case of “reliance

---


200 See Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 150, at § 9A.04[A][1][a].

201 Id. §§ 7.02–7.03.

parties”—parties who relied on the public domain status of the work prior to the restoration of copyright to engage in actions that would be copyright infringements had the works been protected, and who continued to engage in such actions after restoration of the copyright. The statute gives reliance parties certain rights to continue using the work in ways that would otherwise be seen as infringements: a statutory license to continue using derivative works and a grace period for other uses.

The statute gives reliance parties certain rights to continue using derivative works and a grace period for other uses. The grace period lasts one year, but the onset of the period is not the date of copyright restoration. Rather, the grace period begins when the reliance party receives notice (or is constructively put on notice) that the restored copyright owner intends to enforce her rights. During the one-year grace period, the reliance party can continue to use the work in ways that would be considered infringing, including distributing, performing, and displaying the work, and authorizing others to do the same.

Derivative works based upon a work with restored copyright enjoy even more rights. As long as the derivative work was created a sufficient time before restoration (before the effective date of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act or, in certain cases, before the joining of the Berne Convention and other treaties by the foreign country source of the restored work), reliance parties can continue using the derivative work indefinitely, without permission of the owner of the restored copyright. The statute simply requires that the reliance party pay compensation to the owner of the restored copyright. If the parties cannot agree on compensation, courts are instructed to set a rate that reflects “any harm to the actual or potential market for or value of the restored work from the reliance party’s continued exploitation of the work, as well as compensation for the relative contributions of expression of the author of the restored work and the reliance party to the derivative work.”

---

203 Id.
204 Id. § 104A(d)(3)(A) (“[A] reliance party may continue to exploit that derivative work for the duration of the restored copyright if the reliance party pays to the owner of the restored copyright reasonable compensation for conduct which would be subject to a remedy for infringement . . . .”).
205 Id. § 104A(d)(2)(B) (outlining a twelve-month grace period for reliance parties beginning on the date notice is given of intent to restore a copyright).
206 Id.
208 Id. § 104A(d)(3).
209 Id.
As our discussion demonstrates, in its approach to copyright restoration, Congress aimed to ensure the continued use of derivative works that were based on foreign works that were unprotected at that time. The same concern is the driving force behind our proposal to create a property version of fair use.

CONCLUSION

In this Article, we call for a radical transformation in the fair use doctrine—not in determining when uses are “fair” but, rather, in delineating the scope of the protection afforded by fair use findings. Today, fair use is personal and individualized. A fair use ruling helps only the individual defendant who was sued for copyright infringement and protects only the challenged use or uses by that defendant. Her victory does not carry over to others who receive permission to use her work that incorporates the fair use. We call for the introduction of a new fair use conception modelled as a property incident. The property version of fair use would provide immunity to any third party who uses derivative works that fairly incorporate copyrighted content with permission from the fair user. Fair use rulings would benefit all those that lawfully use, perform, distribute, and adapt follow-on works in which copyrighted content is fairly embedded (i.e., incorporated by right of fair use). Downstream users of the follow-on work would no longer need to engage in any bargaining with the owner of the original source work; it would suffice for them to obtain a license from the fair user who created the follow-on work.

Implementation of our proposal would give courts broad discretion to decide which fair use, if any, to recognize in cases brought before them. To assist courts, we propose two default rules that would apply when a court fails to specify which of the two fair use conceptions it has selected. In cases involving derivative works that incorporate preexisting copyright content, the property version of fair use should apply and run to subsequent users of the derivative work. In other cases, the traditional in personam version should govern. Courts would retain the discretion to diverge from the default rules by, for example, creating an in personam fair use for a derivative work. The reform we propose would benefit not only users but also creators who fairly rely on preexisting materials, as it would dramatically enhance the marketability, and thus the value, of their works. The proposal is fully consistent with the general trend in copyright law to protect marketability even at the expense of the veto power of the
original work owner. At the same time, our remedy respects the judicial autonomy that has traditionally characterized fair use rulings.

Copyright law is not exclusively concerned with the production of original expressive content; it also seeks to promote the use of works after they have been created. One of the central purposes of the fair use doctrine is to ensure such future use. Without reform, the fair use doctrine cannot afford adequate protection to user interests. We submit that our proposed reform would follow in the footsteps of similar accommodations already made by copyright law to protect the rights and interests of follow-on users and creators. An in rem conception of fair use that exists alongside the traditional in personam fair use privilege can bring about an improved balance in copyright law between the rights of creators and those of follow-on users.